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    政大機構典藏 > 文學院 > 哲學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/128123
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/128123

    Title: 淺析個人同一性
    A Brief Analysis of Personal Identity
    Authors: 郭澄澄
    Guo, Cheng-Cheng
    Contributors: 鄭光明
    Guo, Cheng-Cheng
    Keywords: 個人同一性
    Personal Identity
    Physical Continuity
    Physical Continuity
    Date: 2019
    Issue Date: 2020-01-03 15:56:41 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 個人同一性問題出現在對於生存和責任等重要議題的分析中,在自由意志問題、道德哲學問題、法律責任和死亡等重大議題方面有著舉足輕重的地位,因此對個人同一性條件的充分討論有重要的哲學和現實意義。個人同一性問題的主要內容是人如何通過時間而持續存在,與每個人的日常生活息息相關。隨著現代技術的不斷發展,機器人、AI智能、AR、VR等技術的普遍應用,「人」的概念越來越受到關注和討論。而隨著意識提取和人體冷凍等科技的進展,永生和肉體死後存活的可能性越來越收到期待。如果在肉體死亡之後還有一個人生存,他需要具備哪些條件才能成為我,這也是個人同一性的重要討論內容之一。
    Personal identity problems appear in the analysis of important issues such as survival and responsibility, and play a pivotal role in major issues such as free will, moral philosophy, legal responsibility and death. Therefore, the full discussion of personal identity conditions has important philosophical and practical significance. The main content of personal identity problem is how people persist through time and closely related to everyone's daily life. With the continuous development of modern technology, the universal application of robots, AI intelligence, AR, VR and other technologies, the concept of "person" has received more and more attention and discussion. With the advancement of technology such as consciousness extraction and body freezing, the possibility of eternal life and survival after the death of the body is increasingly expected. If there is another person after the physical death, what conditions do he need to have? This is also one of the important discussions of personal identity.
    This article takes the whole process of thinking about the reality of personal identity problems, and studies the history of personal identity. This paper mainly introduces and sorts out the main reduction theories and debates on personal identity in the history of philosophy, and divides them into physical continuity theory and psychological continuity theory. The theory of physical continuity believes that persons are nothing but human animals or organisms, and then reduced to the brain, so as long as they have physical continuity, they can be the same person. Psychological continuity theorist believes that people and animals have different psychological factors such as memory, desire, intention and belief. Therefore, the condition of personal identity requires the continuous existence of psychological elements. However, both the theory of physical continuity and the theory of psychological continuity have problems that cannot be solved. Therefore, Parfit puts forward a discussion on the importance of personal identity in his book, "Reasons and Persons," and believes that personal identity itself is not important at all. What really matters is the relationship R, which is the psychological connection and/or continuity of the right cause, and the correct cause can be any relationship. Even Parfit has solved the problems faced by the theory of personal identity in the past, but it also directly dispels the meaning of personal identity and makes the discussion about personal identity become illusory.
    After analyzing their respective advantages and disadvantages and facing problems that cannot be solved by moral and legal issues, I put forward my own views and tries to make up for the theory of psychological continuity, on the basis of paying attention to the practical significance of intuition. By examining a series of thought experiments, I find that man is not a constant stable entity, but a constantly changing self-organization process, with a history traceable from the third-person view, in which psychological continuity is the key condition of personal identity. However, the discussion in this article still has a lot of limitations, and there are many problems that cannot be solved.
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    Description: 碩士
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106154015
    Data Type: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU201901293
    Appears in Collections:[哲學系] 學位論文

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