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| 题名: | 淺析個人同一性
A Brief Analysis of Personal Identity |
| 作者: | 郭澄澄
Guo, Cheng-Cheng |
| 贡献者: | 鄭光明
郭澄澄
Guo, Cheng-Cheng |
| 关键词: | 個人同一性
物理連續性
心理連續性
第三人稱
Personal Identity
Physical Continuity
Physical Continuity
Third-Person |
| 日期: | 2019 |
| 上传时间: | 2020-01-03 15:56:41 (UTC+8) |
| 摘要: | 個人同一性問題出現在對於生存和責任等重要議題的分析中，在自由意志問題、道德哲學問題、法律責任和死亡等重大議題方面有著舉足輕重的地位，因此對個人同一性條件的充分討論有重要的哲學和現實意義。個人同一性問題的主要內容是人如何通過時間而持續存在，與每個人的日常生活息息相關。隨著現代技術的不斷發展，機器人、AI智能、AR、VR等技術的普遍應用，「人」的概念越來越受到關注和討論。而隨著意識提取和人體冷凍等科技的進展，永生和肉體死後存活的可能性越來越收到期待。如果在肉體死亡之後還有一個人生存，他需要具備哪些條件才能成為我，這也是個人同一性的重要討論內容之一。
本文全程帶著對個人同一性問題現實意義的思考，研究個人同一性問題的歷史，主要就哲學史上有關個人同一性的主要還原論觀點與辯論進行簡要介紹和梳理，將其分為物理連續性理論和心理連續性理論。物理連續性理論家認為，人不過是人類動物或有機體，而後縮減為大腦理論，因此，只要具有物理連續性，就可以是同一個人。心理理論家則認為，人和動物不同，具有記憶、慾望、意圖和信念等多種心理因素，因此個人同一性的條件需要心理要素的連續存在。然而物理連續性理論和心理連續性理論都具有無法解決的問題，因此Parfit在其著作《理與人》中提出了關於個人同一性重要性的討論，認為個人同一性本身並不重要，重要的是其寓於的關係R，即擁有正確原因的心理的聯繫性和/或者連續性，並且正確原因可以是任何關係。僅管Parfit釜底抽薪地解決了過去個人同一性理論面臨的問題，但也直接消解了個人同一性的意義，讓關於個人同一性的討論成為虛妄。
筆者在分析各自的利弊，以及面對道德和法律問題無法解決的問題後，提出了自己的觀點，試圖在重視直覺和個人同一性的現實意義的基礎上，彌補個人同一性心理連續性理論的缺口。通過考察一系列思想實驗和科幻案例，筆者發現，人並不是一個不變的穩定實體，而是不斷變化的自我組織過程，具有一段從第三人稱可追溯的歷史，其中心理連續性是個人同一性的關鍵條件。但本文的討論依然具有很大的局限性，存在很多無法解決的問題以待進一步發展。
Personal identity problems appear in the analysis of important issues such as survival and responsibility, and play a pivotal role in major issues such as free will, moral philosophy, legal responsibility and death. Therefore, the full discussion of personal identity conditions has important philosophical and practical significance. The main content of personal identity problem is how people persist through time and closely related to everyone`s daily life. With the continuous development of modern technology, the universal application of robots, AI intelligence, AR, VR and other technologies, the concept of "person" has received more and more attention and discussion. With the advancement of technology such as consciousness extraction and body freezing, the possibility of eternal life and survival after the death of the body is increasingly expected. If there is another person after the physical death, what conditions do he need to have? This is also one of the important discussions of personal identity.
This article takes the whole process of thinking about the reality of personal identity problems, and studies the history of personal identity. This paper mainly introduces and sorts out the main reduction theories and debates on personal identity in the history of philosophy, and divides them into physical continuity theory and psychological continuity theory. The theory of physical continuity believes that persons are nothing but human animals or organisms, and then reduced to the brain, so as long as they have physical continuity, they can be the same person. Psychological continuity theorist believes that people and animals have different psychological factors such as memory, desire, intention and belief. Therefore, the condition of personal identity requires the continuous existence of psychological elements. However, both the theory of physical continuity and the theory of psychological continuity have problems that cannot be solved. Therefore, Parfit puts forward a discussion on the importance of personal identity in his book, "Reasons and Persons," and believes that personal identity itself is not important at all. What really matters is the relationship R, which is the psychological connection and/or continuity of the right cause, and the correct cause can be any relationship. Even Parfit has solved the problems faced by the theory of personal identity in the past, but it also directly dispels the meaning of personal identity and makes the discussion about personal identity become illusory.
After analyzing their respective advantages and disadvantages and facing problems that cannot be solved by moral and legal issues, I put forward my own views and tries to make up for the theory of psychological continuity, on the basis of paying attention to the practical significance of intuition. By examining a series of thought experiments, I find that man is not a constant stable entity, but a constantly changing self-organization process, with a history traceable from the third-person view, in which psychological continuity is the key condition of personal identity. However, the discussion in this article still has a lot of limitations, and there are many problems that cannot be solved. |
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| 描述: | 碩士
國立政治大學
哲學系
106154015 |
| 資料來源: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106154015 |
| 数据类型: | thesis |
| DOI: | 10.6814/NCCU201901293 |
| 显示于类别: | [哲學系] 學位論文
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