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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/128695

    Title: Environmental policy competition and heterogeneous capital endowments
    Authors: 賴育邦
    Lai, Yu-Bong
    Contributors: 財政系
    Keywords: Environmental scarcity rents;Interjurisdictional competition;International trade;Mobile capital;Monopolistic competition
    Date: 2019-02
    Issue Date: 2020-02-20 13:12:28 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: In a model with monopolistic competition, international trade, and mobile capital, this paper aims to investigate the relationship between two countries with different capital endowments in terms of environmental regulations. The conventional result is that the capital-abundant country will charge a higher tax rate than the capital-scarce country. This present paper, however, finds that the opposite result may occur. Another feature of this paper is that governments strategically use the distribution of environmental rents as a tool to attract capital inflows. We show that in the absence of capital mobility, the two countries will distribute all of the pollution tax revenues to the general public. The presence of capital mobility induces the governments to allocate some or all of the environmental rents to the polluting firms to attract capital inflows. The capital-abundant country has a stronger incentive to allocate rents to the firms than the capital-scarce country. We also consider the case with global pollution, in which both countries tend to set less stringent regulations.
    Relation: Regional Science and Urban Economics, Vol.Volume 75, pp.107-119
    Data Type: article
    DOI 連結: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2019.01.011
    DOI: 10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2019.01.011
    Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 期刊論文

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