政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/130506

English | 正體中文 | 简体中文 | Post-Print筆數 : 27 | 全文笔数/总笔数 : 111316/142225 (78%)
造访人次 : 48376911 在线人数 : 798

RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.

搜寻范围

查询小技巧：

您可在西文检索词汇前后加上"双引号"，以获取较精准的检索结果

若欲以作者姓名搜寻，建议至进阶搜寻限定作者字段，可获得较完整数据

进阶搜寻

主页 ‧ 登入 ‧ 上传 ‧ 说明 ‧ 关于政大典藏 ‧ 管理

到手机版

政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 學位論文 > Item 140.119/130506

请使用永久网址来引用或连结此文件: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/130506

题名:	以資訊揭露的觀點來看審計公費揭露方式與企業超額現金持有的關聯性 Audit Fee Disclosure and Corporate Cash Holdings: A Disclosure Perspective
作者:	何家瑜 Ho, Chia-Yu
贡献者:	潘健民 Pan, Chien-Min 何家瑜 Ho, Chia-Yu
关键词:	資訊揭露超額現金持有審計公費 Information Disclosure Excess Cash Holdings Audit Fees
日期:	2020
上传时间:	2020-07-01 13:34:12 (UTC+8)
摘要:	本篇研究為探討企業超額現金持有與審計公費揭露方式之關聯，欲了解企業是否透過個別金額揭露之方式來揭露審計公費，以增加企業的資訊揭露。本次研究之實證結果發現，企業超額現金持有數愈高，企業有愈高的機率選擇以個別金額揭露之方式來揭露審計公費。本篇研究透過企業超額現金持有與審計公費級距金額揭露之關聯及企業超額現金持有與審計公費個別金額揭露之關聯等兩項追加測試，以進一步了解當企業超額現金持有數愈高，企業審計公費之級距金額或個別金額是否愈高。兩項追加測試之實證結果發現，當企業超額現金持有數愈高，企業之審計公費級距金額與個別金額愈高，表示當企業超額現金持有數愈高，企業有愈高的意願採用個別金額揭露方式來揭露審計公費，企業審計公費也愈高。 This study examines the association between corporate excess cash holdings and audit fee disclosures. I investigate whether excess cash holdings affect firms’ choices between individual amount disclosure of audit fees or the fee range disclosure of audit fees. The reasoning behind this is that firms might communicate their excess cash holdings level through the ways they disclose audit fees and firms with a higher level of excess cash holdings are more likely to choose individual amount disclosure of audit fees. The empirical results indicate that firms with more excess cash holdings are more likely to choose individual amount disclosure of audit fees, as expected. I conduct two further analyses to learn more information of the main results. I test the association between excess cash holdings and the fee range of audit fees and the association between excess cash holdings and individual amount of audit fees. I find that firms with have higher level of excess cash holdings are more likely to have higher level of audit fees. The results also indicate that firms with higher level of excess cash holdings also pay higher audit fees.
參考文獻:	上市上櫃公司治理實務守則(民109年2月13日)。證券發行人財務報告編製準則(民108年3月18日)。公開發行公司年報應行記載事項準則(民109年1月22日)。公司募集發行有價證券公開說明書應行記載事項準則(民109年1月22日)。機構投資人盡責管理守則(民105年6月30日)。國家發展委員會(1994)。〈強化公司治理政策綱領暨行動方案〉。金融監督管理委員會證券期貨局(2020)。〈2013強化我國公司治理藍圖〉。行政院(2002)。〈挑戰2008：國家發展重點計畫(2002-2007) 〉。 Antunovich, P. 1996. Optimal slack policy under asymmetric information. Unpublished paper, Northwestern University. Bates, T. W., K. M. Kahle, and R. M. Stulz. 2009. Why do US firms hold so much more cash than they used to? The Journal of Finance 64 (5): 1985-2021. Bartov, E., I. Krinsky, and J. Lee. 1998. Evidence on how companies choose between dividends and open‐market stock repurchases. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 11 (1): 89-96. Bell, T. B., R. Doogar, and I. Solomon. 2008. Audit labor usage and fees under business risk auditing. Journal of Accounting Research 46 (4): 729-760. Blokdijk, H., F. Drieenhuizen, D. A. Simunic, and M. T. Stein. 2003. Factors affecting auditors` assessments of planning materiality. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 22 (2): 297-307. Choi, J. H., C. Kim, J. B. Kim, and Y. Zang. 2010. Audit office size, audit quality, and audit pricing. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 29 (1): 73-97. Comment, R., and G. A. Jarrell. 1991. The relative signalling power of Dutch‐auction and fixed‐price self‐tender offers and open‐market share repurchases. The Journal of Finance 46 (4): 1243-1271. Copley, P. A., and E. B. Jr. Douthett 2009. Are assurance services provided by auditors on initial public offerings influenced by market conditions? Contemporary Accounting Research 26 (2): 453-476. Dann, L. Y. 1981. Common stock repurchases: An analysis of returns to bondholders and stockholders. Journal of Financial Economics 9 (2): 113-138. DeFond, M., and J. Zhang. 2014. A review of archival auditing research. Journal of Accounting and Economics 58 (2-3): 275-326. Diamond, D. W., and R. E. Verrcchia. 1991. Disclosure, liquidity, and the cost of capital. The Journal of Finance 46 (4): 1325-1359. Dopuch, N., and D. Simunic. 1982. Competition in auditing: An assessment. Symposium on Auditing Research. 4th edition. Urbana-Champaign, University of Illinois. Epps, R. W., and S. J. Cereola. 2008. Do institutional shareholder services (ISS) corporate governance ratings reflect a company`s operating performance? Critical Perspectives on Accounting 19 (8): 1135-1148. Francis, J. R. 2004. A What do we know about audit quality? The British Accounting Review 36 (4): 345-368. Francis, J. R. 2011. A framework for understanding and researching audit quality. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 30 (2): 125-152. Francis, J. R., D. Nanda, and P. Olsson. 2008. Voluntary disclosure, earnings quality, and cost of capital. Journal of Accounting Research 46 (1): 53-99. Francis, J. R., and M. D. Yu. 2009. Big 4 office size and audit quality. The Accounting Review 84 (5): 1521-1552. Fenn, G., and N. Liang. 2001. Corporate payout policy and managerial stock incentives. Journal of Financial Economics 60 (1): 45-72. Hackenbrack, K., and W. R. Knechel. 1997. Resource allocation decisions in audit engagements. Contemporary Accounting Research 14 (3): 481-500. Harford, J. 1999. Corporate cash reserves and acquisitions. The Journal of Finance 54 (6): 1969-1997. Hay, D. C., W. R. Knechel, and N. Wong. 2006. Audit fees: A meta‐analysis of the effect of supply and demand attributes. Contemporary Accounting Research 23 (1): 141-191. Ikenberry, D., J. Lakonishok, and T. Vermaelen. 1995. Market underreaction to open market share repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics 39 (2-3): 181-208. Iskander, M., and N. Chamlou. 2000. Corporate governance: A framework for implementation. The World Bank. Jensen, M. C. 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. The American Economic Review 76 (2): 323-329. Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (4): 305-360. Jha, A., and Y. Chen. 2015. Audit fees and social capital. The Accounting Review 90 (2): 611-639. Johnstone, K. M., and J. C. Bedard. 2004. Audit firm portfolio management decisions. Journal of Accounting Research 42 (4): 659-690. Jolls, C. 1998. Stock repurchases and incentive compensation. Working paper, National Bureau of Economic Research. Kahle, M. K. 2002. When a buyback isn’t a buyback: Open market repurchases and employee option. Journal of Finance 63 (2): 235-261. Knechel, W. R. 2000. Auditing: Assurance and risk. 2th edition. UK, Routledge. Knechel, W. R., V. Naiker, and G. Pacheco. 2007. Does auditor industry specialization matter? Evidence from market reaction to auditor switches. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 26 (1): 19-45. Knechel, W. R., A. Vanstraelen, and M. Zerni. 2015. Does the identity of engagement partners matter? An analysis of audit partner reporting decisions. Contemporary Accounting Research 32 (4): 1443-1478. Lennox, C., X. Wu, and T. Zhang. 2014. Does mandatory rotation of audit partners improve audit quality? The Accounting Review 89 (5): 1775-1803. Michas, P. N. 2011. The importance of audit profession development in emerging market countries. The Accounting Review 86 (5): 1731-1764. Nelson, M. W., J. A. Elliott, and R. L. Tarpley. 2002. Evidence from auditors about managers` and auditors` earnings management decisions. The Accounting Review 77 (s-1): 175-202. Opler, T., L. Pinkowitz, R. Stulz, and R. Williamson. 1999. The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings. Journal of Financial Economics 52 (1): 3-46. Opler, T., and S. Titman. 1994. Financial distress and corporate performance. Journal of Finance 49: 1015-1040. Pearson, T., and G. Trompeter. 1994. Competition in the market for audit services: The effect of supplier concentration on audit fees. Contemporary Accounting Research 11 (1): 91-114. Pinkowitz L., and R. Willamson. 2001. Bank power and cash holdings: Evidence from Japan. The Review of Financial Studies 14 (4): 1059-1082. Pinkowitz, L., R. M. Stulz, and R. Williamson. 2015. Do US firms hold more cash than foreign firms do? The Review of Financial Studies 29 (2): 309-348. Rajan, R. G., and L. Zingales. 1995. What do we know about capital structure? Some evidence from international data. The Journal of Finance 50 (5): 1421-1460. Siems, M., and O. S. Alvarez-Macotela. 2015. The G20/OECD principles of corporate governance 2015: A critical assessment of their operation and impact. Simunic, D. A. 1980. The pricing of audit services: Theory and evidence. Journal of Accounting Research 22 (3): 161-90. Skinner, D. J., and S. Srinivasan. 2012. Audit quality and auditor reputation: Evidence from Japan. The Accounting Review 87 (5): 1737-1765. Turpen, R. A. 1990. Differential pricing on auditors’ initial engagements: Further evidence. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 9 (2): 60-76. Vermaelen, T. 1981. Common stock repurchases and market signalling: An empirical study. Journal of Financial Economics 9 (2): 139-183. Watts, R. L., and J. L. Zimmerman. 1983. Agency problems, auditing, and the theory of the firm: Some evidence. The Journal of Law and Economics 26 (3): 613-633. Weber, J., M. Willenborg, and J. Zhang. 2008. Does auditor reputation matter? The case of KPMG Germany and ComROAD AG. Journal of Accounting Research 46 (4): 941-972. Weisbenner, S. J. 2000. Corporate share repurchases in the 1990s: What role do stock options play? Working paper, University of Illinois.
描述:	碩士國立政治大學會計學系 107353018
資料來源:	http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107353018
数据类型:	thesis
DOI:	10.6814/NCCU202000566
显示于类别:	[會計學系] 學位論文

文件中的档案:

没有与此文件相关的档案.

在政大典藏中所有的数据项都受到原著作权保护.

社群 sharing

著作權政策宣告 Copyright Announcement

1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏，無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用，惟仍請適度，合理使用本網站之內容，以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用，則請先取得著作權人之授權。
The digital content of this website is part of National Chengchi University Institutional Repository. It provides free access to academic research and public education for non-commercial use. Please utilize it in a proper and reasonable manner and respect the rights of copyright owners. For commercial use, please obtain authorization from the copyright owner in advance.

2.本網站之製作，已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益，如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者，請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw)，維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
NCCU Institutional Repository is made to protect the interests of copyright owners. If you believe that any material on the website infringes copyright, please contact our staff(nccur@nccu.edu.tw). We will remove the work from the repository and investigate your claim.

DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004 MIT & Hewlett-Packard / Enhanced by NTU Library IR team Copyright © - 回馈