English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 27 |  Items with full text/Total items : 109952/140887 (78%)
Visitors : 46287666      Online Users : 931
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version
    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/130939
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/130939


    Title: 關鍵查核事項與債務契約條款
    The relationship between key audit matters and loan contract terms
    Authors: 韓佳軒
    Han, Chia-Hsuan
    Contributors: 金成隆
    Chin, Chen-Lung
    韓佳軒
    Han, Chia-Hsuan
    Keywords: 關鍵查核事項
    債務契約
    Key audit matters
    Loan contract
    Date: 2020
    Issue Date: 2020-08-03 17:28:51 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本文旨在探討關鍵查核事項與企業向銀行借款時所設定之債務契約條款之關聯性。其中,關鍵查核事項是以其報導字數、報導之項目數、報導次數之排名以及是否報導金額作為衡量變數;債務契約條款之衡量變數則包含借款利率、借款期間、借款是否要求抵押以及借款之金額。
    本文實證結果如下:第一,關鍵查核事項之報導字數較多,可幫助企業債務人取得較較高的借款金額以及減少提供抵押品要求的可能之債務契約;第二,關鍵查核事項報導之項目越多,則企業債務人可以取得較低之借款利率、不需要抵押品的契約以及較高之借款金額;第三,關鍵查核事項報導次數之排名越高,會促使銀行債權人給予較高之借款利率、較短之借款期間、較少的借款金額以及要求抵押品之契約。第四,關鍵查核事項中若有揭露相關之金額,則銀行債權人會給予較低的借款利率、較多的借款金額以及不需要抵押品的債務契約。本研究進一步測試關鍵查核事項揭露金額之多寡是否會對債務契約訂定產生影響,研究結果表明揭露金額越高,企業債務人可以取得較低之借款利率、較長的借款時間、較多的借款金額以及不需要抵押品之債務契約,亦即關鍵查核事項揭露完整性的提升,能夠促使銀行債權人給予較優惠的債務契約條款。
    The objective of this thesis is to investigate the relationship between key audit matters (KAMs) and loan contract terms of commercial bank. In this study, I use number of words, number of reported items, rank of reported category and whether the amount is reported in KAMs as measurement variables, while the loan contract terms are measured by loan interest rate, loan duration, loan amounts and whether the contracts required collateral.
    The empirical results of this study can be summarized as follow: First, the debtor can get higher amount of loan and the loan contract without collateral when the word count in KAM is higher. Second, the debtor can get lower loan rates, contract without collateral and higher loan amount when the number of item in KAM is higher. Third, creditor will provide higher loan rates, shorter loan period, lower loan amount and contract with collateral when the rank of the times of KAM category reported is higher. Forth, this study shows that creditor will provide lower loan rates, higher loan amount and loan contract without collateral when there is disclosure of amount in KAM. Furthermore, this study also investigated that whether the high amount disclosure in KAM will impact the loan contract or not. The result shows that when the amount is higher, creditor will provide lower loan rate, longer loan period, the higher loan amount and the contract without collateral. From the overall perspective, the rise of the completeness in KAMs can make creditor provide favorable loan contract terms for debtor.
    Reference: 一、中文參考文獻
    金管會,2016,上市(櫃)公司105年財務報告採用新式查核報告情形。
    高蘭芬與邱正仁,2002,董監事股權質押對會計盈餘與股票報酬相關性之影響,臺大管理論叢,第13卷,第1期:127-162。
    陳瑞斌、翁慈青與朱全斌,2009,揭露水準對於信用評等與負債資金成本之影響,財務金融學刊,第十七卷,第二期。
    張元與葉清雄,2014,忙碌董事、風險承擔與債務資金成本,兩岸金融季刊,第2卷,第3期:1-54。
    鄭桂蕙、林宛瑩與許崇源,2006,董監事持股高低對庫藏股買回誘因之影響,東吳經濟商學學報,第54期(9月):1-26。

    二、英文參考文獻
    Ahmed, A. S., B. K. Billings, R. M. Collateralton, and M. Stanford-Harris. 2002. The role of accounting conservatism in mitigating bondholder-shareholder conflicts over dividend policy and in reducing debt costs. The Accounting Review 77 (October): 867-890.
    Ashbaugh-Skaife, H., D. W. Collins, and R. LaFond. 2006. The effects of corporate governance on firms’ credit ratings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 42 (June): 203-243.
    Bae, K.-H., and V. K. Goyal. 2009. Creditor rights, enforcement, and bank loans. The Journal of Finance 64 (April): 823-860.
    Bhojraj, S., and P. Sengupta. 2003. Effect of corporate governance on bond ratings and yields: the role of institutional investors and outside directors. The Journal of Business 76 (July): 455-475.
    Boolaky, P. K. and R. Quick.2016. Bank directors’ perceptions of expanded auditor’s reports. International Journal of Auditing 20 (2): 158-174.
    Brasel, K., M. M. Doxey, J. H. Grenier, and A. Reffett. 2016. Risk disclosure preceding negative outcomes: the effects of reporting critical audit matters on judgments of auditor liability. The Accounting Review 91 (September): 1345-1362.
    Chava, S., D. Livdan, and A. Purnanandam. 2008. Do shareholder rights affect the cost of bank loans? Working paper, The University of Houston.
    Chen, L., K. L. Jones, L. L. Lisic, P. Michas, R. Pawlewicz, and M B. Pevzner. 2013. Comments by the auditing standards committee of the auditing section of the american accounting association on the IAASB proposal: Improving the auditor’s report. Current Issues in Auditing 7 (1): C11-C20.
    Christensen, B. E., S. M. Glover, and C. J. Wolfe. 2014. Do critical audit matter paragraphs in the audit report change nonprofessional investors’ decision to invest? Working paper, University of Illinois and University of Texas at Austin.
    Church, B. K., S. M. Davis, and S. A. McCracken. 2008. The auditor`s reporting model: A literature overview and research synthesis. Accounting Horizons 22 (1): 69-90.
    Czerney, K., J. J. Schmidt and A. Thompson. 2017. Do investors respond to explanatory language included in unqualified audit reports? Working paper, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, University of Texas at Austin and University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
    Easley, D., S. Hvidkjaer, and M. O’Hara. 2002. Is information risk a determinant of asset returns? The Journal of Finance 57 (October)
    Easley, D., and M. O’Hara. 2004. Information and the cost of capital. The Journal of Finance 59 (August): 1553-1583.
    Graham, J. R., S. Li, and J. Qiu. 2008. Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting. Journal of Financial Economics 89 (July): 44-61.
    Gray, G. L., J. L. Turner, P. J. Coram and T. J. Mock. 2011. Perceptions and misperceptions regarding the unqualified auditor’s report by financial statement preparers, users, and auditors. Accounting Horizons 25 (4): 659-684.
    Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW). 2007. Audit quality forum reports: fundamentals- Auditor reporting. Available at: https://www.icaew.com/-/media/corporate/files/technical/audit-and-assurance/audit-quality/audit-quality-forum/january-2007-auditor-reporting.ashx. Access Date: February 18, 2020.
    International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB). 2011. Consultation paper: Enhancing the value of auditor reporting: exploring options for change. Available at: http://www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/exposure-drafts/CP_Auditor_Reporting-Final.pdf. Access Date: February 20, 2020.
    Jiang, J. 2008. Beating earnings benchmarks and the cost of debt. The Accounting Review 83 (March): 377-416.
    Kim, J.-B., J. S. L. Tsui, and C. H. Yi. 2011. The voluntary adoption of international financial reporting standards and loan contracting around the world. Review of Accounting Studies 16 (December): 779-811.
    Kim, J. B. and L. Zhang. 2016. Accounting conservatism and stock price crash risk: Firm‐level evidence. Contemporary Accounting Research 33 (1): 412-441.
    Köhler, A., and N. V. S. Ratzinger-Sakel, and J. Theis. 2016. The effects of key audit matters on the auditor`s report`s communicative value: Experimental evidence from investment professionals and non-professional investors. Working paper, University of Duisburg-Essen, and University of Hamburg.
    Lee, T.H., A. M. Ali, and D. Bien. 2009. Towards an understanding of the audit expectation gap. Journal of Audit Practice 6 (1): 7-35.
    Leftwich, R. 1983. Accounting information in private markets: Evidence from private lending agreements. The Accounting Review (58): 23-42.
    Mock, T. J., J. Bédard, P. J. Coram, S.M. Davis, R. Espahbodi., and R. C. Warne. 2013. The Audit Reporting Model: Current Research Synthesis and Implications. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 32 (1): 323-351.
    Pakaluk, M. 2017. The illusion of insight in an extended auditor’s report. Working paper, Busch School of Business and Economics.
    Pelzer, J. R. E. 2016. Understanding barriers to critical audit matter effectiveness: a qualitative and experimental approach. Ph. D. dissertation, The Florida State University.
    Porter, B., C. Ó. HÓgartaigh and R. Baskerville. 2009. Report on research conducted in the United Kingdom and New Zealand in 2008 investigating the audit expectation-performance gap and users’ understanding of, and desired improvements to, the auditor’s report. Working paper, Exeter University, University College Dublin and Victoria University.
    Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). 2013. Proposed Auditing Standards—The Auditor’s Report on an Audit of Financial Statements When the Auditor Expresses an Unqualified Opinion; the Auditor’s Responsibilities Regarding Other Information in Certain Documents Containing Audited Financial Statements and the Related Auditor’s Report; and Related Amendments to PCAOB Standards. Available at: https://pcaobus.org/Rulemaking/Docket034/Release_2013-005_ARM.pdf. Access Date: February 18, 2020.
    Rajan, R., and A. Winton. 1995. Covenants and collateral as incentives to monitor. The Journal of Finance 50 (September): 1113-1146.
    Sengupta, P. 1998. Corporate Disclosure Quality and the Cost of Debt. The Accounting Review 73 (October): 459-474.
    Sirois, L. P., J. Bédard, and P. Bera. 2018. The Informational Value of Key Audit Matters in the Auditor`s Report: Evidence from an Eye-Tracking Study. Accounting Horizons 32 (2): 141-162.
    Smith, K. W. 2017. Tell me Collaterale: a content analysis of expanded auditor reporting inthe United Kingdom. Working paper, Virginia Tech.
    Vanstraelen, A., C. Schelleman, R. Meuwissen. and I. Hofmann.2012. The audit reporting debate: Seemingly intractable problems and feasible solutions. European Accounting Review 21 (2): 193-215.
    Yu, F. 2005.Accounting transparency and the term structure of credit spreads. Journal of Financial Economics 75: 53-84.
    Zhang, J. 2008. The contracting benefits of accounting conservatism to lenders and borrowers. Journal of Accounting and Economics 45 (March): 27-54.
    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    107353040
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107353040
    Data Type: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU202000671
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系] 學位論文

    Files in This Item:

    File Description SizeFormat
    304001.pdf2092KbAdobe PDF20View/Open


    All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.


    社群 sharing

    著作權政策宣告 Copyright Announcement
    1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏,無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用,惟仍請適度,合理使用本網站之內容,以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用,則請先取得著作權人之授權。
    The digital content of this website is part of National Chengchi University Institutional Repository. It provides free access to academic research and public education for non-commercial use. Please utilize it in a proper and reasonable manner and respect the rights of copyright owners. For commercial use, please obtain authorization from the copyright owner in advance.

    2.本網站之製作,已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益,如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者,請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw),維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
    NCCU Institutional Repository is made to protect the interests of copyright owners. If you believe that any material on the website infringes copyright, please contact our staff(nccur@nccu.edu.tw). We will remove the work from the repository and investigate your claim.
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback