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Political Party Diversity in Local Council and Government Corruption—Evidence from the Spatial Analysis of Taiwan
Spatial Durbin model
|Issue Date: ||2020-08-03 18:14:56 (UTC+8)|
With the modernization of economic and political development, political corruption has become an important issue. When there is corruption in the government, it will form an obstacle to the efficiency of policy implementation and economic development in the region, and the people trust in the government will also be drastically reduced. This shows that the degree of political corruption and political integrity has gradually been regarded as an important global issue. Researches on the causes and influencing factors of corruption have also gradually attracted attention, but most of the researches on corruption are widely used as subordinate related topics such as oligopolistic market renting behavior, electoral system, judicial integrity, and democratic politics. Therefore, this article incorporates factors that are different from political competition and the electoral system, and uses the concentration of the seats of members of Congress to apply empirical analysis of the spatial dose model to the impact of corruption in counties and cities.
This paper studies the influencing factors of corruption in various counties and cities in Taiwan from 2011 to 2018, conducts the Wald test, and concludes that the spatial Durbin model using fixed effects is the spatial model applicable to this article. The empirical results found that the counties and cities with higher concentration and corruption have a significant positive impact, indicating that the more concentrated the counties are to the exclusive counties and cities, the corruption cases prosecuted by public officials in that county and city also increase, but the Correlation, that is, the phenomenon of spatial clustering, research data shows that the phenomenon of local government corruption and colonial infection shows a reverse result.
Finally, this paper also found that social and economic indicators such as the education level of public officials, government expenditures of various cities and the average disposable income per capita are the influencing factors of corruption. The detail report and discussion are presented in below chapters.
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|Source URI: ||http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107255020|
|Data Type: ||thesis|
|Appears in Collections:||[財政學系] 學位論文|
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