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    Title: 議會政黨集中度與貪腐—以臺灣地方政府為例
    Political Party Diversity in Local Council and Government Corruption—Evidence from the Spatial Analysis of Taiwan
    Authors: 王若琳
    Wang, Ruo-Lin
    Contributors: 黃智聰
    Huang, Jr-Tsung
    王若琳
    Wang, Ruo-Lin
    Keywords: 貪腐
    議會政黨集中度
    空間計量模型
    Corruption
    Local council
    HHI
    Spatial Durbin model
    Date: 2020
    Issue Date: 2020-08-03 18:14:56 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 隨著經濟和政治發展日趨現代化,政治貪腐成為一個重要課題,當政府存在貪腐的情形,對於政策施行的效率和該地區的經濟發展都會形成一種阻礙,而人民對於政府的信任度也會大幅銳減,自1995年開始國際透明組織每年發表清廉指數及貪腐指數,由此可見政治的貪腐和政治的廉潔程度,逐漸被視為一項全球重要的議題。關於貪腐成因以及影響因素的研究也慢慢受到關注,但絕大部分貪腐的研究廣設為寡占市場的競租行為、選舉制度、司法健全、民主政治等的附屬相關議題。故本文納入了有別於政治競爭和選舉制度的因素,使用議會政黨席次的集中度,對於各縣市貪腐的影響,更運用了空間計量模型進行實證分析。本文研究2011年至2018年的臺灣各縣市貪腐影響因素,進行Wald檢定,得出使用固定效果的空間杜賓模型為本文適用的空間模型。實證結果發現,各縣市議會政黨席次集中度越分散,公務人員發生貪腐遭起訴之人數減少。相反的,若集中度越高且議會中席次最多的政黨與執政黨為同一政黨,公務人員因貪腐遭起訴人數也會減少。而空間群聚的現象,研究資料顯示,地方政府貪腐群聚傳染的現象呈現反向的結果。最後,本文也發現貪腐與公務人員受教育程度、各縣市政府支出、平均每人可支配所得等社會經濟指標有關。
    With the modernization of economic and political development, political corruption has become an important issue. When there is corruption in the government, it will form an obstacle to the efficiency of policy implementation and economic development in the region, and the people trust in the government will also be drastically reduced. This shows that the degree of political corruption and political integrity has gradually been regarded as an important global issue. Researches on the causes and influencing factors of corruption have also gradually attracted attention, but most of the researches on corruption are widely used as subordinate related topics such as oligopolistic market renting behavior, electoral system, judicial integrity, and democratic politics. Therefore, this article incorporates factors that are different from political competition and the electoral system, and uses the concentration of the seats of members of Congress to apply empirical analysis of the spatial dose model to the impact of corruption in counties and cities.
    This paper studies the influencing factors of corruption in various counties and cities in Taiwan from 2011 to 2018, conducts the Wald test, and concludes that the spatial Durbin model using fixed effects is the spatial model applicable to this article. The empirical results found that the counties and cities with higher concentration and corruption have a significant positive impact, indicating that the more concentrated the counties are to the exclusive counties and cities, the corruption cases prosecuted by public officials in that county and city also increase, but the Correlation, that is, the phenomenon of spatial clustering, research data shows that the phenomenon of local government corruption and colonial infection shows a reverse result.
    Finally, this paper also found that social and economic indicators such as the education level of public officials, government expenditures of various cities and the average disposable income per capita are the influencing factors of corruption. The detail report and discussion are presented in below chapters.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政學系
    107255020
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107255020
    Data Type: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU202000835
    Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 學位論文

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