政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/131202
English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 27 |  全文笔数/总笔数 : 92604/122928 (75%)
造访人次 : 26903197      在线人数 : 470
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
搜寻范围 查询小技巧:
  • 您可在西文检索词汇前后加上"双引号",以获取较精准的检索结果
  • 若欲以作者姓名搜寻,建议至进阶搜寻限定作者字段,可获得较完整数据
  • 进阶搜寻


    请使用永久网址来引用或连结此文件: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/131202


    题名: 稅務資訊交換對跨國企業區位選擇的影響-國別報告揭露程度
    The Impact of Tax Information Exchange on MNE’s Location Choice-Country by Country Reporting Disclosure
    作者: 劉嘉英
    Liu, Chia-Ying
    贡献者: 陳香梅
    胡偉民

    劉嘉英
    Liu, Chia-Ying
    关键词: 區位選擇
    國別報告
    稅務資訊透明
    稅務資訊交換
    location choice
    Country-by-Country Report
    tax information transparency
    tax information exchange
    日期: 2020
    上传时间: 2020-08-03 18:16:08 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 稅務資訊透明已是全球反避稅風潮下無法避免的趨勢,稅務資訊交換協議(TIEA)和國別報告(CbCR)皆是為了提升租稅透明度而設計的稅務資訊交換機制,然而目前尚未有文獻探討TIEA、CbCR對跨國企業區位選擇的影響。另外,由於各國採用的國別報告申報機制之不同,即僅允許第一機制或可採第二機制,而第二機制是否採代理申報或本地申報,均關係到不同程度的資訊揭露;然目前卻尚未有文獻聚焦於國別報告的資訊揭露程度是否會對區位選擇造成影響。
    為研究稅務資訊交換,尤其著重於國別報告機制對區位選擇的影響,本文採用特定替代方案條件邏輯斯模型 (alternative specific conditional logit),研究2001年至2018 年間台灣上市櫃公司海外新設立的分支機構之區位選擇行為。本文實證結果發現TIEA和CbCR皆會對區位選擇造成負向顯著的影響,顯示稅務資訊交換後,導致租稅規避行為更容易被發現,進而影響該區位的選擇。最重要的,本文首度證實國別報告的揭露程度,會對區位選擇造成顯著的負向影響。若地主國的第二機制僅能透過本地申報,將會大幅降低母公司在該地設立分支機構的機率。推論是因為國別報告揭露的內容涉及跨國企業的利潤配置,一般被母公司視為商業機密,因此不願意揭露給分支機構。若地主國希望吸引外資投資,尤其是資訊交換網絡不廣闊的國家,國別報告制度應越簡便越好,才能降低資訊揭露對於跨國企業的衝擊。
    Tax transparency is a trend under global anti-tax avoidance. Tax Information Exchange Agreement (TIEA) and Country-by-Country Reporting (CbCR) are mechanisms designed to improve tax transparency. However, there is no literature discussing the impact of TIEA and CbCR on MNE’s location choice. In addition, Countries may apply different sharing mechanism for CbCR. Some only accept primary mechanism, and others accept secondary mechanism, such as surrogate filling and local filling. However, there is no literature discussing whether the information disclosure in CbCR will affect MNE’s location choice.
    In order to investigate the impact of tax information exchange on MNE’s location choice, this paper uses alternative specific conditional logit model to examine the newly established overseas branches of Taiwanese MNE from 2001 to 2018. The empirical results find that both TIEA and CbCR will have a significant negative impact on location choice. Most importantly, this paper is the first one to confirm that the degree of information disclosure in CbCR will have a significant negative impact on location choice. If second mechanism can only accept local filing, it will greatly reduce the probability of setting up a branch in that country. The result can infer that the disclosure in CbCR involves the profit allocation of MNE, which is regarded as a trade secret by parent company, so parent company is unwilling to disclose it to branches. Therefore, if countries hope to attract foreign investment, the CbCR rule should be as simple as possible to reduce the negative impact of information disclosure on MNE.
    參考文獻: Almeida, H. and Wolfenzon, D. (2006), “A theory of pyramidal ownership and family business groups”, Journal of Finance, 61(6), 2637–2680.
    Bennedsen, M. and Zeume, S. (2018), “Corporate tax havens and transparency,” The Review of Financial Studies, 31(4), 1221–1264.
    Braun, J. and Weichenrieder, A. (2015), “Does exchange of information between tax authorities influence multinationals' use of tax havens?” Discussion Paper No.15-015.
    Bilicka, K. and Fuest, C. (2014), “With which countries do tax havens share information?” International Tax and Public Finance, 21(2), 175-197.
    Barrios, S., H. Huizinga, L. Laeven, and G. Nicodeme (2012), “International firm location decisions,” Journal of Public Economics, 96, 946–958.
    Bouvatier, V., Capelle-Blancard, G. and Delatte, A. (2017), “Banks in tax havens: first evidence based on Country-by-Country Reporting,” Discussion Paper.
    Buettner, T., M. Overesch, and G. Wamser (2017), “Anti profit-shifting rules and foreign
    direct investment,” International Tax and Public Finance, 25(3), 553-580.
    Barthel, F., M. Busse and E. Neumayer (2010), “The impact of double taxation treaties on foreign direct investment: evidence from large dyadic panel data,” Contemporary Economic Policy, 28(3), 366-377.
    Blonigen, B.A and Davies, R.B (2004), “Do bilateral tax treaties promote foreign direct investment?” Handbook of international Trade: Economic and Legal Analysis of Laws and Institutions.
    Dyreng, S.D, Lindsey, B.P, Markle, K.S. and Shackelford, D.A. (2015), “The effect of tax and nontax country characteristics on the global equity supply chains of US multinationals,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 59 (2-3), 182-202.
    Dyreng, S.D, Lindsey, B.P and Thornock, J.R(2013), “Exploring the role Delaware plays as a domestic tax have,” Journal of Financial Economics,108(3), 751-772.
    Dyreng, S.D., Hoopes, J.L. and Wilde, J.H. (2016), “Public pressure and corporate tax behavior,” Journal of Accounting Research, 147-186.
    Desai, Mihir A. & Foley, C. Fritz & Hines, James Jr., (2006), “The demand for tax haven operations,” Journal of Public Economics, 90(3), 513-531.
    Dischinger, M. and Riedel, N. (2011), “Corporate taxes and the location of intangible assets within multinational firms,” Journal of Public Economics, 95(7), 691-707.
    Dharmapala, D. (2014), “What do we know about base erosion and profit shifting? A Review of the Empirical Literature,” Fiscal Studies, 35(4), 421-448.
    De Simone, L. and M. Olbert (2019), “Real effects of private Country-by-Country Disclosure,” Working Paper.
    Daniels, J.P, O’Brien, P. and von der Ruhr, M.B. (2015), “Bilateral tax treaties and US foreign direct investment financing modes,” International Tax and Finance, 22(5), 777-810.
    Duanmu, J.L. (2012), “Firm heterogeneity and location choice of Chinese multinational enterprises (MNEs),” Journal of World Business, 47(1), 64-72.
    Evers, M., Meier, I. and Christoph, S. (2016), “Country-by-Country Reporting: tension between transparency and tax planning,” Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 17-008.
    European Commission (2016), “Impact assessment assessing the potential to further transparency on income tax information, SWD (216)117FINAL,12.4.2016,42.
    Fernández, Z. and Nieto, M.J. (2006), “Impact of ownership on the international involvement of SMEs”, Journal of International Business Studies, 37(3), 340-351.
    Gumpert, A., Hines, J. and Schnitzer, M. (2016), “Multinational firms and tax havens,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 98(4), 713-727.
    Hines, A. and Rice, E.M. (1994), “Foreign tax havens and American business.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(1), 149-182.
    Hanlon, M., Maydew, E.L. and Thornock, J.R. (2015), “Taking the long way home: U.S. tax evasion and offshore investments in U.S. equity and debt markets,” Journal of Finance, 70, 257–287.
    Hanlon, M. (2018), “Country-by-Country Reporting and the international allocation of taxing rights,” International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation.
    Hoopes, J.L., Mescall, D. and Pittman, J.A. (2012), “Do IRS audits deter corporate tax avoidance?” The Accounting Review, 87(5), 1603-1639.
    Hoopes, J.L., Robinson, L. and Slemrod, J. (2018), “Public tax-return disclosure,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 142-162.
    Heckemeyer, J. and A. K. Hemmerich (2018), “Information exchange and tax haven investment in OECD securities markets,” SSRN Electronic Journal, WP.
    Johannesen, N. and Zucman, G. (2014), “The end of bank secrecy? An evaluation of the G20 tax haven crackdown,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 6(1), 65-91.
    Joshi, P. (2019), “Does private Country-by-Country Reporting deter tax avoidance and income shifting? Evidence from BEPS Action Item 13,” Working Paper.
    Joshi, P., Outslay, E. and Pearson, A. (2019), “Does public Country by Country Reporting deter tax avoidance & income shifting?” Schulich Working Paper.
    Karkinsky, T. and Riedel, N.(2012), “Corporate taxation and the choice of patent location within multinational firms,” Journal of International Economics, 88(1), 176-185.
    Kemme, D. M., B. Parikh and T. Steigner (2017), “Tax havens, tax evasion and tax information exchange agreements in the OECD,” European Financial Management, 23(3), 519-524.
    Louie, H.J. and Rousslang, D.J. (2008), “Host-country governance, tax treaties and US direct investment abroad,” International Tax and Public Finance ,15(3), 256–273.
    Lohse, T. and Riedel, N. (2013), “Do transfer pricing laws limit international income shifting? evidence from European multinationals,” CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4404.
    Lawless, M., D. McCoy, E. Morgenroth, and C. O’Toole (2017), “Corporate tax and
    location choice for multinational firms,” Applied Economics, 50(26), 2920–2931.
    Mara, E.R. (2015), “Determinants of tax havens,” Procedia Economics and Finance, 1638-1646.
    Merlo, V., N. Riedel, and G. Wamser (2014), “Anti-avoidance legislations and the location choice of multinational firms,” Working Paper.
    Merlo, V., N. Riedel, and G. Wamser (2019), “The impact of thin capitalization rules on the location of multinational firms' foreign affiliates,” CESifo Working Paper Series 5449.
    Muthitacharoen, A. (2018), “Location choice and tax responsiveness of foreign multinationals: evidence from ASEAN countries,” Discussion Papers 95.
    Murphy, R. (2009), “Country-by-Country Reporting – holding multinational corporations to account wherever they are,” Task Force on Financial Integrity and Economic Development.
    Mudabir, S.M. (2002), “Diversification and market entry in the context of foreign direct Investment, International Business Review, 11(1), 35-55.
    OECE (1998), “Harmful tax competition an emerging global issue,” OECD Publishing.
    OECD (2015a), “BEPS 2015 final report,” OECD Publishing.
    OECD (2015b), “Action 13: guidance on the implementation of transfer pricing documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting,” OECD Publishing.
    OECD (2017), “OECD transfer pricing guidelines for multinational enterprises and tax administrations 2017,” OECD publishing, Paris.
    OECD (2018), “Country‑by‑Country Reporting – compilation of peer review reports (Phase 1),” OECD publishing.
    OECD (2019), “Country‑by‑Country Reporting – compilation of peer review reports (Phase 2),” OECD publishing.
    Rauter, T. (2018), “Disclosure regulation, corruption, and investment: evidence from natural resource extraction.” Working paper.
    Rasciute, S. and Downward, P. (2017), “Explaining variability in the investment location choices of MNEs: an exploration of country, industry and firm effects,” International Business Review, 26(4), 605-613.
    Rashid, M., Looi, X.H and Wong, S.J. (2017), “Political stability and FDI in the most competitive Asia Pacific countries,” Journal of Financial Economic Policy, 9(2),140-155.
    Shah, M.H., and Khan, F. (2019), “Telecommunication infrastructure development and FDI into Asian developing nations,” Journal of Business and Tourism, 5(1), 91-102.
    Shah, M. H., & Azam, A. (2018), “Financial development and investors location choice in the Arab World,” International Journal of Business Studies Review, 2(2), 58-74.
    Tørsløv, T.R, Wier, L. S. and Zucman, G. (2018), “The missing profits of nations,” NBER Working Paper No. 24701.
    Van 't Riet, M. and Lejour, A. (2017), “Optimal tax routing: network analysis of FDI diversion,” CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2017-022.
    Weichenrieder, A. and Xu, F. (2018), “Are tax havens good? Implications of the crackdown on secrecy,” Journal of Economics, 127(4), 1-14.
    Zucman, G. (2013), “The missing wealth of nations: are Europe and the U.S. net debtors or net creditors?” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128(3), 1321-1364.
    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政學系
    107255028
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107255028
    数据类型: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU202000946
    显示于类别:[財政學系] 學位論文

    文件中的档案:

    档案 描述 大小格式浏览次数
    502801.pdf1849KbAdobe PDF0检视/开启


    在政大典藏中所有的数据项都受到原著作权保护.


    社群 sharing

    著作權政策宣告
    1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏,無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用,惟仍請適度,合理使用本網站之內容,以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用,則請先取得著作權人之授權。
    2.本網站之製作,已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益,如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者,請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw),維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - 回馈