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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 財務管理學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/131484
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/131484


    Title: 政治關聯對於企業併購的影響
    Political Connection Impact on Merger and Acquisition
    Authors: 謝柔明
    Hsieh, Jou-Ming
    Contributors: 陳嬿如
    Chen, Yenn-Ru
    謝柔明
    Hsieh, Jou-Ming
    Keywords: 政治關聯
    企業併購
    政府政策
    Political Connection
    M&A
    Government Policy
    Date: 2020
    Issue Date: 2020-09-02 11:44:21 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 政治關聯相對公司價值為增加或減損,過去以來多有爭論。中國作為近代全球的經濟成長動能,其政府主導的政權結構使得中國政治關聯的重要性增加。本文以中國國家發展和改革委員會於2010年頒布的《國務院關於促進企業兼併重組的意見》政策為外部衝擊(external shock),探討政策實施背景前後,政治關聯是否影響企業併購意願及其影響。
    實證結果顯示政治關聯具有正向市場宣告效果。其中,當公司流動性充足,意味著併購限制較少,市場將加深政治關聯代理問題的疑慮,市場宣告效果轉為負面。併後會計表現方面,政治關聯對於財務、市場表現強勢的公司而言為助力,反之則會侵蝕公司併購績效。此外,儘管政治關聯有利優勢公司,政策外部衝擊存在時,其代理問題的負面影響大於政治連結價值。
    The effect of political connection on firm value has been controversial. China, as a modern global economic growth driver, the feature of government-led regime makes political connection more important. We regard the policy of “Opinion on Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions” (hereafter OCMA) issued by the State Council of China on October 28,2010 as external shock and discuss whether political connection affects corporate M&A willingness and its impact before and after the implementation period of policy.
    The empirical results show that political connection contributes positive market announcement effect. Besides, market announcement effect will become negative for financial sufficiency company. It implies that the market would deepen their doubts on agency problem because there are fewer restriction on M&A for sufficient company. Furthermore, we find that whether political connection would increase firm value depends on the financial or market performance of acquirer company. For strong performance acquirer, political connection will add firm value. However, if acquirer doesn’t show strong performance, the effect of political connection is negative on post M&A accounting performance. Finally, our research shows that the negative impact of agency problem is greater than connection value when OCMA policy exists among strong performance acquirer.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財務管理學系
    107357031
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107357031
    Data Type: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU202001587
    Appears in Collections:[財務管理學系] 學位論文

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