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| Title: | 人工智慧法律主體之論爭─以人工智慧創作為例
Debate about the Legal Subject of Artificial Intelligence: Taking Artificial Intelligence Creation as an Example |
| Authors: | 翁呈瑋
Wong, Cheng-Wei |
| Contributors: | 陳起行
翁呈瑋
Wong, Cheng-Wei |
| Keywords: | 人工智慧
法律主體
人工智慧創作
著作權法
Artificial Intelligence
Legal subject
Artificial Intelligence creation
Copyright law |
| Date: | 2020 |
| Issue Date: | 2020-09-02 12:22:35 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 本研究之目的在於，透過觀察人工智慧創作所產生之議題，以及相關人工智慧與法律主體之間的長期論爭，來檢視兩者相互作用之下，是否可得證人工智慧在某些法領域上存在著將其認定為法律主體之優勢。
首先，本文考察現有人工智慧創作之科技，並檢視各國現有著作權法規範，以呈現目前已逐漸產生規範不足以因應新科技之情形；其次，本文整理過往之法律主體理論，並分析了是否得將人工智慧視為法律主體之見解；最後，本文在預設人工智慧之創作具備可著作性、承認人工智慧得為事實上之創作者兩大前提之下，以人工智慧創作在著作權法上之權利歸屬爭議，進一步分析將人工智慧法律主體化之方案與其他方案之間的優劣。
本文之貢獻存在於兩方面。第一，本文在各個法律主體理論的分析上，指出就法規技術而言，無法否定人工智慧作為法律主體之可能性，並且進一步論述應以務實、分析利弊之觀點檢視在個別法領域上將其主體化可能產生之優劣。第二，本文以人工智慧創作與著作權法之權利爭議為例，指出將人工智慧視為法律主體看待，可能產生較其他方案所無之法律關係以及權利歸屬認定之優勢。
本文建議未來立法者及學說討論上，應正視人工智慧作為法律主體之可能，將人工智慧法律主體化方案亦應納入未來著作權法規範之考量，並且應得以此前提為基礎，進一步具體分析主體化方案在其他法領域之利弊。
The purpose of this study is to examine whether there is an advantage in identifying Artificial Intelligence (AI) as a legal subject in certain fields of law by observing the legal issues arising from AI creation and the long-standing disputes between AI and the concept of legal subjects.
First, this study examines the current technology of AI creation, and the existing copyright laws and regulations of various countries to show that the current regulations are gradually becoming insufficient to address the legal issues of new AI technologies; Secondly, this study examines past legal subject theories and analyzes whether AI can be regarded as a legal subject; Finally, this study, presupposing that AI creation is copyrightable and recognizing that AIs can be de facto authors, in the dispute over the ownership of copyrights, further analyzes the pros and cons of the idea of AI as a legal subject and other schemes.
The contribution of this study lies in at least two dimensions. First, in the analysis of the various legal subject theories, this study points out that as far as regulations are concerned, the possibility of AI as a legal subject cannot be denied, and further arguments in individual legal fields should be from a pragmatic and analytical perspective of the pros and cons of subjectivity. Second, this study takes as an example the dispute of rights concerning AI creation and copyright law, and finds that regarding AI as a legal subject has advantages over other schemes in terms of legal relations and ownership recognition.
I argue that in the future, legislators and theoretical discussions should acknowledge the possibility of AI as a legal subject, and take “AI as a legal subject” into consideration in the future copyright norms. This “pros and cons analysis” premise may also be used as the basis for further considerations in other fields of law. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
法律學系
107651063 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107651063 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| DOI: | 10.6814/NCCU202001717 |
| Appears in Collections: | [法律學系] 學位論文
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Files in This Item:
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Description |
Size | Format | |
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| 106301.pdf | | 4331Kb | Adobe PDF2 | 1074 | View/Open |
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