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    Title: 論專利法進步性判斷之後見之明與防免策略—從心理學研究成果為出發點觀察
    Ascertaining and Avoiding Hindsight Bias in Judgement of Inventive Step—Observation from the Viewpoint of Psychology Studies
    Authors: 葉國璽
    Yeh, Kuo-Hsi
    Contributors: 沈宗倫
    葉國璽
    Yeh, Kuo-Hsi
    Keywords: 專利法
    進步性
    非顯而易見性
    後見之明
    系爭發明本身結果知識
    系爭發明外結果知識
    Patent law
    Inventive step
    Obviousness
    Hindsight bias
    Hindsight bias resulting from the invent at dispute itself
    Hindsight bias resulting from out of the invent at dispute
    Date: 2020
    Issue Date: 2020-09-02 12:23:54 (UTC+8)
    Abstract:   進步性基準作為專利有效性審查最關鍵之門檻,其標準之重要性自然不言而喻,然而近年來,專利實務上的進步性判斷受到後見之明影響之批評不絕於耳,因此各國審查實務與學說無不渾身解數試圖建構後見之明防免策略,然而究竟何為後見之明,其是否真實影響進步性判斷,其如何影響以及影響之範圍為何,如何判斷實務進步性判斷中是否存有後見之明,以及最重要的係如何在進步性判斷架構中建構完整的後見之明防免策略等問題,均未在各國專利實務中被完整解答,是以本文嘗試以後見之明防免為中心,從心理學角度分析後見之明之意涵,並透過法學與心理學跨領域整合研究,探討後見之明對於進步性之影響,進而提供是否實務進步性判斷受到後見之明影響之分析,並重新詮釋進步性之意義,據以建構最大程度減緩後見之明的進步性判斷架構,以期為我國進步性判斷上提供妥適、有效且正確之理論基礎與判斷指引。
      本文將介紹現行美國、歐盟專利局、我國專利實務上對於進步性審查之架構,並分析各國法學與心理學之後見之明偏誤學說研究,證實後見之明對進步性之影響,再以後見之明的來源為區分標準,定義出系爭發明本身結果知識與系爭發明外結果知識,並解釋該等結果知識如何影響進步性判斷與影響之範圍,再以之作為檢驗實務進步性判斷是否受到後見之明的影響,進而提出五種審查者可能受到不可容許後見之明影響之案例類型,但不以此為限,其分別為不當認定技術內涵、使用不適當之先前技術、不適當定義所屬領域具有通常知識者、不適當拼湊複數引證、不適當技術推演之論理等類型,以提供實務判斷其進步性是否受到後見之明影響之參考。
      最後,本文將交互分析、結合現行可能有效減緩後見之明偏誤之心理學界與法學界的策略,建構出實體與程序架構之九重防免機制,以期能夠最大程度減緩後見之明對進步性審查所可能造成之偏誤,確保進步性之判斷盡可能達到正確之境地,以落實進步性之立法目的。
      As the most crucial threshold in patent validity examination, the importance of inventive step, in other words, obviousness standard is self-evident. However, in recent years, patent practice such as substantive examination as well as judgement has been affecting by hindsight bias causing strong criticism by the legal scholar. Therefore, patent examiners all over the world are trying their best to construct strategies against hindsight bias. Nevertheless, what exactly is hindsight bias? Whether it actually affects the judgement of inventive step? If does, how it affects, and what is the scope of the influence? How to diagnose whether there is hindsight bias in practical judgement of inventive step? And the most important, how to construct a mature strategy and judgmental framework for inventive step to prevent hindsight bias? Those questions above have not been fully answered in the patent practice of any country. Thus, this article attempts to focus on averting hindsight bias, analyzing the meaning of hindsight bias from the perspective of psychology, investigating the impact of hindsight bias on judgement of inventive step through interdisciplinary researches of jurisprudence and psychology. And then, this article will also provide an analysis protocol to diagnose whether practical inventive step judgement is affected by hindsight bias as well as reinterpret the significance of inventive step so as to construct, the most crucially, an inventive step judgment framework that can minimize hindsight bias in order to provide an appropriately, effectively and accurately theoretical basis and judicial guideline for inventive step.
      This article will introduce the current structure of inventive step examination in the United States, the European Patent Office, and Taiwan’s patent practice, and analyzes the doctrines of hindsight bias in the researches of jurisprudence and psychology in order to confirm the impact of hindsight bias on inventive step. Then, I use the resource of hindsight information causing hindsight bias as the distinguishing standard to define the hindsight bias resulting from the invent at dispute itself as well as the hindsight bias resulting from out of the invent at dispute for explaining how such hindsight bias above affects inventive step judgement and the scope of influence. Furthermore, I use them as a test to diagnose whether the inventive step judgement is affected by such hindsight bias, and then address five types of cases where each of the cases below proposes considering factors that show the examiner may be affected by unacceptable hindsight bias in inventive step judgement, but notice that those cases are not an all-inclusive list. Those cases are improperly identifying technical inference, using improper prior arts, improperly defining a person having ordinary skill in the art, improperly combining multiple references, and improperly deducting technical results. Those cases will be provided to check whether the inventive step judgements made by examiners are affected by hindsight bias or not.
      Finally, this article will analyze and apply the possible strategies made by psychology and jurisprudence in order to propose the nine-levels substantive and procedural mechanisms for preventing hindsight bias with the hope that the errors in inventive step judgement caused by hindsight bias can be alleviated as far as possible. This will ensure the inventive step judgements are as accurate as possible in order to make sure that the legislative purposes of inventive step will be fully fulfilled.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    法律科際整合研究所
    105652007
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0105652007
    Data Type: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU202001399
    Appears in Collections:[法律科際整合研究所] 學位論文

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