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Director Candidates Nomination System, Firm Performance and Earnings Management
Director candidates nomination system
|Issue Date: ||2021-01-04 10:46:44 (UTC+8)|
本研究以Tobin’s Q、股票報酬率及資產報酬率(Return on Assets，ROA)衡量公司績效，以裁決性應計數衡量董事的監督功能。研究結果指出公司實施董事候選人提名制與Tobin’s Q及股票報酬率呈顯著正相關，與裁決性應計數呈顯著負相關。實證結果支持本研究假說，說明實施董事候選人提名制的公司較未實施董事候選人提名制的公司有更佳之公司績效以及抑制盈餘管理之效果。本研究假設採用董事候選人提名制能讓股東選出更為適任的董事，因此進一步測試公司採用董事候選人提名制與其董事會特性之關聯性。研究結果指出採用董事候選人提名制的公司，其董事會具較高的外部董事比例，且董事兼任上市櫃公司家數較高，說明實施董事候選人提名制的公司，其董事獨立性較高且能力較佳。
This study aims to investigate whether the implementation of candidates nomination system helps shareholders select board candidates who can enhance the firm value and better perform their monitoring role.
There is information asymmetry arising between managers and investors, and firms may take advantage of it to self serve their own interests. Specifically, firms may not disclose nominees of directors until the shareholders’ meeting in an attempt to garner enough votes to support their nominees. Candidates nomination system helps increase information transparency, helping shareholders select more competent directors. The competent directors can lower agency costs and enhance firm performance through their advisory and monitoring roles. Along this logic, I hypothesize that firms adopting candidates nomination system tend to have higher firm performance and lower earnings management.
To conduct my test, I use Tobin’s Q, stock returns and ROA to measure the firm performance, and discretionary accruals to proxy for earnings management. My analyses indicate that the implementation of candidates nomination system is positively associated with Tobin’s Q and stock returns, and negatively associated with discretionary accruals. In addition, I examine the relationship between board characteristics and the adoption of candidates nomination system. The empirical evidence shows that, on average, firms adopting candidates nomination system tend to have a board with more outside directors and busy directors.
Altogether, my findings suggest that firms with candidates nomination system help shareholders select more competent directors who increase firm value and lower agency costs through their advisory and monitoring roles, thus increase firm performance.
|Reference: ||工商時報，2005.6.30，談企業併購法制的精進方向—最新修正公司法對 併購的影響（下）（10版）。|
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|Source URI: ||http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107353003|
|Data Type: ||thesis|
|Appears in Collections:||[會計學系] 學位論文|
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