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The Relationship between Pay Disparity and Firm Performance and Value
vertical pay disparity
horizontal pay disparity
|Issue Date: ||2021-03-02 14:18:19 (UTC+8)|
|Abstract: ||本研究以臺灣 2019 年度上市櫃公司為研究對象，探討薪資差距與企業績效及價值之間的關聯性，同時也探討薪資差距與員工流動率之關聯性。本文將薪資差距區分為垂直薪資差距與水平薪資差距，垂直薪資差距為高階主管與基層員工之間的薪資差距，水平薪資差距為基層員工之間的薪資差距。實證結果發現，不論是垂直薪資差距或是水平薪資差距，皆與企業績效呈現顯著正相關，但兩者皆不影響企業價值。此外，不論是垂直薪資差距或是水平薪資差距，皆與員工流動率無顯著相關。為了使比較基礎一致，將垂直與水平薪資差距換算成PR 值，PR 值的計算方法是將解釋變數進行排序後，分成一百等分，各個解釋變數落在第幾個等分中。實證結果顯示，相較於水平薪資差距的 PR 值，垂直薪資差距的 PR 值對企業績效的影響較大，然而兩者同樣不影響企業價值。本文實證結果並無證據證明較高薪資差距會損害企業績效的論述，也沒有證據顯示員工會因為企業較高的薪資差距而選擇離職。|
In this article, I take Taiwan's listed companies in 2019 as the research object. I mainly study the the correlation between pay disparity and firm performance and value, and also explores the correlation between pay disparity and employee turnover. This article divides the pay disparity into vertical pay disparity and horizontal pay disparity.
The vertical pay disparity is the pay disparity between the senior executives and the grassroots employees, and the horizontal pay disparity is the pay disparity between the grassroots employees. The empirical results found that whether it is vertical pay disparity or horizontal pay disparity both have a significant positive correlation with firm performance, but neither of them affects firm value. In addition, neither the vertical pay disparity nor the horizontal vertical pay disparity is significantly related to employee turnover. In order to make the comparison basis consistent, the vertical and horizontal pay disparity are converted into PR values. The PR value is calculated by sorting the explanatory variables and dividing them into one hundred equal divisions, and each explanatory variable falls in which division. The empirical results show that compared to the PR value of the horizontal pay disparity, the PR value of the vertical pay disparity has a greater impact on firm performance, but the two also do not affect firm value. The empirical results of this article have no evidence to prove that a higher pay disparity will harm the firm performance, and there is no evidence that employees will quit because of the company’s higher pay disparity.
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|Source URI: ||http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107353114|
|Data Type: ||thesis|
|Appears in Collections:||[會計學系] 學位論文|
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