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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 財務管理學系 > 期刊論文 >  Item 140.119/135872
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/135872


    Title: Executive Stock Options, Corporate Cash Holdings and M&A Decisions
    高階主管股票選擇權、現金持有與併購決策
    Authors: 陳嬿如
    Chen, Yenn-Ru
    Huang, Yu-Lin
    Chen, Bai-Sian
    Contributors: 財管系
    Keywords: executive stock options;corporate cash holdings ; mergers and acquisitions 
    高階主管股票選擇權 ; 現金持有 ; 企業併購
    Date: 2021-04
    Issue Date: 2021-06-25 09:49:32 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: This study examines the effect of corporate cash holdings on the risk-taking activities induced by executive stock options (ESOs). Using mergers and acquisitions (M&As) as the proxy of corporate decisions more associated with idiosyncratic risk taking, we find excess cash holdings stimulate the M&A bidding probability induced by the risk incentive of ESOs (vega). The probability of conducting ESOs-induced M&As in cash-rich firms is 7.58% higher than that in non-cash-rich firms. The positive impact of excess cash on the ESOs-induced M&A decisions is more pronounced in firms with low leverage and those in the old economy. Through analyses of the announcement effect and the one-year profitability effect, our results show the market considers the ESOs-induced M&A decisions made by cash-rich firms are more associated with precautionary motives rather than agency incentives. However, while cash-rich firms undertaking ESOs-induced M&As have better profitability than those not conducting ESOs-induced M&As, how the market assigns future valuations to cash-rich firms conducting ESOs-induced M&As still depends on the corporate governance environment of these firms.
    本研究探討現金持有於高階主管股票選擇權(ESOs)誘發之風險承擔行為之影響,以企業併購作為衡量指標。實證發現公司持有超額現金將有助於提升高階主管因ESOs風險誘因而進行併購決策之機率。當持有超額現金,高階主管因ESOs而進行併購之機率顯著高於未持有超額現金公司之併購機率,差異約達7.58%。同時,超額現金對於因ESOs而進行併購決策之正向影響,在低負債企業與隸屬舊經濟產業之公司中較為明顯。此外,透過宣告效果與績效表現之分析,市場對於超額現金公司因ESOs而併購之決策較傾向認定為預防性動機所致。雖此決策將有助公司未來營運績效,但市場如何衡量其併購後評價仍取決於其公司治理環境。
    Relation: NTU Management Review, Vol.31, No.1, pp.71-115
    Data Type: article
    DOI 連結: https://doi.org/10.6226/NTUMR.202104_31(1).0003
    DOI: 10.6226/NTUMR.202104_31(1).0003
    Appears in Collections:[財務管理學系] 期刊論文

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