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https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/138853
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| Title: | Expectation and cooperation in prisoner`s dilemmas: The moderating role of game riskiness |
| Authors: | 吳庭達
Ng , Gary Ting Tat
Au, Wing Tung |
| Contributors: | 心理系 |
| Keywords: | Prisoner’s dilemma;Risk aversion;Risk orientation;Expectation of cooperation;Game riskiness |
| Date: | 2016-04 |
| Issue Date: | 2022-02-10 11:32:32 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigated the effect of risk orientation, game riskiness, and expectation of cooperation on cooperation in one-shot prisoner’s dilemmas (PD). Participants in pairs played PD games that varied on game riskiness such that for half of the games cooperation was more risky than defection (more risky games) while for another half cooperation was less risky (less risky games). They estimated how likely it was that the other player was going to cooperate (expectation of cooperation) before they made their cooperation/defection decision on each game. Supporting the Goal/Expectation Hypothesis, we replicated the effect that expectation of cooperation enhanced cooperation. We also found that risk-seeking individuals cooperated more in more risky games whereas risk-averse individuals cooperated more in less risky games. More importantly, we found that game riskiness moderated the effect of expectation of cooperation on cooperation. The positive effect of expectation of cooperation on cooperation was stronger for more risky games than for less risky games. Our results illustrated how the relation between expectation and cooperation as stipulated by the Goal/Expectation Hypothesis was moderated by riskiness of the situations. A prisoner’s dilemma (PD) models a situation that a decision of achieving an optimal individual outcome leads to a suboptimal collective outcome. In a typical two-person PD game, each player decides simultaneously whether to cooperate or defect. If both players choose to cooperate, both receive the reward outcome (R). If one chooses to cooperate and one chooses to defect, the one who defected receives the temptation outcome (T), while the one who cooperated receives the sucker outcome (S). If both players choose to defect, both receive the punishment outcome (P). The dilemma arises when these four outcomes satisfy a condition such that T > R > P > S (Rapoport, 1967). Players unavoidably face risk due to uncertainty of outcomes because choosing cooperation faces the uncertainty of getting either R or S; while choosing defection faces the uncertainty of getting T or P. Understanding how risk is related to cooperation in PD is thus essential. Numerous studies have investigated the relation between an individual’s risk orientation and cooperation, but the results were inconsistent (e.g., de Heus, Hoogervorst, & Dijk, 2010; Glöckner & Hilbig, 2012; Sabater-Grande & Georgantzis, 2002). In this paper, we explore further how riskiness of situation and individual difference in risk orientation can influence cooperation by incorporating expectation of cooperation in the context of one-shot PD games in which a game is played once only. |
| Relation: | Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, Vol.23, No.2, pp.353–360 |
| Data Type: | article |
| DOI 連結: | https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-015-0911-7 |
| DOI: | 10.3758/s13423-015-0911-7 |
| Appears in Collections: | [心理學系] 期刊論文
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