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| Title: | 高階經理人激勵性薪酬對創新績效之影響－家族與非家族企業之比較
The Impact of Incentive Compensation of Top Managers on Innovation Performance： A Comparison of Family and Non-family Firms |
| Authors: | 彭惠瑜
Peng, Hui-Yu |
| Contributors: | 黃政仁
Huang, Cheng-Jen
彭惠瑜
Peng, Hui-Yu |
| Keywords: | 家族企業
高階經理人
激勵性薪酬
創新績效
Family firms
Top managers
Incentive compensation
Innovation performance |
| Date: | 2022 |
| Issue Date: | 2022-07-01 16:04:18 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 本研究以2010年至2020年間台灣之電子業上市公司為研究樣本，運用結構方程模式（Structural Equation Modeling，簡稱SEM）探討家族與非家族不同之企業控制型態，以及家族企業中，由家族成員擔任高階經理人之不同比例是否會透過高階經理人激勵性薪酬進而對創新績效產生影響。實證結果發現如下：（1）相對於非家族企業，家族企業透過較低比例之高階經理人激勵性薪酬對創新績效產生顯著之負向影響。（2）家族企業中，當家族成員擔任高階經理人之比例愈高，其透過愈低比例之高階經理人激勵性薪酬對創新績效產生顯著之負向影響。（3）本研究額外測試將家族企業變數區分為積極家族企業與消極家族企業，以比較家族對於企業之不同控制程度透過高階經理人激勵性薪酬進而對創新績效產生之影響是否存有差異，結果顯示相對於非家族企業，無論是積極、消極家族企業皆透過較低比例之高階經理人激勵性薪酬對創新績效產生顯著之負向影響。此外，相對於消極家族企業，積極家族企業透過更低比例之高階經理人激勵性薪酬進而更不利於創新績效。（4）本研究改變家族成員擔任高階經理人比例變數之衡量方式，以及加入創新績效之落後兩期模式，以檢測整體模型之穩定性，結果顯示皆與主要測試之結果一致。
This study uses a sample of listed companies in the electronics industry in Taiwan from 2010 to 2020, and applies Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) to examine whether the different business control types between family and non-family firms, and the different proportions of family members serving as top managers in family firms have an impact on innovation performance through incentive compensation of top managers. The empirical results are as follows: (1) Compared with non-family firms, family firms have a significant negative impact on innovation performance through a lower proportion of incentive compensation of top managers. (2) In family firms, the higher the proportion of family members serving as top managers, the lower the proportion of top managers` incentive compensation has a significant negative impact on innovation performance. (3) This study additionally tests the classification of family firms into active family firms and passive family firms to compare whether there is a difference in the impact of different levels of family control over the business on innovation performance through the incentive compensation of top managers. The results show that compared with non-family firms, both active and passive family firms have a significant negative impact on innovation performance through a lower proportion of incentive compensation of top managers. In addition, compared with passive family firms, active family firms are more detrimental to innovation performance through a lower proportion of incentive compensation of top managers. (4) This study changes the measurement of the proportion of family members serving as top managers and adds a two-period lagging model of innovation performance to examine the stability of the overall model. The results are consistent with the results of the main test. |
| Reference: | 資誠聯合會計師事務所，2021，2021全球暨台灣家族企業調查報告，網址：
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
109353019 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0109353019 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| DOI: | 10.6814/NCCU202200621 |
| Appears in Collections: | [會計學系] 學位論文
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