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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/147067


    Title: 論晶圓代工廠商研發策略的演進:以聯電放棄先進製程為例
    The Evolution of IC Foundries’ Strategies: The Case of UMC’s Current R&D Strategy
    Authors: 黃柏盛
    Huang, Po-Sheng
    Contributors: 李文傑
    王信實

    Lee, Wen-Chieh
    Wang, Shinn-Shyr

    黃柏盛
    Huang, Po-Sheng
    Keywords: 賽局理論
    信譽累積
    晶圓代工
    Game theory
    Semiconductor
    Foundry
    Process innovation
    Date: 2023
    Issue Date: 2023-09-01 15:32:56 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本文利用賽局理論研究晶圓代工廠商研發策略的演進並使用信譽累積模型,對較晚加入純晶圓代工市場的廠商進行信譽累積的計算,再由該廠商累積的信譽判斷該廠商在某時間點會選擇違反合約或是遵守合約的行為。除此之外,本文亦透過此模型對於較晚加入純晶圓代工市場的廠商進行該廠商是否會在某時間點退出先進製程的市場改為加入成熟製程的市場的分析。最後,本文透過現有資料模擬實際晶圓代工廠商的狀況,分析何種因素會導致晶圓代工廠商放棄先進製程。
    This article sets out to investigate the process innovation strategies of semiconductor subcontracting business that is named after the pure-play foundry industry. By analyzing whether the integrated device manufacturer (IDM) would like to enter the foundry business and keep the promise to its customers to only stick to the contracting manufacturing businesses, foundry’s innovation strategies are proved to correlate with parameters describing business dynamics. Besides, numerical exercises are also introduced here to calibrate key parameters to match the business dynamics of foundry industry. The provided research framework can apply to the future predictions to forecast research and development roadmap of foundry competitions.
    Reference: 中文部分
    1.三星官方網站 (2023) . https://semiconductor.samsung.com/foundry/manufacturing/
    2.太田泰彦 (2022) . 半導體地緣政治學 (卓惠娟譯) . 野人文化.
    3.台積電官方網站 (2023) https://www.tsmc.com/chinese
    4.邱品蓉 (2023年4月10日) . 【圖解】台積電封王3挑戰解析:摩爾定律如何續命?下一個2兆營收哪裡來?. 數位時代. https://www.bnext.com.tw/article/74707/tsmc-semiconductor-april-mag
    5.邵樂峰 (2020年8月7日) . 迎戰後摩爾定律時代:半導體製程演進之路走向何方?. 電子工程專輯 https://www.eettaiwan.com/20200807nt31-challenges-in-the-era-of-post-moore-s-law/
    6.林子元 (2022) . 專業晶圓代工策略分析-資源依賴觀點[碩士論文]. 國立台灣大學.
    7.書摘精選、曲建仲、葉芷娟 (2023年4月12日) . 台積電的2奈米、3奈米是什麼?和最強競爭者英特爾差距多少?. 天下雜誌. https://www.cw.com.tw/article/5125326
    8.聯電官方網站 (2023) . https://www.umc.com/zh-TW/Home/Index

    英文部分
    1.Baker, G., Gibbons, R., & Murphy, K. J. (2002) . Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117 (1) , 39–84.
    2.Doornik, K. (2006) . Relational contracting in partnerships. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 15 (2) , 517-548.
    3.Fudenberg, D., & Maskin, E. (1990) . “Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games. Journal of Economic Theory”, 51 (1) , 194-206.
    4. Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (1991) . Quality Ladders in the Theory of Growth. The Review of Economic Studies, 58 (1) , 43–61. https://doi.org/10.2307/2298044
    5.Levin, J. (2003) . Relational incentive contracts. American Economic Review, 93 (3) , 835-857.
    6.Miller, C. (2022) . Chip War: The Fight for the World`s Most Critical Technology. Simon and Schuster.
    7.Radner, R. (1985) . Repeated principal-agent games with discounting. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1173-1198.
    8.Rubinstein, A. (1979) . Offenses that may have been committed by accident—an optimal policy of retribution. Applied game theory, 25, 406-413.
    9.Shin, N., Kraemer, K. L., & Dedrick, J. (2017) . R&D and firm performance in the semiconductor industry. Industry and Innovation, 24 (3) , 280-297.
    10.Su, Y. H., Guo, R. S., & Chang, S. C. (2004, September) . Inter-firm collaboration mechanism in process development and product design between foundry and fabless design house. In 2004 Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology Workshop Proceedings (IEEE Cat. No. 04EX846) (pp. 47-50) . IEEE.
    11.Watson, J. (2021) . Theoretical foundations of relational incentive contracts. Annual Review of Economics, 13, 631-659.
    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    經濟學系
    110258020
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110258020
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[經濟學系] 學位論文

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