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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/147068

    Title: 論地緣政治風險對晶圓代工廠商擴張策略的影響
    The Effects of Geopolitical Risks on the Expansion of IC Foundries
    Authors: 黃文甫
    Huang, Wen-Fu
    Contributors: 王信實

    Wang, Shinn-Shyr
    Lee, Wen-Chieh

    Huang, Wen-Fu
    Keywords: 賽局理論
    Game theory
    Reputation accumulation
    IC foundry business
    Geopolitical risks
    Date: 2023
    Issue Date: 2023-09-01 15:33:15 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 信譽是影響晶圓代工廠能否與客戶維持長期合作關係的關鍵因素之一,因 此本研究首先利用賽局理論並引入信譽作為激勵機制建立晶圓代工廠商業模式 決策模型,說明信譽與其他市況參數,對廠商是否選擇持續與客戶合作而採純 代工模式,所要求的耐心水準臨界值之影響。再推廣至廠商面對地緣政治風險 的不確定性恆常影響下,將模型加入相關的風險與擴張參數,以分析特定情況 下,地緣政治風險與代工廠擴張策略,和其他市況參數對持續選擇與客戶合作 所要求的耐心水準臨界值之影響,並進一步找出風險與擴張策略等參數間的交 互影響。最後再以比較靜態分析解釋不同情境下各參數的變動對代工廠策略選 擇意願的影響,冀能提供應對地緣政治的不確定性與不同市場環境下,晶圓代 工廠制定擴張策略與商業模式選擇之參考。
    The recent rising issue shocks the world regarding the escalating geopolitics risks would put the nowadays stable international supply chain into risk. In view of the concentration of semiconductor foundry business, the geopolitical risks are especially highlighted to endanger the further development of foundry business. This research; thus, put together the reputation accumulation process into the repeated game theoretic framework. In this vein, the research framework is able to delicately analyze how the rising geopolitical risks would intertwine with other parameters directing the dynamics of the business environmental. In addition to typical qualitative arguments, the current developed framework can excel at consecutive evolutionary analyses once putting more accumulating data. Hence, in sum, this research aims to provide some insight for the initial attempt at systematic research regarding the flows of discussions on geopolitical risks.
    Reference: 參考文獻
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    Description: 碩士
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110258027
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[經濟學系] 學位論文

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