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    Title: 探討美國矽谷銀行倒閉事件 –兼論標準流動性覆蓋比率之有效性
    The Collapse of Silicon Valley Bank and the Effectiveness of Standardized Liquidity Coverage Ratio in Banking Supervision
    Authors: 陳彥霖
    Chen, Yen Ling
    Contributors: 呂桔誠
    江永裕

    陳彥霖
    Chen, Yen Ling
    Keywords: 金融監理
    銀行監理
    金融機構風險管理
    公司治理
    美國矽谷銀行
    巴塞爾資本協定
    流動性覆蓋比率
    淨穩定資金比率
    Financial Supervision
    Banking Supervision
    Risk Management for Financial Institutions
    Corporate Governance
    Silicon Valley Bank
    Basel Ⅲ
    Liquidity Coverage Ratio
    Net Stable Funding Ratio
    LCR
    NSFR
    Date: 2024
    Issue Date: 2024-04-01 14:25:48 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本研究以美國矽谷銀行倒閉事件為例,輔以不同研究方法,說明銀行實施巴塞爾銀行監理委員會(簡稱BCBS)標準流動性覆蓋比率(簡稱LCR)的有效性及重要性。研究結果顯示,如同矽谷銀行資產配置的金融機構,若遵循標準LCR規範,將於連續升息環境中發出警訊。因該類法定風險規範須逐月計算及按季揭露,又須維持比最低法定標準更高的警示目標;甚至於低於警示比率時,銀行就能立即啟動逐週或逐日監控及調整。因該類指標具備國際規範的一致性定義,不容金融機構自我放寬解釋,並須於該類指標所顯現的風險警訊出現時有所因應,直至風險指標改善為止。因此在這類法定監理流程及內外部監控下,應有更高機會避免發生如同矽谷銀行的倒閉事件。
    This research takes the failure of SVB as an example, and use different methods to illustrate the effective and important implementation of the full standardized Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) by Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). This research shows that a bank with the same assets allocation as SVB had abided by the full standardized LCR will get early warning signals in an environment with rising interest rates. Because these regulatory ratios must be calculated monthly and disclosed seasonally, and a bank have to maintain a certain level higher than the minimum standard as "an early warning standard" for internal risk management. When falling below "the early warning standard", a bank will start up their weekly or daily monitoring and adjustment to correct the ratio. Besides, the definitions of these regulatory ratios have been highly standardized with no room for banks to manipulate. Also, the banks must improve the assets and liabilities to comply the regulatory standards. Therefore, with the outer supervision, regulation and internal risk monitoring process, the collapse just like SVB is avoidable.
    Reference: 參考資料及文獻

    英文參考資料及文獻

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    3. BCBS. (2004). Principles for the Management and Supervision of Interest Rate Risk, standards and monitoring. July 2004. Retrieved from Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs108.pdf
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    7. BCBS. (2010b). Basel Ⅲ:International framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring. December 2010. Retrieved from Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs188.pdf
    8. BCBS. (2010c). Guidance for national authorities operating the countercyclical capital buffer. December 2010. Retrieved from Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs187.pdf
    9. BCBS. (2012). Capital requirements for bank exposures to central counterparties. July 2012. Retrieved from Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs227.pdf
    10.BCBS. (2013). Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools. January 2013. Retrieved from Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.pdf
    11.BCBS. (2014). BASEL III: the net stable funding ratio. October 2014. Retrieved from Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d295.pdf
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    13.Beim, David and Christopher McCurdy (2009). Report on Systemic Risk and Bank Supervision. August 2009. Retrieved from Federal Reserve Bank: https://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-docs/2009-08-05%20FRBNY%20Report%20on%20Systemic%20Risk%20and%20Supervision%20Draft.pdf
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    15.Ciuriak, D. (2023). Let it Fail? Reflections on the SVB Collapse and the US and Canadian Approaches to Bank Crises. 7 December 2023. Retrieved from C.D. Howe Institute: https://www.cdhowe.org/public-policy-research/let-it-fail-reflections-svb-collapse-and-us-and-canadian-approaches-bank
    16.FCIC (2011). Conclusions of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. 4 March 2011. Retrieved from Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission: http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_conclusions.pdf
    17.Feldberg, G. (2023a). Lessons from Applying the Liquidity Coverage Ratio to Silicon Valley Bank. 27 March 2023. Retrieved from Program on Financial Stability, Yale SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT: https://som.yale.edu/story/2023/lessons-applying-liquidity-coverage-ratio-silicon-valley-bank
    18.Feldberg, G. (2023b). Silicon Valley Bank’s Liquidity, Part Two: What About the Net Stable Funding Ratio? 4 April 2023. Retrieved from Program on Financial Stability, Yale SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT: https://som.yale.edu/story/2023/silicon-valley-banks-liquidity-part-two-what-about-net-stable-funding-ratio
    19.FRB. (2019a). Tailoring Rule visual. October 2019. Retrieved from Federal Reserve Board: https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/boardmeetings/files/tailoring-rule-visual-20191010.pdf
    20.FRB. (2019b). Federal Register / Vol. 84, No. 212 / Friday, November 1, 2019 / Rules and Regulations. 1 November 2019. Retrieved from GovInfo/Federal Reserve Board: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-11-01/pdf/2019-23662.pdf
    21.FRB. (2019c). SVBFG Target Corporate Governance/Global Risk Management Supervisory Letter. 19 November 2019. Retrieved from Federal Reserve Board: https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/files/svbfg-target-corporate-governance-global-risk-management-supervisory-letter-20191119.pdf
    22.FRB. (2021a). SVB 2021 Asset Quality and Credit Risk Management Target Supervisory Letter. 17 August 2021. Retrieved from Federal Reserve Board: https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/files/svb-2021-asset-quality-and-credit-risk-management-target-supervisory-letter-20210817.pdf
    23.FRB. (2021b). SVBFG Liquidity Planning Target Supervisory Letter. 2 November 2021. Retrieved from Federal Reserve Board: https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/files/svbfg-liquidity-planning-target-supervisory-letter-20231102.pdf
    24.FRB. (2021c). SVBFG Capital Planning Target Supervisory Letter. 9 November 2021. Retrieved from Federal Reserve Board: https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/files/svbfg-capital-planning-target-supervisory-letter-20211109.pdf
    25.FRB. (2022a). SVBFG and SVB Governance and Risk Management Target Supervisory Letter. 31 May 2022. Retrieved from Federal Reserve Board: https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/files/svbfg-and-svb-governance-and-risk-management-target-supervisory-letter-20220531.pdf
    26.FRB. (2022b). SVBFG 2022 Large and Foreign Banking Organization (LFBO) Horizontal Capital Review Supervisory Letter. 19 August 2022. Retrieved from Federal Reserve Board: https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/files/svbfg-2022-lfbo-horizontal-capital-review-supervisory-letter-20220819.pdf
    27.FRB. (2022c). SVB 2022 CAMELS Examination Supervisory Letter. 15 November 2022. Retrieved from Federal Reserve Board: https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/files/svb-2022-camels-examination-supervisory-letter-20221115.pdf
    28.FRB. (2022d). SVBFG 2023 LFBO Horizontal Liquidity Review Entry Letter. 17 November 2022. Retrieved from Federal Reserve Board: https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/files/svbfg-2023-lfbo-horizontal-liquidity-review-entry-letter-20221117.pdf
    29.FRB. (2022e). Memorandum re Recession Readiness – Silicon Valley Bank. 1 December 2022. Retrieved from Federal Reserve Board: https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/files/memorandum-re-recession-readiness-silicon-valley-bank-20221201.pdf
    30.FRB. (2022f). SVBFG and SVB Internal Audit Target Supervisory Letter. 27 December 2022. Retrieved from Federal Reserve Board: https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/files/svbfg-and-svb-internal-audit-target-supervisory-letter-20221227.pdf
    31.FRB. (2023a). Board Briefing on Impact of Rising Interest Rates and Supervisory Approach. 14 February 2023.Retrieved from Federal Reserve Board: https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/files/board-briefing-on-impact-of-rising-interest-rates-and-supervisory-approach-20230214.pdf
    32.FRB. (2023b). Memorandum of Understanding (Draft). 10 March 2023. Retrieved from Federal Reserve Board: https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/files/memorandum-of-understanding-draft-20230310.pdf
    33.FRB. (2023c). Review of the Federal Reserve’s Supervision and Regulation of Silicon Valley Bank. 28 April 2023. Retrieved from Federal Reserve Board: https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/svb-review-20230428.pdf
    34.Fung, K. (2023). Silicon Valley Bank CEO Sold $3.5 Million in Stock 2 Weeks Before Collapse. 10 March 2023. Retrieved from Newsweek: https://www.newsweek.com/silicon-valley-bank-ceo-sold-million-stock-before-collapse-1787062
    35.Knauth, Dietrich and Tom Hals. (2023). Silicon Valley Bank's former owner, FDIC bracing for fight over $2 bln.22 March 2023. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/svb-financial-group-accuses-fdic-cutting-it-off-cash-2023-03-21/
    36.Knot, K. (2023). Mamma Mia, here we go again? Lessons from Silikon Valley Bank and Credit Suisse, BIS - Central bankers' speeches.28 April 2023. Retrieved from Bank for International Settlements: https://www.bis.org/review/r230502a.pdf
    37.Nelson, B. (2023a). Silicon Valley Bank Would Have Passed The Liquidity Coverage Ratio Requirement.14 March 2023. Retrieved from BANK POLICY INSTITUTE: https://bpi.com/silicon-valley-bank-would-have-passed-the-liquidity-coverage-ratio-requirement/
    38.Nelson, B. (2023b). Update on SVB’s LCR. 28 March 2023. Retrieved from BANK POLICY INSTITUTE: https://bpi.com/update-on-svbs-lcr/
    39.Office of Inspector General(OIG)(2023). Material Loss Review of Silicon Valley Bank. 25 September 2023. Retrieved from Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System: https://oig.federalreserve.gov/reports/board-material-loss-review-silicon-valley-bank-sep2023.pdf
    40.Schroeder, P. (2023). U.S. bank regulators say system is sound, but rules need review. 28 March 2023. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/markets/us/feds-barr-says-regulators-committed-ensuring-all-deposits-are-safe-2023-03-27/
    41.Shalal, Andrea and Pete Schroeder. (2023). White House pushes new rules for mid-sized banks without Congress. 31 March 2023. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/markets/us/white-house-pushes-stronger-regional-bank-rules-without-congress-2023-03-30/
    42.Smialek, Jeanna and Emily Flitter. (2023). Fed Vice Chair Calls Silicon Valley Bank a ‘Textbook Case of Mismanagement’. 27 March 2023. Retrieved from The New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/27/business/economy/fed-silicon-valley-bank-mismanagement.html
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    44.SVB. (2023b). Environmental, Social and Governance Report 2022, A Review of Our Corporate Responsibility Practice. Retrieved from SVB Financial Group: https://www.svb.com/globalassets/library/uploadedfiles/svb_environmental_social_governance_report_2022.pdf
    45.Tufford, H. (2023). Was SVB all about that ESG? 31 March 2023. Retrieved from ESG Now Podcast, MSCI: https://www.msci.com/www/esg-now/was-svb-all-about-that-esg-/03741678197

    中文參考資料及文獻

    1. 中央存款保險公司. (2009). 主要國家對全球金融風暴之因應措施. 存款保險叢書之 119.
    2. 李佳津. (2016). 美國金融機構流動性監管機制之改革-兼論Fed QE退場對銀行流動性之影響. 中央銀行.
    3. 林士貴、李志宏、臧正運、林慶達、蔡煥文、許庭毓. (2022). 以流動性覆蓋比率監控流動性之研究. 存款保險資訊季刊第34卷第4期, 頁 30-35.
    4. 林劭杰. (2011). 台灣地區銀行業抗循環資本緩衝初探. 金融聯合徵信雙月刊第十七期, 頁 11-23.
    5. 金管會. (2014a). 銀行流動性覆蓋比率實施標準.金融監督管理委員會銀行局.
    6. 金管會. (2014b). 流動性覆蓋比率之計算方法說明及表格.金融監督管理委員會銀行局.
    7. 金管會. (2016a). 銀行淨穩定資金比率實施標準.金融監督管理委員會銀行局.
    8. 金管會. (2016b). 淨穩定資金比率之計算方法說明及表格總說明.金融監督管理委員會銀行局.
    9. 陳怡娟. (2021). 我國純網銀流動性風險管理機制. 財團法人台北市外匯市場發展基金會專題研究.
    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    國際金融碩士學位學程
    112ZB1002
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0112ZB1002
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[Master’s Program in Global Banking and Finance] Theses

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