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    题名: 新興政黨合作或競爭之策略性選擇
    Strategic Choices for Emerging Political Parties : Cooperation or Competition
    作者: 張文怡
    Chang, Wen-Yi
    贡献者: 王智賢
    Wang, Jue-Shyan
    張文怡
    Chang, Wen-Yi
    关键词: 成長利益
    子賽局完全均衡
    序列均衡
    Growth interests
    Subgame perfect equilibrium
    Sequential equilibrium
    日期: 2024
    上传时间: 2024-06-03 11:46:09 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 觀察臺灣近二十餘年來的選舉案例中，常有新興政黨與資深政黨合作參選之情形，雙方經利益評估後共同協調聯盟的可能性。本文建立賽局模型，分析在單一選區選舉中，成長利益會如何影響新興與資深政黨間合作競爭關係發展。據子賽局完全均衡結果表明，在滿足一定條件之下，若新興政黨獨自參選的成長利益相對較小時，其會尋求與政治立場相近之資深政黨合作，反之則兩黨各自競爭。另外，在資訊不對稱及序列均衡下，強勢 (s) 及弱勢 (w) 型態之新興小黨會考慮合作所帶來的報酬多寡，以及成長利益的獲取與否來構思競合策略。此外，利益分配、政黨實力以及競選成本也同樣為左右政黨策略的因素。
    Observing election cases in Taiwan over the past two decades, it is common to see cooperation between emerging and established political parties, where both sides assess their interests and coordinate the possibility of forming alliances. This paper establishes a game-theoretic model to analyze how the growth interests affect the cooperation or competition between emerging and established parties in single-district elections. According to the subgame perfect equilibrium results, under certain conditions, if the growth interests of the emerging party running independently are relatively small, it will seek cooperation with established parties that share similar political stances; otherwise, both parties will compete separately. Furthermore, under conditions of asymmetric information and sequential equilibrium, emerging small parties of both strong (s) and weak (w) types will consider the rewards and costs of cooperation, as well as the acquisition of growth interests, in formulating their strategies. Additionally, factors such as interest distribution, party strength, and campaign costs also influence the strategies of both parties.
    參考文獻: I.中文部分

    王智賢、陳虹羽，2022，〈單一選區下三政黨的合作與競爭之賽局分析〉，《選舉研究》，29(1): 1-30。
    田弘華、劉義周，2005，〈政黨合作與杜瓦傑法則:連宋配、國親合的賽局分析〉，《台灣政治學刊》，9(1): 3-37。
    林繼文，2008，〈以輸爲贏：小黨在日本單一選區兩票制下的參選策略〉，《選舉研究》，15(2): 37-66。
    胡祖慶，2006，《政黨合作與結盟》，台北:書泉出版社。
    張肇鏵，2007，〈立法院內政黨合作賽局之研究─權力指數觀點〉，國立臺灣大學國家發展學系碩士學位論文。
    黃秀端，2001，〈單一選區與複數選區 相對多數制下的選民策略投票〉，《東吳政治學報》，13: 37-75。
    鄧宇敦，2002，〈台灣政黨選舉結盟之探究—以國、親、新三黨為例〉，國立成功大學政治經濟研究所碩士學位論文。
    鐘逸群，2019，〈小黨候選人的競選策略：以臺灣的社會民主黨為例〉，淡江大學公共行政學系公共政策碩士班碩士學位論文。


    II.英文部分

    Aumann, R. J., and M. Maschler. 1964. “The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games.” Advances in Game Theory, 52(1), 443-476.
    Best, R. E., and S. B. Lem. 2010. “Electoral Volatility, Competition and Third-Party Candidacies in US Gubernatorial Elections.” Party Politics 17(5): 611-628.
    Cox, G. W. 1997. Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems. Cambridge University Press.
    Fell, Dafydd. 2014. “Measuring and Explaining the Electoral Fortunes of Small Parties in Taiwan’s Party Politics.” Issues and Studies. 50(1): 153-188.
    Kreps, David M., and Robert Wilson. 1982. “Sequential Equilibria.” Econometrica 50(4): 863-894.
    Spoon, J. J. 2011. Political Survival of Small Parties in Europe. University of Michigan Press.
    Staatz, J. M. 1983. “The Cooperative as A Coalition: A Game-Theoretic Approach.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 65(5): 1084-1089.
    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政學系
    111255008
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0111255008
    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[財政學系] 學位論文

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