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| Title: | 經驗如何可能？論經驗類比中的實體概念
How is Experience Possible?On Kant’s Concept of Substance in the Three Analogies of Experience of the First Critique |
| Authors: | 王彥勛
Wang, Yen-Hsun |
| Contributors: | 謝昭銳
Xie, Zhao-Rui
王彥勛
Wang, Yen-Hsun |
| Keywords: | 經驗類比
實體
本源統覺
時間關係
延展統一經驗
限制
Analogies of Experience
Substance
Original Apperception
Temporal Relations
Extended Unified Experience
Limitation |
| Date: | 2024 |
| Issue Date: | 2024-09-04 15:15:10 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 筆者這篇論文的核心是通過《經驗類比》中通過本源統覺與調節性的時間關係在先驗層面上論述一種可以將內感官中新獲得的雜多表象統一的、不斷延展的經驗，以及討論這個延展且統一的經驗在先驗層面上與其他經驗進行區分並具有特定範圍的條件。為了完成這個論述，筆者將首先在第二章中借助艾利森和蓋耶的詮釋對《先驗演繹》、《圖式論》和《一切知性原理的系統論》來說明知性範疇、知性範疇對應的先驗圖式與知性範疇進行具體運用時所需要的原理之間的關聯。接著，筆者將在第三章中借助艾利森和蓋耶的詮釋對知性原理中的三個經驗類比進行梳理以及總結。筆者將在第四章中通過康德在論述三種經驗類比時舉出的例子以及筆者自己的閱讀提出艾利森和蓋耶詮釋的不足，尤其是在經驗的可區分性上以及可具有範圍性上的不足和三種經驗類比協同運用的不足。這些不足都說明主體難以單單憑藉第一類比中的實體的知性運用來解釋經驗本身如何可能與其他經驗相互區分以及經驗本身如何具有一個確定的範圍，而不是任由其持存性使經驗不斷延展下去。同時主體難以單單憑藉第一類比中的實體結合出複雜的、包含具有不同時間模式的客體的經驗，因為三個經驗類比的定義以及知性運用方式都不相同而不能獨斷地認為第二和第三類比所作用的基礎都是第一類比的實體。尤其是考慮到第三類比中諸實體的同時存在是在交互知覺的情況下，即內感官的雜多表象是不連續的情況下預設諸實體的同時存在，這明顯超出了第一類比實體的先驗功能。出於這個原因，筆者將嘗試在第五章中借助前文對三個經驗類比的詮釋以及《經驗類比》當中的重要引文來說明本文的核心觀點。筆者將在第五章第一節中引用《經驗類比》的幾個關鍵引文說明由於所有經驗甚至是認知最終都是通過本源統覺按照某個總體的時間關係對內感官中的雜多表象進行統一的結果，因此涉及三個經驗類比協同運用的經驗在先驗層面上都是統一的。筆者還會通過另外幾段關鍵引文說明本源統覺在按照這個總體的時間關係進行統一時會具有調節性。這個總體的時間關係的調節性體現為本源統覺可以將一個知覺與一個在時間關係中被給予的另一個未被規定的知覺結合起來，並形成具有特定時間模態的經驗。總體時間關係的調節性也體現在三個經驗類比中都有在不具備雜多表象的條件下進行預設的能力，例如當某物發生就可以預設此物接續著某個先前發生的事物。而這種源自總體時間關係的調節性在本源統覺不斷地、自發地作用下就會賦予經驗延展性(發展性)，由此可以說明一個可以做為三種經驗類比協同運用的延展且統一的經驗，這個延展且統一的經驗按照特性也被筆者稱為擴展的實體。筆者將在第五章的第二節介紹直觀公理和知覺預測在先驗層面上的必然性，並說明以此限制延展統一經驗以使其可與其他經驗區分的可能性以即具有特定範圍的可能性。筆者在第五章的第三節將會討論延展統一經驗中具有不同時間狀態的經驗客體或預設客體在調節性的時間關係下的相互限制並說明以此限制延展統一經驗以使其可與其他經驗區分的可能性以即具有特定範圍的可能性。
關鍵詞:經驗類比、實體、本源統覺、時間關係、延展統一經驗、限制、可區分性、可具有範圍性
The core purpose of this paper is to explore, at the transcendental level, how the manifold of new representations and perceptions in inner sense can be unified into an ever-extending experience through the original apperception and regulative temporal relations in the Analogies of Experience, and to discuss the conditions under which this extended and unified experience can be distinguished from other experiences and has a specific scope at the transcendental level. To accomplish this, the author will first, in Chapter Two, use the interpretations of Henry E. Allison and Paul Guyer to explain the connections between the categories of understanding, their corresponding transcendental schemata, and the principles required for their specific application, based on the Transcendental Deduction, the Schematism, and the System of All Principles of Pure Understanding. Next, in Chapter Three, the author will use Allison and Guyer's interpretations to sort out and summarize the three Analogies of Experience. In Chapter Four, through examples given by Kant when discussing the three Analogies and the author's own readings, the author will point out the shortcomings of Allison and Guyer's interpretations, especially in terms of the distinguishability and scope of experiences and the coordination of the three Analogies. These shortcomings indicate that it is difficult for the subject to explain how experiences can be distinguished from other experiences and have a specific scope solely through the intellectual use of substance in the First Analogy, rather than allowing the persistence of experiences to extend indefinitely. Additionally, it is challenging for the subject to combine complex experiences containing objects with different temporal modes solely through the intellectual use of substance in the First Analogy, as the definitions and uses of the three Analogies are different and it cannot be assumed that the basis of the Second and Third Analogies is the substance of the First Analogy. Especially considering that the simultaneous existence of substances in the Third Analogy is presupposed in cases of reciprocal perception, where the manifold of inner sense is discontinuous, which clearly goes beyond the transcendental function of substance in the First Analogy. For this reason, the author will try, in Chapter Five, to explain the core view of this paper through the previous interpretations of the three Analogies and important quotations from the Analogies of Experience. In the first section of Chapter Five, the author will quote several key passages from the Analogies of Experience to explain that since all experiences and even cognitions are ultimately the result of unifying the manifold of inner sense through the original apperception according to an overall temporal relation, even complex experiences involving the coordinated use of the three Analogies, or containing experience objects with all three temporal modes, are unified at the transcendental level. The author will also cite several other key passages to illustrate that the original apperception, when unifying according to this overall temporal relation, has a regulative function. This regulative function of the overall temporal relation is manifested in the original apperception's ability to combine a perception with another perception given in a temporal relation that is not yet determined, forming experiences with specific temporal modalities. The regulative function of the overall temporal relation is also reflected in the three Analogies' ability to make assumptions in the absence of manifold representations, such as when something happens, presupposing it follows something that happened before. This regulative function of the overall temporal relation, continuously and spontaneously active in the original apperception, grants the experience its extensibility (development). Thus, it can be said that an extended and unified experience, serving as the coordinated use of the three Analogies, is an extended substance. In the second section of Chapter Five, the author will introduce the necessity of axioms of intuition and anticipations of perception at the transcendental level, explaining how they limit the extended unified experience so that it can be distinguished from other experiences and have a specific scope. In the third section of Chapter Five, the author will discuss the mutual limitations of experience objects or assumed objects with different temporal states in the extended unified experience under the regulative temporal relations, explaining how these limitations ensure that the extended unified experience can be distinguished from other experiences and have a specific scope.
Keywords: Analogies of Experience, Substance, Original Apperception, Temporal Relations, Extended Unified Experience, Limitation, Distinguishability, Scope of Experience |
| Reference: | Kritik der reinen Vernunft, (1781/1787)
鄧曉茫, 2017,《純粹理性批判》,人民出版社第二版;
李秋零,2004,《純粹理性批判》,中國人民大學出版社;
Westphal, K. (2004). Kant's Transcendental Proof of Realism, Cambridge University Press.
Henry E. Allison. (2004). Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense. -Yale University Press
Paul Guyer. (1987). Kant and the Claims of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
Katharina T. Kraus. (2020). Kant on Self-Knowledge and Self-Formation: The Nature of -Inner Experience. Cambridge University Press.
Ginsborg Hannah. (2006). Kant and the Problem of Experience. Philosophical Topics, 70-80.
CleveJames. (1979). Substance, Matter, and Kant's First Analogy. Kant Studien , 151-157.
Sutherland Daniel. (2005). The point of Kant's axioms of intuition. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 140-146. |
| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
哲學系
109154009 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0109154009 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [哲學系] 學位論文
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