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| Title: | 銀行董監股權質押對銀行信用風險之影響
The Impact of Share Pledging by Bank Directors and Supervisors on Bank Credit Risks |
| Authors: | 李承澔
LEE, CHENG-HAO |
| Contributors: | 湛可南
Chan, Konan
李承澔
LEE, CHENG-HAO |
| Keywords: | 股權質押
銀行信用風險
逾期放款(不良債權)
銀行規模
內部人誘因
風險行為
Share Pledging
Bank Credit Risk
Non-Performing Loans
Bank Size
Insider Incentives
Risk Behaviors |
| Date: | 2025 |
| Issue Date: | 2025-07-01 14:51:10 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 本研究探討銀行董監事進行股權質押對銀行信用風險的影響，補足現有文獻對此議題的忽略。以 2007 年至 2024 年之台灣 29 家銀行為樣本，實證結果顯示：銀行董監質押與銀行逾期放款比率呈顯著負相關，顯示董監事個人的財務（質押）壓力可能促使董監事採取更為保守的放款策略，且此效果在中小型銀行中更為明顯。此外，銀行董監質押比例較高時，異常放款成長亦顯著降低，進一步驗證了銀行董監個人的財務誘因對銀行放款行為的傳導機制。本研究進一步使用雙重差分模型處理內生性問題，採用 2011 年台灣《公司法》第 197-1 條限制質押股票投票權之修正案作為外生衝擊，發現該修正案施行後高質押銀行的逾期放款比率上升，顯示證實之因果關係成立。本研究亦透過多項穩健性檢定（包含替換銀行信用風險的應變數、調整實證研究的設定條件），證實主要結果之穩定性。本研究不僅填補質押與銀行風險領域文獻的空白，也揭示董監股權質押為影響銀行信用穩定的重要因子之一，並突顯銀行規模的重要調節角色。
This study investigates how share pledging by directors and supervisors (D&Ss) of banks influences bank credit risk, a topic largely overlooked in the existing literature. Using a panel dataset of 29 Taiwanese banks from 2007 to 2024, the analysis finds a negative association between D&Ss pledging and non-performing loan ratios, suggesting that bank D&Ss’ financial (pledging) pressure may incentivize conservative lending behavior and lower bank credit risk. This effect is more pronounced in smaller banks. Moreover, abnormal loan growth is significantly reduced under high pledging conditions, confirming a behavioral transmission channel. To address endogeneity, a difference-in-differences design leveraging the 2011 amendment to Taiwan’s Company Act that restricts the voting right of pledged shares shows that after the 2011 amendment banks with high D&Ss pledging have increased non-performing loan ratio, which further supports the causal relationship of empirical results. Multiple robustness tests—using alternative bank credit risk proxies and different empirical specifications—validate the findings. This study bridges pledging and banking risk research, highlights pledging as a potential determinant of bank credit stability, and reveals the moderating role of bank size. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
財務管理學系
112357020 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0112357020 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [財務管理學系] 學位論文
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