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Title: | 資本所得稅、通貨膨脹門檻、與經濟成長:訊息不對稱的角色 Capital Income Tax, Inflation Threshold, and Economic Growth: the Role of Asymmetric Information |
Authors: | 洪福聲 |
Contributors: | 經濟系 |
Keywords: | 資本所得稅;鑄幣稅;訊息不對稱;通貨膨脹門檻;經濟成長;信用分配 Capital Income Taxation;Seigniorage;Asymmetric Information;Inflation Threshold;Economic Growth;Credit Rationinng |
Date: | 2019-09 |
Issue Date: | 2025-07-16 11:12:47 (UTC+8) |
Abstract: | 為了提高資本投資,傳統的經濟理論認為最適的資本所得稅率應該為零。當資本所得稅率等於零時,資本投資的稅後報酬率最高,人們會因而提高儲蓄,進而提升資本投資。若資本所得稅率等於零,則政府資本所得稅收也會等於零。但許多的研究卻顯示,資本所得稅收在政府的所有稅收中佔有顯著的比例。本計畫第一年,擬將資本市場的訊息不對稱,納入一個內生經濟成長(AK)模型,探討資本所得稅的必要性,以期調和理論與實際的差異。值得一提的是,現存訊息不對稱的文獻大都認為資本所得課稅會扭曲訊息不對稱的嚴重程度,惡化信用分配(credit rationing,想借錢投資的人借不到)的現象,進而導致太少的資本投資。因此若直接將現存文獻的訊息不對稱與AK模型結合,除非同時加入其他的因素,否則最適資本稅率恐怕還是為零。為了能夠達到調和資本所得稅理論與實際的差異,第一年計畫擬在內生成長模型中建立一個新的訊息不對稱架構,在未考量其他因素之下,可以使得訊息不對稱與正的最適的資本所得稅率同時存在。這個計畫的完成可以調和現存理論與實際的差異,具有潛在的學術貢獻。第二年計畫延伸第一年所建立的理論模型,將資本課稅修正為對廠商的產出課稅。在AK模型中,對產出課稅等同於同時對資本與勞動課相同的稅率,透過第一年的計畫,我們將先建立訊息不對稱與正的最適產出稅率同時存在的模型,且當產出稅率低(高)於這個最適的稅率時,稅率的增加將伴隨著資本投資及經濟成長率的增加(減少)。接著考量政府同時運用課稅稅收與鑄幣稅收以融通外生給定的政府支出比例,當貨幣當局決定貨幣的成長率後,鑄幣稅收就被決定,剩下不足的部分由課稅支應。在此架構下,我們可由政府的預算限制式,建立貨幣成長率與產出稅率的關係,並藉此建立通貨膨脹與經濟成長非線性關係。由於通貨膨脹與經濟成長的非線性關係已經為實證文獻所證實,第二年的計畫可提供一個全新的管道得到此一非線性關係。此外,近期實證文獻發現,造成通膨與經濟成長非線性關係的門檻水準,在已開發國家要比開發中國家低;但這個結果的背後原因,尚無理論文獻探究。由於已開發國家的金融發展程度要比開發中國家高,故已開發國家訊息不對稱嚴重程度(及信用分配嚴重程度)要比開發中國家輕微。據此,第二年計畫將凸顯已開發國家與開發中國家訊息不對稱(及信用分配)嚴重程度的差異,進而探究這個差異如何影響政府的支出融通政策及通膨與經濟成長非線性關係的門檻水準。 Traditional economic theory asserts that a zero-tax-rate on capital incomes can enhance capital investment. Specifically, when the tax rate is equal to zero, one can derive the highest rate of after-tax returns for capital investment, which increases savings and hence capital investment. If the tax rate on capital incomes is equal to zero, government tax revenues from capital incomes is also equal to zero. Nevertheless, recent studies have found that tax revenues from capital/corporate incomes account for a significant proportion of government tax revenues. The purpose the first-year project is to incorporate asymmetric information with an AK-type model of endogenous growth and then to probe the possibility that the optimal tax rate on capital incomes is positive. It is worth noting that recent models of asymmetric information claim that capital income taxation exacerbates the problem of asymmetric information and raises the incidence of credit rationing (i.e., some borrowers cannot receive a loan). Thus, unless we simultaneously incorporate other factors, the optimal tax rate on capital incomes must be equal to zero if we simply adopt the structure of asymmetric information in recent studies. To accomplish our purpose, we will develop a new structure of asymmetric information in this project and incorporate it with an AK-type model of endogenous growth. By so doing, the first-year project is able to reconcile the theories and practices of asymmetric information and capital income taxation. The second-year project intends to add money into the first-year model and revise capital income taxation into output taxation. In an AK-type model of endogenous growth, taxation on output is equivalent to taxation on both capital and labor incomes. Through the first-year model, a positive rate of optimal taxation can be obtained if an increase in the tax rate increases (decreases) capital investment and economic growth when initial tax rates are less (greater) than the optimal tax rate on output. By assuming that the government finances its exogenously-given expenditures by seigniorage and output taxation, we can obtain a correlation between the tax rate on output and the growth rate of money. This correlation will be further explored to obtain a non-linear relationship between inflation and economic growth, a result that is confirmed by many empirical studies. Given this, the second-year project is able to generate a nonlinear relationship between inflation and economic growth from a new perspective. Moreover, some researchers have further discovered that the threshold level of inflation in the inflation-growth relationship is lower in developed countries than in developing ones. However, recent theoretical studies are not able to yield this empirical result and hence fail to provide a theoretical explanation. It is worth noting that the problem of asymmetric information (and hence the incidence of credit rationing) is more severe in developing countries than in developed ones. Based on this disparity between developed and developing countries, the second-year project will examine how the severity of asymmetric information influences government policy of expenditure financing and, through this channel, affects the threshold level of inflation in the inflation-growth relationship. |
Relation: | 科技部, MOST107-2410-H004-015, 107.08-108.07 |
Data Type: | report |
Appears in Collections: | [經濟學系] 國科會研究計畫
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