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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/158549


    Title: 營利事業利用擴大書審制度及推計課稅逃漏稅之研究
    A Study on Corporate Income Tax Evasion through the Use of the Expanded Paper Review System and Presumptive Taxation in Taiwan
    Authors: 洪世皇
    Hong, Shih-Huang
    Contributors: 翁堃嵐
    洪世皇
    Hong, Shih-Huang
    Keywords: 擴大書審制
    推計課稅
    逃漏稅
    預期效用理論
    查核機率
    申報純益率
    Expanded Paper Review System
    Presumptive Taxation
    Tax Evasion
    Expected Utility Theory
    Audit Probability
    Declared Profit Rate
    Date: 2025
    Issue Date: 2025-08-04 14:21:23 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本研究旨在探討營利事業於我國「擴大書面審核制度」與「推計課稅機制」並存之稅制環境下,其在面對查核不確定性與制度誘因時所採取之逃漏稅策略。本文基於 Allingham and Sandmo(1972)預期效用模型,建構一套同時納入申報收入與申報成本費用為決策變數之理論架構,進一步分析稅捐機關對申報資料採收入推計與成本核實之不對稱處分方式,對營利事業最適申報行為之影響。
    模型推導結果指出:第一,在現行制度下,營利事業不會選擇浮報成本費用;第二,當擴大書審率偏低時,因隱藏成本費用之邊際租稅利益較低,營利事業將採取部分隱藏策略;第三,當擴大書審率偏高時,因隱藏成本費用之邊際租稅利益較高,企業無論成本結構如何,皆將採取完全隱匿策略。
    本研究之主要貢獻為:(一)提出兼具申報收入與申報成本的雙變數模型,補足現有文獻對逃漏稅決策探討之不足;(二)揭示查核與處罰制度不對稱對營利事業行為的誘因效果;(三)提供數理化邊界條件以分析最適申報策略;(四)對未來調整擴大書審門檻、提高查核密度與強化罰則設計,提出具體政策建議。
    This study investigates the tax evasion strategies of corporate taxpayers under Taiwan’s dual-system structure of the Expanded Paper Review System and Presumptive Taxation. Building on the expected utility framework of Allingham and Sandmo (1972), this research develops a theoretical model that incorporates both declared revenue and declared cost as decision variables. The model examines how asymmetric enforcement—presumptive taxation on revenue and factual verification with penalties on costs—affects firms’ optimal reporting behavior under the dual thresholds of the expanded review regime.

    The analytical results yield four key propositions: (1) firms have no incentive to over-report costs under the current system ; (2) when the standard profit rate is low , , the marginal tax benefit of concealing costs and expenses is limited, prompting firms to adopt a partial concealment strategy; and (3) when the standard rate is high, the marginal tax benefit of concealing costs and expenses becomes significant, leading firms—regardless of their cost structure—to adopt a full concealment strategy .

    This study contributes to the literature by: (i) introducing a two-variable model that better captures real-world reporting strategies; (ii) identifying the behavioral consequences of asymmetric tax enforcement; (iii) providing mathematically derived boundary conditions for optimal evasion decisions; and (iv) offering policy recommendations to enhance tax compliance
    Reference: 一、中文部分
    朱敬一(1988)。臺灣營利事業所得稅逃漏的成因與指標:MIMIC 模型的應用。《經濟論文叢刊》,16,481–489。
    吳欣蕙、陳國樑(2020)。現行擴大書面審核制度良窳評估。《財稅研究》,49(4),74–108。
    林隆昌(2004)。適用擴大書審公司購買保單之所得稅分析。《實用稅務》,350,77–85。
    芮昌旭(1984)。擴大書面審核措施與營利事業所得稅之課徵。《財稅研究》,16(6), 146–153。
    徐傳英(1997)。擴大書審之探討與因應建議。《實用稅務》,275,24–29。
    陳佩芬(2004)。營利事業以擴大書審方式申報應注意事項。《稅務旬刊》,1892,18–20。
    陳明進(2006)。稽徵機關稅務查核對營利事業短漏報所得之影響。《經濟論文(中央研究院經濟研究所)》,34(2),213–250。
    張龍憲(1999)。擴大書面審核不是萬靈丹。《實用稅務》,2–13,11–13 頁。
    張五益(1984)。擴大書面審核不是所得稅稽徵的正辦。《實用稅務》,3–18,7–8 頁。
    張仕政(2013)。擴大書審於法無據。《稅務旬刊》,2223,12–14 頁。
    黃士洲(2021)。擴大書審稅制的法律觀點-從租稅法律主義、量能課稅原則切入。《月旦財稅實務釋評》,14,8–15。
    游敏慧、吳朝欽(2015)。我國擴大書審制度之稅務規避問題研究。《財稅研究》,46(2),89–110。
    翁堃嵐(2005)。論推定計稅。《經濟論文》,33(2),141–171。
    鄭伃君, 楊子霆, 韓幸紋. (2020). 租稅稽查與廠商租稅逃漏-來自擴大書審廠商的證據. 《經濟論文》, 48(4), 475-509.


    二、 英文部分
    Allingham, M. G. and A. Sandmo, (1972). Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis, Journal of Public Economics, 1, 3-4, 323-338.
    Chu, C.Y. Cyrus (1990).A model of income tax evasion with group conformity and social customs,Economics Letters, 32(2), 147–152.
    Cowell, F. A. (1990). Cheating the government: The economics of evasion. MIT Press.
    Graetz, M., Reinganum, J., and Wilde, L. (1986). The tax compliance game: Toward an interactive theory of law enforcement. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2(1), 1–32.
    Hanlon, M., and Heitzman, S. (2010). A review of tax research. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50(2–3), 127–178.
    Kreutzer, D., and Lee, D. R. (1986). On taxation and understated monopoly profits. National Tax Journal, 39(2), 241–243.
    Ueng, K.L., Yang, C.C., 2000. Taxation with little administration. Journal of Public Economics 75,145–156
    Ueng, K. L. G., and Yang, C. C. (2001). Plea bargaining with the IRS: Extensions and further results. Journal of Public Economics, 81(1), 83–98. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00089-X
    Wang, L. F. S., and Conant, J. L. (1988). Corporate tax and output decisions of uncertain monopolist. National Tax Journal, 41(4), 579–581.
    Wang, L. F. S. (1990). Tax evasion and monopoly output decisions with endogenous probability of detection. Public Finance Quarterly, 18(4), 480–487.
    Witte, A. D., and Woodbury, D. F. (1985). The effect of tax laws and tax administration on tax compliance: The case of the U.S. individual income tax, National Tax Journal, 38, 1-14.
    Yaniv, G. (1995). A note on the tax-evading firm. National Tax Journal, 48(1), 113–120.
    Yaniv, G. (1996). Tax evasion and output decisions. Public Finance Quarterly, 24(4), 501–505.
    Yitzhaki, S. (1974). A note on income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis. Journal of Public Economics, 3(2), 201–202.

    三、 相關網站
    Google 學術搜尋,https://scholar.google.com。
    財政部網站,https://www.mof.gov.tw。
    全國法規資料庫,https://law.moj.gov.tw。
    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政學系
    108255033
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108255033
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 學位論文

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