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Title: | 拉丁美洲5G安全化:以華爲禁令的比較研究爲例 5G securitization in Latin America: a comparative study of reactions to Huawei ban |
Authors: | 何玥彤 Ho, Yueh-Tung |
Contributors: | 馮慕文 Fabricio Antonio Fonseca Fernandez 何玥彤 Ho, Yueh-Tung |
Keywords: | 拉丁美洲 5G 安全化 華為 Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) 5G Securitization Huawei |
Date: | 2025 |
Issue Date: | 2025-08-04 15:17:24 (UTC+8) |
Abstract: | 全球在 5G 電信技術上的競爭,在很大程度上受到國家安全考量的影響,而國 家安全疑慮已成為美國主導之安全化(securitization)論述的核心議題。隨著華為逐 漸成為 5G 領域的領導企業,美國已開始施壓其盟友,要求禁止華為參與其國內的 5G 建設。本論文以 5G 作為美國與中國之間戰略競爭的替代(proxy),並針對巴 西、厄瓜多與哥斯大黎加三個國家進行比較案例分析,聚焦於這三國在拉丁美洲推 動 5G 建設背景下,對華為禁令所做出的不同回應。本文主要依循安全化理論中的 Three Faces of Securitization,以及運用了「新古典現實主義」理論框架,探討為何 有些國家選擇禁用華為,而有些國家則否。 研究顯示,美國在 5G 議題上推動安全化策略的成效,取決於各國的國內層級 變數,而具體的背景因素(contextual factors)則可能強化或削弱美國所施加的影響 力。政治意識形態本身並非左右是否禁用華為的決定性因素。儘管發展需求是國家 考量之一,其影響主要反映在 5G 頻譜拍賣及其附帶條件的設計,而非直接導致全 面禁止華為的政策選擇。本文也發現貿易與投資作為影響 5G 政策決策的經濟因素 的重要性,而貸款則無此作用。巴西對中國的高度貿易依賴促使其採取務實態度; 厄瓜多由於對中國的債務承擔而走向較為平衡的政策;而哥斯大黎加與中國經濟聯 繫相對有限,使美國的 5G 安全化策略得以成功。本文填補了既有文獻在拉丁美洲 國家 5G 政策決策方面的不足,透過比較案例的方式揭示結構性因素與國內變項在 外交政策決策過程中的複雜互動,並提供新的實證分析。 The global competition over 5G telecommunications has been significantly shaped by national security concerns, which have become the central securitization discourse promoted by the United States. As Huawei emerged as a dominant player in 5G technology, the U.S. began urging its allies to ban the company. This thesis uses 5G as a proxy for examining the broader U.S.-China rivalry and conducts a comparative analysis of Brazil, Ecuador, and Costa Rica, focusing on their varied responses to the Huawei ban within the context of 5G adoption in Latin America. Following the theoretical concepts of the Three Faces of Securitization and applying the theoretical frameworks of Neoclassical Realism, the study investigates why some countries chose to ban Huawei while others did not. The findings suggest that the success of the U.S. 5G securitization strategy was critically shaped by national-level variables, with contextual factors either amplifying or minimizing U.S. influence. Political ideology alone was not decisive; although development concerns were present, they primarily affected auction conditions rather than resulting in a full ban. Furthermore, the thesis highlights the significance of trade and investment as economic factors in 5G policy decisions, whereas loans are not considered significant. Brazil’s substantial trade reliance on China fostered a pragmatic stance; Ecuador’s debt obligations to China led to a more balanced approach; and Costa Rica’s limited economic ties with China that facilitated the success of U.S. securitization. This thesis contributes to filling a gap in the literature by providing a comparative analysis of Latin American countries’ decision-making processes regarding 5G and Huawei, offering new insights into the complex interplay of structural and domestic factors in foreign policy decisions. |
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Description: | 碩士 國立政治大學 外交學系 112253015 |
Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0112253015 |
Data Type: | thesis |
Appears in Collections: | [外交學系] 學位論文
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