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| Title: | 務實的半導體外交：利用全球供應鏈促進美中穩定，同時增強國家安全
Pragmatic Semiconductor Diplomacy: Leveraging Global Supply Chains for U.S. - China Stability While Bolstering National Security |
| Authors: | 雷沛陽
Prayon, Blake |
| Contributors: | 袁力強
Yuan, Li-Chung
雷沛陽
Blake Prayon |
| Keywords: | 供應鏈
國家安全
務實主義
半導體
supply chains
national security
pragmatism
semiconductors |
| Date: | 2025 |
| Issue Date: | 2025-09-01 15:00:35 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 在當前的全球體系下，科技——尤其是半導體——在國與國之間的關係中扮演著日益重要的角色，因為安全與經濟利益高度依賴這些技術，以及一個國家在這些關鍵技術貿易中的地位。處於這場科技戰前線的是兩個大國：美國與中國。然而，問題在於，當其中一個大國（美國）——這個曾經是唯一霸權的國家——試圖以犧牲其他國家為代價來維持其在全球秩序中的地位時，就會引發衝突。這種行為可以用現實主義來解釋，即這個國家認為國際體系本質上是一種無政府狀態，因此必須採取自利的行動以確保自身安全與利益。
然而，認為世界處於無政府狀態且各國之間無法合作的這種觀點，本身就是一種「自我實現」的價值觀，這可以透過建構主義來理解。換句話說，更為友善與合作的國與國關係，以及其相關價值觀，是可以被「建構」出來的。因此，使用建構主義來解釋美國許多外交政策決定是十分重要的，因為這些決策並非客觀事實，而是多年來文化植入與社會共識所形成的價值選擇。像是對中國實施制裁、針對其本土半導體產業的政策，以及引發貿易戰等行為，其實都助長了兩個大國之間關係的惡化。
Under the current global system, technology, more importantly, semiconductors, hold an ever important role in the relations between states, as security and economic concerns are heavily reliant on these technologies and a country's role in trading these key technologies. At the forefront of this technology battle are two Great Powers; The United States and China. A problem arises, however, when one power (The US), which was previously the sole hegemonic power, seeks to retain its place in the global order at the expense of other states. A state doing this could be given a prescription of Realism, in which it takes these actions due to the idea that the world is in a state of anarchy without these moves. However, the ideals that the world is in a state of anarchy and other states cannot be cooperated with is in and of itself a self inducing value which can be described through Constructivism, meaning a more hospitable form of state-state relations and its subsequent values can be constructed. It is important to use constructivism to explain how many US foreign policy decisions are not a fact of the matter, but instead values that were agreed upon by years of cultural implantation, and that policy decisions such as sanctions, targeting of domestic semiconductor products of a country like China, and a trade war, are conducive to the relationship between the two great powers worsening. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
亞太研究英語碩士學位學程(IMAS)
112926011 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0112926011 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [亞太研究英語博/碩士學位學程(IDAS/IMAS)] 學位論文
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