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| Title: | 美國對中國半導體產業的出口管制政策：川普與拜登政府時期的演變與影響評估
U.S. Export Control Policies on China’s Semiconductor Industry: Evolution and Impact Assessment under the Trump and Biden Administrations |
| Authors: | 陳彥睿
Chen, Yen-Jui |
| Contributors: | 薛健吾
Hsueh, Chien-Wu
陳彥睿
Chen, Yen-Jui |
| Keywords: | 權力轉移理論
出口管制
半導體產業
美中科技競爭
供應鏈重組
小院高牆
Power transition theory
Export Control
Semiconductor industry
U.S.-China tech competition
Supply chain restructuring
Small yard high fence |
| Date: | 2025 |
| Issue Date: | 2025-09-01 16:33:33 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 本研究旨在探討美國對中國半導體出口管制政策的演變與影響，核心研究問題有三：第一，美國為封鎖中國半導體產業，採取了哪些具體的出口管制策略、政策工具及其演變歷程？ 第二，這些管制對中國半導體產業的實際衝擊、政策有效性與中方的應對策略為何？ 第三，從全球視角觀察，這些措施是促使半導體供應鏈更趨集中與陣營化，還是更趨分散與多元化？
研究發現，首先，在政策演進上，美國對中半導體管制已從貿易爭端深化為一套以國家安全為核心的體系化科技圍堵架構 。川普政府開啟了以「實體清單」和「外國直接產品規則」為主的限制；拜登政府則在此基礎上，推行更精緻化的「小院高牆」策略，將管制範圍擴展至技術、資本、人才等層面，並透過《晶片與科學法案》、對外投資審查等新興工具，建構了一個日益強調盟友協同的全面性圍堵架構。此一進程不僅是政策的升級，更體現了權力轉移理論中，守成霸權為延緩權力轉移而採取的預防性遏制行動。
其次，在對中國的影響與政策有效性評估上，本研究認為美國的管制確實成功遲滯了中國獲取最尖端技術的步伐，並顯著提高了其研發成本，達成了「延緩」而非「遏止」的階段性目標。然而，中國憑藉強大的國家動員與產業韌性，透過加速國產替代、聚焦成熟製程、以及採取多樣化規避手段，在相當程度上緩解了衝擊。因此，美國的封鎖效果是有限的，且外部壓力反而激化了中國的自主決心，長期可能催生更具獨立性的競爭對手。此一結果顯示崛起挑戰者的強大「能動性」：美國的極限施壓，雖成功遲滯其尖端技術步伐，卻也極大地降低了中國對現狀的滿意度，反而激化其採取加速國產替代、聚焦成熟製程等「削弱」策略，從而使封鎖的長期效果呈現有限性與反作用力。
最後，在全球供應鏈影響方面，研究結論並非單一的集中或分散，而是一場集中與分散並存的複雜轉型。一方面，在先進製程、關鍵設備等尖端領域，美國正推動供應鏈向其與核心盟友的「陣營化集中」；但另一方面，中國為應對封鎖而加速建構的平行供應鏈體系，以及全球企業為分散風險將封測等環節移至東南亞等地的趨勢，則共同促成了供應鏈的「區域化分散」與「雙軌化」。全球半導體產業正從過去追求效率的單一中心模式，轉向一個地緣政治主導、多中心並存的新格局。
This study examines the evolution and impact of U.S. semiconductor export controls against China, addressing three core research questions: First, what specific export control strategies, policy instruments, and evolutionary trajectories has the United States employed to restrict China's semiconductor industry? Second, what are the actual impacts of these controls on China's semiconductor sector, their policy effectiveness, and China's corresponding response strategies? Third, from a global perspective, have these measures led to greater concentration and bloc formation in semiconductor supply chains, or to increased dispersion and diversification?
The research findings reveal, first, regarding policy evolution, that U.S. semiconductor controls against China have evolved from trade disputes into a comprehensive systemic technological containment framework centered on national security considerations. The Trump administration initiated restrictions primarily through the “Entity List” and “Foreign Direct Product Rule”; the Biden administration has built upon this foundation by implementing a more sophisticated “small yard, high fence” strategy, expanding controls to encompass technology, capital, and talent dimensions, and constructing an increasingly comprehensive containment architecture emphasizing allied coordination through new instruments such as the CHIPS and Science Act and Outbound Investment Security Program. This progression represents not merely policy escalation, but embodies the preventive containment actions taken by a status quo hegemon to delay power transition, as predicted by power transition theory.
Second, concerning impact assessment and policy effectiveness vis-à-vis China, this study argues that U.S. controls have indeed successfully delayed China's access to cutting-edge technologies and significantly increased its R&D costs, achieving the phased objective of “delaying” rather than “halting” development. However, leveraging robust state mobilization capacity and industrial resilience, China has substantially mitigated these impacts through accelerated domestic substitution, focus on mature process technologies, and diverse circumvention measures. Consequently, the U.S. blockade effect remains limited, and external pressure has paradoxically intensified China's determination for self-reliance, potentially catalyzing the emergence of a more independent competitor in the long term. This outcome demonstrates the powerful “agency” of rising challengers: while U.S. maximum pressure has successfully delayed China's advanced technological progress, it has also significantly diminished China's satisfaction with the status quo, thereby intensifying its adoption of “undermining” strategies such as accelerated domestic substitution and focus on mature processes, rendering the long-term effectiveness of the blockade both limited and counterproductive.
Finally, regarding global supply chain implications, the research conclusion reveals not a singular pattern of concentration or dispersion, but rather a complex transformation characterized by the coexistence of both trends. On one hand, in advanced process technologies and critical equipment sectors, the United States is promoting supply chain “bloc-based concentration” toward itself and core allies; conversely, China's accelerated construction of parallel supply chain systems in response to the blockade, combined with global enterprises' trend of relocating assembly and testing operations to Southeast Asia and other regions for risk diversification, has collectively fostered “regional dispersion” and “dual-track” development of supply chains. The global semiconductor industry is transitioning from a previous efficiency-oriented single-center model toward a new paradigm characterized by geopolitical dominance and multi-center coexistence. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
東亞研究所
109260012 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0109260012 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [東亞研究所] 學位論文
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