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| 題名: | 董事忙碌異質性與企業績效之關係
Busy Director Heterogeneity and Firm Performance |
| 作者: | 施昊廷
Shih, Haw-Ting |
| 貢獻者: | 車倫周
Cha, Yun-Ju
施昊廷
Shih, Haw-Ting |
| 關鍵詞: | 董事會忙碌程度
公司績效
專業背景
異質性
集團公司
ROA
臺灣
Board Busyness
Firm Performance
Heterogeneity
Professional Background
Business Group
Return on Assets (ROA)
Taiwan |
| 日期: | 2025 |
| 上傳時間: | 2025-09-01 16:36:49 (UTC+8) |
| 摘要: | 本研究旨在探討董事會忙碌程度對公司營運績效之影響，並進一步分析董事背景、公司特性與集團結構是否會影響此關係。利用台灣上市公司 2010 年至 2023 年共 9,771筆公司年度資料，並以資本市場上普遍採用的董事席次資料衡量董事忙碌程度，我們發現：董事會越忙碌，其所屬公司之資產報酬率（ROA）表現越差。
本研究的結果呼應 Peng、Chu 與 Huang（2025）對「灰色董事」U 形效果之發現，但更進一步指出：董事忙碌對績效的負面效應主要集中於（i）缺乏財務、會計或法律專業背景的忙碌董事，以及（ii）其兼職全數集中於同一企業集團的情境。此外，此效應在大型企業與非科技產業樣本中特別顯著，顯示監督需求越高的公司對董事時間匱乏更為敏感。相較於 Peng 等人聚焦於董事獨立性與灰色董事比例，本研究直接拆解「忙碌程度」的異質性來源，並採用較長樣本期間與年份和產業固定效果模型。
上述結果顯示，董事會忙碌程度並非一概而論，其對公司績效的影響會隨董事特質與任職結構而異，為企業與監理機關在董事遴選與治理設計上提供政策建議。
This study investigates the impact of board member busyness on firm performance and further examines whether this relationship is affected by directors’ backgrounds, firm characteristics, and group structures. Using 9,771 firm-year observations from Taiwanese listed firms between 2010 and 2023, and measuring busyness by the number of external directorships, a common approach in capital market research, we find that firms with busier boards tend to exhibit lower return on assets (ROA).
Our findings reinforce the U-shaped effect of grey directors documented by Peng, Chu, and Huang (2025), but go further to show that the negative performance impact of busyness is most pronounced when (i) directors lack professional backgrounds in finance, accounting, or law, and (ii) their outside board seats are all concentrated within the same business group. These effects are especially strong in large firms and non-technology industries, where monitoring demands are higher.
Unlike Peng et al., who focus on board independence and the proportion of grey directors, our study decomposes the sources of busyness heterogeneity and employs a longer sample period with year and industry fixed effects. The results suggest that the governance consequences of board busyness are not uniform and depend on director attributes and structural context. These insights offer policy implications for director selection and board governance design. |
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| 描述: | 碩士
國立政治大學
財務管理學系
112357027 |
| 資料來源: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0112357027 |
| 資料類型: | thesis |
| 顯示於類別: | [財務管理學系] 學位論文
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