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| Title: | 氣候風險、薪酬激勵與利害關係人議合
Climate Risk, Incentive Compensation, and Stakeholder Engagement |
| Authors: | 林志宇 |
| Contributors: | 陳嬿如
Chen, Yenn-Ru
林志宇 |
| Keywords: | 永續薪酬激勵
利害關係人議合
氣候風險
ESG-linked Compensation
stakeholder Engagement
Climate Risk |
| Date: | 2025 |
| Issue Date: | 2025-09-01 16:37:17 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 2019年美國企業圓桌論壇新版《企業目的聲明》強調應為利害關係人創造長期價值，但實務上企業在外部危機下仍傾向優先保護股東利益，且高階管理層薪酬制度多以股東報酬率為核心，形成內在矛盾。過去文獻多聚焦於永續激勵對營運與永續績效的影響，對永續激勵與利害關係人議合間的關係著墨甚少，主因在於議合程度難以量化。本研究結合大型語言模型，建立企業議合水準的判斷方法，探討永續激勵對議合的影響，並檢驗議合作為是否獲得市場正向反應，同時將氣候風險納入分析以觀察外部情境對管理者執行議合行為的影響。
本研究以2016年至2023年美國S&P 500成分股企業為觀察對象，篩選後獲得2,701筆觀察值，並以S&P ESG評分進行穩健性測試。實證結果顯示，企業整體更重視內部利害關係人（股東與員工）及社會層面，對供應鏈（供應商與客戶）的議合程度則相對較低。薪酬制度中納入永續激勵可顯著促進企業與客戶之間的議合，且企業會依氣候風險壓力調整議合策略，相較於高氣候風險，企業在低氣候風險更顯著採取議合行動。穩健性分析進一步發現，永續激勵能顯著提升ESG評分，反映管理者傾向選擇較易量化且可觀察的永續績效指標來達成激勵目標。然而，無論議合水準或ESG評分，對市場價值（Tobin’s Q）均未呈現顯著影響，顯示市場難以及時辨識並評價企業的議合表現。
In 2019, the revised Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation issued by the U.S. Business Roundtable emphasized creating long-term value for stakeholders. However, in practice, companies under external crises still tend to prioritize protecting shareholder interests, and executive compensation schemes are often centered on shareholder returns, creating an inherent contradiction. Previous literature has mostly focused on the impact of sustainability incentives on operational and sustainability performance, with relatively little attention given to the relationship between sustainability incentives and stakeholder engagement, primarily because engagement levels are difficult to quantify. This study leverages large language models to develop a method for assessing corporate engagement levels, examines the effect of sustainability incentives on engagement, and further investigates whether such engagement activities receive positive market responses. Climate risk is also incorporated into the analysis to observe how external contexts influence managers’ engagement behaviors.
This study takes U.S. S&P 500 constituent companies from 2016 to 2023 as the research sample, yielding 2,701 observations after screening, and employs the S&P ESG scores for robustness testing. The empirical results show that companies generally place greater emphasis on internal stakeholders (shareholders and employees) and the social dimension, while engagement with supply chain stakeholders (suppliers and customers) is relatively low. Incorporating sustainability incentives into compensation schemes significantly promotes engagement between companies and customers, and companies adjust their engagement strategies according to climate risk pressure—compared with high climate risk, companies are more likely to engage with stakeholders under low climate risk. Robustness analysis further finds that sustainability incentives significantly improve ESG scores, reflecting managers’ tendency to choose more easily quantifiable and observable sustainability performance indicators to achieve incentive targets. However, neither engagement levels nor ESG scores have a significant effect on market value (Tobin’s Q), indicating that the market finds it difficult to promptly identify and assess corporate engagement performance. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
財務管理學系
112357040 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0112357040 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [財務管理學系] 學位論文
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