English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 27 |  Items with full text/Total items : 94986/125531 (76%)
Visitors : 31066550      Online Users : 433
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/22323

    Title: Resource Rivalry and Endogenous Lobby
    Authors: 王智賢;古慧雯;陳添枝
    Wang, Jue-Shyan;Koo, Hui-wen;Chen, Tain-Jy
    Keywords: Trade protection;Resource allocation;Auction
    Date: 2006-12
    Issue Date: 2009-01-06 15:23:56 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: We present a two-sector model to depict the determination of trade preference. The model highlights lobby as a rivalry between sectors in competition for resources where the outcome of the lobby race is determined by each sector’s ability to generate rent at a given welfare cost to the general population. We investigate the relation between the structure of trade protection and the resource endowment.
    Relation: Japan and the World Economy,18(4),488-511
    Data Type: article
    DOI 連結: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.japwor.2004.12.003
    DOI: 10.1016/j.japwor.2004.12.003
    Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 期刊論文

    Files in This Item:

    File SizeFormat
    29.pdf325KbAdobe PDF1254View/Open

    All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

    社群 sharing

    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback