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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/30199
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/30199


    Title: 我國獨立董事制度與法令環境之關聯性研究
    Authors: 邱素芬
    Contributors: 郭弘卿
    邱素芬
    Keywords: 獨立董事
    監督績效
    結構性改變
    independent directors
    monitoring effectiveness
    structural changes
    Date: 2006
    Issue Date: 2009-09-11 17:26:27 (UTC+8)
    Abstract:   我國於2006年1月11日修正公布證券交易法,正式引進獨立董事及審計委員會制度。國內設置獨立董事制度時間尚短,正處於持續探索與完善的階段。不僅各界學者對此改革有不同看法,其實行效果亦有待檢驗。對於國內獨立董事制度未來將會如何發展,是否能夠發揮監督力量,仍有待觀察。
      本研究以2001年至2005年之上市公司為研究對象,透過t檢定與迴歸模型分析我國獨立董事制度與監督績效之關係;檢視法令賦予獨立董事之職責是否確能發揮,並探討主管機關於2002年起積極鼓勵公司設置獨立董事是否對公司監督機制造成結構性改變。實證結果發現,獨立董事對公司重大事項能發揮監督功能,惟監督績效未如預期明顯,需有強化監督之必要;此外,公司監督機制於該制度實施前後存在結構性改變,此改變於制度實施當年度最顯著,之後隨著制度開始實施而逐漸縮小改變差距。
    The newly amended Securities and Exchange Law has stipulated the set up of independent directors and audit committee on January 11, 2006 in Taiwan. The set up of the system is only for a short time and continues to explore with the implementation. There are different views on the reform, and the efficiency has to be tested. The future development and oversight function of independent directors are needed to observe.
    This study examines the relationship of independent directors and monitoring effectiveness by using a sample of listed companies from 2001 to 2005. Whether the responsibilities under the Act are executed, and if there are structural changes because authorities encourage the initial public offerings set up independent directors since 2002. The results show that independent directors can play a major oversight function on major company matters, but monitoring effectiveness is not significant as expected and needs to strengthen it. In addition, there are structural changes before and after the implementation of policies, and it is most significant in 2002, after gradually smaller with time.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計研究所
    94353020
    95
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0094353020
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系] 學位論文

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