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    题名: 公司特性、公司治理與高管股票薪酬績效關聯性之研究
    作者: 楊翔傑
    贡献者: 梁嘉紋
    楊翔傑
    关键词: 高階主管薪酬
    股票薪酬與績效敏感性
    公司特性
    公司治理
    日期: 2008
    上传时间: 2009-09-11 17:31:09 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本研究參考Sloan (1993)之研究方法,以交乘項之方式研究公司特性與公司治理如何影響高階主管股票薪酬對於會計及市場績效之關聯程度。其中,公司特性包括公司成長機會、公司規模、公司風險與負債比例;而公司治理主要包括董事會特性與高階主管權力兩大構面。
    研究結果發現,當公司具有高度成長機會時,會計、市場兩績效與高階主管股票薪酬之關聯程度會顯著降低。此一實證結果顯示,當公司未來具有高度成長機會時,以當期會計或市場績效指標無法充分反映經理人之投資決策經濟效果。
    在公司規模方面,本研究發現公司規模愈大,會計績效與高階主管股票薪酬之關聯程度會顯著降低,但與市場績效之關聯程度則未有顯著改變。此一實證結果顯示,當公司規模愈大時,在人力資源供給有限之情況下,需要人才之能力愈高,為了留住有能力之高階主管,公司必須支付更高之基本薪酬,而降低其與績效之關聯程度。
    在公司風險方面,本研究發現公司風險愈高,會計績效與高階主管股票薪酬之關聯程度會顯著提高,但與市場績效之關聯程度則會顯著降低。此一實證結果顯示,當公司風險愈高時,市場績效所包含之雜訊愈多,愈無法充分顯示高階主管的努力程度,故薪酬契約會降低高階主管股票薪酬與市場績效的關聯程度,加強會計績效所佔之比重。
    在負債比率方面,本研究發現公司負債比率愈高,會計績效與高階主管股票薪酬之關聯程度會顯著提高,但與市場績效之關聯程度則未有顯著的變化。此一實證結果顯示,當公司債務投資人比重愈高,薪酬契約之訂定會加強高階主管薪酬與會計績效之關聯程度,也表示債務投資人較重視財務報表上之績效指標或者財務比率,以彰顯公司之償債能力。
    在董事會規模方面,發現董事會規模愈大,高階主管股票薪酬與會計績效之關聯性會顯著降低,但與市場績效則無顯著關係。此一結果顯示,當董事會人數愈多時,董事會決策能力愈差,愈難整合所有董事之意見去訂定有效之薪酬契約以提升績效與高階主管股票薪酬之關聯性。
    在經理人董事席次比例方面,發現經理人董事席次比例愈高,高階主管股票薪酬與會計績效之關聯性會顯著降低,但與市場績效則無顯著關係。此一結果顯示,當經理人同時具有董事身分,且比重愈大時,愈有可能透過自身之影響力為自某取較高的股票薪酬,降低其與會計績效之敏感程度。
    在其他變數方面,獨立董事席次比率、席次控制權與盈餘分配權偏離倍數、董事長是否兼任總經理及經理人持股比率中,並未發現高階主管股票薪酬與會計、市場兩績效之關聯性會受到此四個變數之影響。
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