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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/32362


    Title: 負面攻擊下內部升遷制度之改善
    Authors: 孫瑋廷
    Contributors: 王智賢
    孫瑋廷
    Keywords: 晉升
    負面攻擊
    異質
    同質
    Date: 2004
    Issue Date: 2009-09-14 13:44:30 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 在相關之傳統職位晉升的研究中,多數只有討論一位員工獲得晉升的情況。Chen(2003)建立一模型,分析當員工彼此間具有負面攻擊競爭對手的情形下,得到正面實力最強的員工遭遇到其他競爭對手最多的負面總攻擊現象,易造成正面能力最強的員工不易獲得晉升的結果。本文則考慮當獲得晉升的員工不只一位時之狀況,發現當員工能力異質時,晉升超過一位員工之制度將使正面能力最強之員工較不會獲得最多之負面攻擊而易於獲得晉升;但當員工能力同質時,只晉升一位員工是對公司最有利的制度。
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政研究所
    92255023
    93
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0922550231
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 學位論文

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