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| Title: | 世界與主體：麥克道爾哲學的幾個主題
World and Subject: Themes from McDowell |
| Authors: | 鄭會穎
Cheng, Huei-Ying |
| Contributors: | 林從一
Lin, Chung-I
鄭會穎
Cheng, Huei-Ying |
| Keywords: | 主體性
世界
自然
麥克道爾
Subjectivity
World
Nature
McDowell |
| Date: | 2007 |
| Issue Date: | 2009-09-17 16:48:38 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 這篇哲學論文是對約翰．麥克道爾(John McDowell)對「主體性」(subjectivity)看法的一個探究。這個計畫由兩部分所組成。一方面，我將討論麥克道爾如何理解並回應他所處理的諸多議題；另一方面，我將藉由考慮主體性的不同面向來進行相關的討論：一個主體是一個存在世界中的知覺者、知識者、思想者、說話者、行動者、具人格者(person)、以及(自我)意識者。我藉由指出並消解一個出自於「理性動物」這個概念的緊張關係來開始這個探究：人類是自然的，卻也同時是理性的。稍後這個探究藉由考慮麥克道爾的「第二自然∕天性」(second nature)概念如何使我們成為具有多重面貌的人類主體來推進。透過細究麥克道爾的診斷與回應，現代與當代哲學中的兩個中心錯誤–狹窄的自然觀以及「笛卡兒式的內在空間」(Cartesian inner space)–將被指出並且拒斥。
在導論章裡我首先建議我們應該為某個對「世界」的看法留下空間。我進一步論證「心靈性」(mentality)具有許多面向，而了解這些面向便是去了解人類主體的多重面貌。在第一章裡，我解釋為了消解「理性動物」這個概念所產生的緊張關係，亞里斯多德(Aristotle)的「第二自然∕天性」概念如何被引進。其後我回應一些對這個策略的擔憂，包括萊特(Crispin Wright)及其它哲學家的批評。高達美(Hans-Georg Gadamer)的「世界∕環境」區分也被引介並關聯到麥克道爾的思想。第二章討論知覺與知識；麥克道爾的主要標的–笛卡兒式的內在空間–被引進並批評。我也對史卓(Barry Stroud)與布雷克本(Simon Blackburn)的相關立場進行評價。稍後我把心靈與世界(Mind and World)的主題和現有的脈絡關聯起來；具體來說，我討論麥克道爾對戴維森(Donald Davidson)與康德(Immanuel Kant)的引用與延伸。然後我討論一個常被提及的「觀念論」指控，以及布蘭登(Robert Brandom)的「殘餘笛卡兒主義」(residual Cartesianism)批評。第三章專注於庫律普基(Saul Kripke)的維根斯坦(Ludwig Wittgenstein)，指出在規則依循背後的一個主要論題是內在空間模型的一個版本，而且庫律普基的維根斯坦其實並不是真正的維根斯坦。我回應來自庫許(Martin Kusch)的許多批評；達美特(Michael Dummett)對化約論的要求也被駁斥。其後，我考慮戴維森的「無語言」宣稱，並討論麥克道爾在多大的程度上同意他。第四章我衡量來自德雷弗斯(Hubert Dreyfus)關於行動和行動者的批評。我討論麥克道爾如何論證德雷弗斯與梅洛龐蒂(Maurice Merleau-Ponty)都犯了「無身體的智性主體迷思」(the Myth of the Disembodied Intellect)。討論當中也回應了艾爾斯(Michael Ayers)的智性主義指控。其後我引入麥克道爾對帕菲特(Derek Parfit)人格看法、以及對戴維森對心物關聯說法的批評。在第五章我專注於意識和自我意識。麥克道爾將他對帕菲特的論證應用在康德身上，但基尼斯弗(Maximilian de Gaynesford)認為麥克道爾誤讀了康德。我為麥克道爾回應這些批評。我進一步把這個討論關聯到麥克道爾對「概念架構–內容二元論」(scheme-content dualism)的攻擊。這把我們帶領到麥克道爾式看法對「感質」(qualia)的拒斥，並進一步到錯覺論證脈絡下「意向主義」(intentionalism)和「選言主義」(disjunctivism)的爭論。我批評克瑞(Tim Crane)設想意向主義以及錯覺論證的方式。我也討論了許多版本的選言主義。在結論章裡，我表達了對麥克道爾「自我決定主體性」(self-determining subjectivity)這個概念的疑慮。根據麥克道爾，人類的自由為「理由空間中的因果關係」(causations in the space of reasons)所構成，但如同賈斯金(Richard Gaskin)所指出，對它的一個完整說明尚未被提供。我以一些關於要如何填滿這個麥克道爾式圖像的約略想法來作結。
This essay is an inquiry into John McDowell’s thinking on ‘subjectivity.’ The project consists in two parts. On the one hand, I will discuss how McDowell understands and responds to the various issues he is tackling; on the other, I will approach relevant issues concerning subjectivity by considering different aspects of it: a subject as a perceiver, knower, thinker, speaker, agent, person and (self-) conscious being in the world. The inquiry begins by identifying and resolving a tension generated by the very idea of ‘rational animal’: human beings are at the same time natural and rational. Later the inquiry proceeds by considering how McDowell’s notion of ‘second nature’ enables us to be human subjects with many faces. By going through the diagnoses and responses of McDowell, two central problems in modern and contemporary philosophy – the narrow conception of nature and the Cartesian inner space model – are identified and repelled.
In Episode N I first urge that we should leave room for a certain notion of ‘world.’ I further argue that mentality has many aspects, and to understand those aspects is to understand the many faces of human subject. In Episode Ⅰ the Aristotelian notion of ‘second nature’ is discussed in order to resolve the tension in the very idea of ‘rational animal.’ Later I reply to some worries about this maneuver, including the objection from Crispin Wright. Hans-Georg Gadamer’s distinction between world and environment is introduced and related to McDowell’s thinking. Episode Ⅱ discusses perception and knowledge; McDowell’s main target – the Cartesian inner space – is introduced and criticized. Barry Stroud’s and Simon Blackburn’s positions are evaluated. Later I connect the main theme of Mind and World to the present context; in particular, I discuss McDowell’s invocation of Donald Davidson and Immanuel Kant. And then I discuss a common accusation of idealism, and Robert Brandom’s accusation of ‘residual individualism.’ Episode Ⅲ concentrates on Saul Kripke’s Wittgenstein, arguing that the master thesis behind the rule-following paradox is a version of the inner space model, and that Kripke’s Wittgenstein is not Wittgenstein. Martin Kusch’s objections are answered; Michael Dummett’s demand of reductionism is rebutted. After this, I turn to Davidson’s ‘no language’ claim, and discuss to what extent McDowell agrees with him. In Episode Ⅳ I evaluate objections from Hubert Dreyfus concerning action and agency. I discuss how Dreyfus and Maurice Merleau-Ponty commit ‘the Myth of the Disembodied Intellect’ identified by McDowell. I answer Michael Ayer’s charge of intellectualism in passing. Later I bring in McDowell’s objections to Derek Parfit on personhood and to Davidson on the mind-body relation. In Episode Ⅴ I focus on consciousness and self-consciousness. McDowell applies his argument against Parfit to Kant, but Maximilian de Gaynesford dissents. I reply to his objections on McDowell’s behalf. I further connect this to McDowell’s attacks on the dualism of scheme and content. This leads to my McDowellian rejection to the existence of qualia, and further brings me to the debate between intentionalism and disjunctivism in the context of the argument from illusion. I argue against Tim Crane’s ways of conceiving issues about intentionalism and the argument from illusion. Varieties of disjunctivism are also discussed. In my Epilogue, I express my worry about McDowell’s notion of ‘self-determining subjectivity.’ According to McDowell, human freedom consists in causations in the space of reason, but as Richard Gaskin points out, a satisfying story of it is yet to be provided. I close this essay with some rough ideas about how to fill in the details of the McDowellian picture. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
哲學研究所
93154001
96 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0093154001 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [哲學系] 學位論文
|
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