政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/34202
English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 27 |  全文笔数/总笔数 : 111210/142126 (78%)
造访人次 : 48142794      在线人数 : 549
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
搜寻范围 查询小技巧：
  • 您可在西文检索词汇前后加上"双引号"，以获取较精准的检索结果
  • 若欲以作者姓名搜寻，建议至进阶搜寻限定作者字段，可获得较完整数据
    •  进阶搜寻
    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/34202


    请使用永久网址来引用或连结此文件: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/34202


    题名: 我國獨立董事與獨立監察人之屬性與盈餘管理之關聯性研究
    作者: 馬瑜霙
    Ma, Yu-ying,
    贡献者: 戚務君
    馬瑜霙
    Ma, Yu-ying,
    关键词: 公司治理
    獨立董事
    盈餘管理
    政治成本
    corporate governance
    independent director
    earnings management
    political cost
    日期: 2002
    上传时间: 2009-09-18
    摘要: 「獨立董事與獨立監察人制度」對我國而言，為一種因法規強制要求而產生的新現象。2002年2月時，在台灣證券交易所股份有限公司及財團法人中華民國證券櫃臺買賣中心等單位的努力下，正式引進「獨立董事與獨立監察人制度」，規定自2002年2月22日起新申請上市上櫃的公司，需設置獨立董事至少二人，及獨立監察人至少一人，期望以此制度革除積習已久的公司治理弊端。
    本研究自選任獨立董事及監察人之事前與事後，從選任席次、素質差異、專業背景差異檢視聘僱事前公司是否有特殊考量，並進一步從盈餘管理的角度，檢視選任事後獨立董事與監察人之預期功能是否對企業整體發揮實際之效用。
    實證結果支持本研究認為因監察人得以單獨行使職權，故獨立監察人實際選任席次超過最低法定門檻之比例確實較獨立董事實際選任席次超過最低法定門檻的比例高，且企業所選任的獨立董監素質，因企業之規模大小不同而有顯著差異，另外，亦發現企業確實會考量職能別的差異，進而聘僱不同專業背景之專家。最後，關於獨立董事與獨立監察人在監督管理當局從事盈餘管理行為時之作用部分，未獲得實證結果支持，推測原因，可能係因我國企業於設置獨立董事與監察人後，僅將其視為專業地位崇高的「名譽」董事與監察人，但並未賦予其監督的實際權力，因而造成獨立董事與監察人未能涉入企業核心，致使其無法發揮監督管理當局之預期功能所導致。
    The institution of independent directors and independent supervisors is a new phenomenon arisen from forced enactment made by Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation and Gretai Securities Market on February 22, 2002. It claims all new listed corporations to employ at least 2 independent directors and 1 independent supervisor in order to enhance corporate governance in Taiwan.
    This thesis examines if enterprises have special considerations when employ independent directors and independent supervisors from the viewpoints of actual numbers, grade level and governance expertise. Furthermore, this thesis also examines the actual contributions of them to reduce the earnings management behaviors.
    Consistent with our hypothesis that due to the different way to oversee the management, this thesis finds that besides achieving the minimum standard threshold, it is more likely for an enterprise to employ much more independent supervisors than independent directors. Moreover, empirical results support that the bigger size of the company, the better independent directors and independent supervisors it will employ. Additionally, this study also finds that corporation will employ different kinds of experts owing to the different functions between independent directors and independent supervisors. Finally, as for reducing earnings management behaviors, this study can’t offer proper evidences. It may result from that enterprise views independent directors and independent supervisors as “reputable” experts, so they can’t have actual power to oversee managements. In other words, independent directors and independent supervisors can’t exercise the role well because of lacking actual power.
    參考文獻: 一、中文部分
    李建然及羅元銘，2002，新上市公司上市後營運績效衰退原因之探討，財務金融學刊，第十卷第一期，24-52頁
    沈維民，1997，企業之盈餘管理：以「會計方法選用」和「應計項目認列」為例，管理評論，第十六卷第一期，11-38頁
    金成隆、林修葳及張永芳，1999，強制性財務預測與盈餘管理關係：20％門檻限制影響之研究，中國財務學刊，第七卷第一期，59-96頁
    林穎芬及劉維琪，2003，從高階主管薪酬的研究探討代理理論在台灣的適用程度，管理學報，第二十卷第二期，365-395頁
    林嬋娟及官心怡，1996，經理人員盈餘預測與盈餘操縱之關聯性研究，管理與系統，第三卷第一期，27-41頁
    林嬋娟、洪櫻芬及薛敏正，1997，財務困難公司之盈餘管理實證研究，管理學報，第十四卷第一期，15-38頁
    林嬋娟、薛敏正與蘇逸穎，2002，預期盈餘與盈餘平穩化實證研究，證券市場發展季刊，第十四卷第一期，139-148頁
    俞海琴及周本鄂，1994，台灣地區上市公司董監事、關係人持股比率和公司托賓Q關係之研究，管理評論，第十三卷第一期，79-98頁
    許盟，2000，我國董事會結構與自願性盈餘預測行為之研究，國立政治大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文
    陳家慧，2000，我國上市公司管理機制與盈餘管理相關性之實證研究，國立政治大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文
    陳育成，2002，臺灣金融業的壞帳管理及相關研究，管理評論，第二十一卷第四期，1-17頁
    陳育成及黃瓊瑤，2001，臺灣資本市場盈餘預測與盈餘管理關連性之研究，證券市場發展季刊，第十三卷第二期，97-122頁
    葉銀華，1998，家族控股集團與股票報酬共變性之實證研究，台大管理論叢，第九卷第一期，25-49頁
    ______，1999，家族控股集團、核心企業與報酬互動之研究—台灣與香港證券市場之比較，管理評論，第十八卷第二期，59-86頁
    葉銀華、魯慧中及高樹嘉，1999，敵意接管、反接管策略與權益代理成本間理論關係之探討，中國財務學刊，第六期第三卷，69-98頁
    葉銀華、李存修、柯承恩，2002，公司治理與評等系統(一版)，台北市：商智文化
    華爾街日報，2002.6.6，那斯達克申請變更上市公司管理規定
    華爾街日報，2002.7.8，美國大公司要立誓信息屬實
    華爾街日報，2002.8.28，美國證券監管當局通過新規嚴管上市公司
    張文瀞、周玲臺與林修葳，2001，審計品質對維持前期盈餘績效公司盈餘管理行為影響之研究，證券市場發展季刊，第十三卷第二期，31-70頁
    劉啟群，1999，我國金融業會計損益項目季別分析：盈餘管理間接測試法，會計評論，第三十一卷，63-79頁
    劉紹樑，2002，從莊子到安隆：A+公司治理(一版)，台北市：天下雜誌
    謝淑娟，1994，觀點探討股權結構與公司經營績效之關係－以台灣上市公司為實證，國立交通大學管理科學研究所未出版碩士論文
    二、英文部分
    Bamber, E. M., L. S. Bamber, and M. P. Schoderbek. 1993. Audit structure and other determinants of audit report lag: An empirical analysis. AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory 12 (Spring): 1-23.
    Barth, M., J. Elliott, and M. Finn. 1999. Market rewards associated with patterns of increasing earnings. Journal of Accounting Research 37 (Autumn): 387-413.
    Bartov, E., 1993, The timing of asset sales and earnings manipulation. The Accounting Review (October): 840-855.
    Bartov, E, F. A. Gul, and J. Tsui. 2001. Discretionary-accruals models and audit qualifications. Journal of Accounting and Economics 30: 421-452.
    Beasley, M. S.1996, An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. The Accounting Review 71 (April): 443-465.
    Becker C. L., M. L. Defond, J. Jiambalvo, and K. R. Subramanyam. 1998. The effect of audit quality on earnings management. Contemporary Accounting Research (Spring): 1-24.
    Burgstahler, D., and I. Dichev. 1997. Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics 24 (December): 99-126.
    Carcello, J. V., and T. L. Neal. 2003. Audit committee characteristics and auditor dismissals following “new” going-concern reports. Accounting Review 78 (January): 95-117.
    DeAngelo, L. E. 1981. Auditor independence,low balling and disclosure regulation. Journal of Accounting & Economics 3 (August): 113-127.
    DeAngelo, L. E. 1988. Managerial competition, information costs, and corporate governance, the use of accounting performances in proxy contests. Journal of Accounting and Economics 10 (January): 3-36.
    DeAngelo, H., and L. DeAngelo. 1994. Accounting choices in troubled companies. Journal of Accounting and Economics 17 (January): 113-143.
    Dechow, P., R. Sloan, and A. Sweeney, 1995. Detecting earnings management. The Accounting Review (April): 193-226.
    Dechow, P., R. Sloan, and A. Sweeney. 1996. Causes and consequence of earnings manipulation :An analysis of firm subject to enforcement actions by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research (Spring): 1-36.
    Dechow, P. M., and D. J. Skinner. 2000. Earnings management: reconciling view of accounting academics, practitioners, and regulators. Accounting Horizons 14 (June): 235-250.
    DeFond, M. L. and J. Jiambalvo. 1994. Debt covenant violation and manipulation of accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics 17: 14-176.
    DeFond, M. L. and K. R., Subramanyam. 1998. Auditor changes and discretionary accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics 25: 36-67.
    Dhaliwal, G., L. Salamon, and E. D. Smith, 1990. The Effect of Owner Versus Management Control on the Choice of Accounting Methods. Journal of Accounting and Economics (January): 45-63.
    Fama, E. and M, Jensen. 1983a. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law & Economics: 301-325.
    Fama, E. and M, Jensen. 1983b. Agency problems and residual claims. Journal of Law & Economics: 327-349.
    Francis, J., and E. Maydew, and H. Sparks. 1999. The role of Big 6 auditors in the credible reporting of accruals. AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory 18 (Fall): 17-34.
    Friedlan, J. M, 1994, Accounting choice of issuers of initial public offerings. Contemporary Accounting Research 11 (Summer): 1-31.
    Gilson, S.C. 1989. Management turnover and financial distress. Journal of Financial (December): 241-262.
    Hand J. R.,1989.Did firms undertake debt-equity swaps for an accounting paper profit or true financial gain? The Accounting Review (October): 587-623.
    Haugen, R. A. and L. W. 1981 Senbet, resolving the agency problems of external capital through option. Journal of Finance 36 (June): 629-647.
    Healy, P., 1985, The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics (April): 85-107.
    Healy, P., and K. Palepu. 1990. The effectiveness of accounting-based dividend constraints. Journal of Accounting and Economics 13 (January): 97-123.
    Jensen, M. and W, Meckling.1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3: 305-360.
    Jensen, M. 1993. The modern Industrial Revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control system. The Journal of Finance 3: 831-880.
    Jones, J. 1991. Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal of Accounting Research 29 (February): 193-228.
    Klein, A. 2002. Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33: 375-400.
    La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silances, and A. Shleifer, 1999, Corporate ownership around the World. Journal of Finance 54: 471-517.
    Lang, M., and R. Lundholm. 1993. Cross-sectional determinants of analyst ratings of corporate disclosures. Journal of Accounting Research 31 (Autumn): 246-271.
    Lees, F., 1981, Public disclosure of corporate earnings forecasts. (NY: The Conference Board)
    Matsumoto, D. A. 2002. Management’s incentives to avoid negative earnings surprise. The Accounting Review 77 (July): 483-514.
    Monichols, M. and G. P. Wilson, 1988, Evidence of earnings management from the provision for bad debts. Journal of Accounting Research (Supplement): 141-161.
    Nelson, M. W., J. A. Elliott, and R. L. Tarpley. 2002. Evidence from auditors about managers` and auditors` earnings management decisions. The Accounting Review 77 (Supplement): 175-202.
    Rangan, S. 1998. Earnings management and the performance of seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Financial Economics 50: 101-122.
    Schipper, K., 1989. Commentary on earnings management. Accounting Horizons 3: 91-102.
    Subramanyam, K.1996. The pricing of discretionary accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics 22: 249-281.
    Sweeney, A. 1994. The debt covenant violations and managers’ accounting responses. Journal of Accounting and Economics 17 (May): 281-308.
    Teoh, S. H., I. Welch, and T. J. Wong. 1998a. Earnings management and the long-term market performance of initial public offerings. Journal of Finance 53 (December): 1935-1974.
    ____ , ____ , and____. 1998b. Earnings management and the underperformance of seasoned equity offering. Journal of Financial Economics 50: 63-99.
    Watts, R. L., and J. L. Zimmerman. 1983. Agency problems, auditing, and the theory of the firm: Some evidence. Journal of Law & Economics 26: 613-633.
    Watts, R., and J. Zimmerman. 1986. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. Positive Accounting Theory.
    ________. 1990. Positive accounting theory: A ten-year perspective. The Accounting Review 65 (January): 131-156.
    Zmijewski, M. E. and R. L. Hagerman. 1981. An income strategy approach to the positive theory of accounting standard setting/choice. Journal of Accounting and Economics 3: 129-150.
    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計研究所
    90353045
    91
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0090353045
    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[會計學系] 學位論文

    文件中的档案:

    档案 描述 大小格式浏览次数
    35304501.pdf48KbAdobe PDF2942检视/开启
    35304502.pdf241KbAdobe PDF2942检视/开启
    35304503.pdf286KbAdobe PDF21032检视/开启
    35304504.pdf262KbAdobe PDF2942检视/开启
    35304505.pdf156KbAdobe PDF21399检视/开启
    35304506.pdf310KbAdobe PDF22814检视/开启
    35304507.pdf280KbAdobe PDF21826检视/开启
    35304508.pdf285KbAdobe PDF21340检视/开启
    35304509.pdf105KbAdobe PDF21138检视/开启
    35304510.pdf186KbAdobe PDF21624检视/开启


    在政大典藏中所有的数据项都受到原著作权保护.


    社群 sharing

    著作權政策宣告 Copyright Announcement
    1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏，無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用，惟仍請適度，合理使用本網站之內容，以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用，則請先取得著作權人之授權。
    The digital content of this website is part of National Chengchi University Institutional Repository. It provides free access to academic research and public education for non-commercial use. Please utilize it in a proper and reasonable manner and respect the rights of copyright owners. For commercial use, please obtain authorization from the copyright owner in advance.

    2.本網站之製作，已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益，如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者，請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw)，維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
    NCCU Institutional Repository is made to protect the interests of copyright owners. If you believe that any material on the website infringes copyright, please contact our staff(nccur@nccu.edu.tw). We will remove the work from the repository and investigate your claim.
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - 回馈