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https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/34725
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| Title: | 外人直接投資與政治遊說
Foreign direct investment and political lobbying |
| Authors: | 余光弘
Yu, Kuang Hung |
| Contributors: | 王智賢
Wang, Jue Shyan
余光弘
Yu, Kuang Hung |
| Keywords: | 外人直接投資
政治獻金
技術外溢效果
foreign direct investment
political contributions
spillover effect |
| Date: | 2007 |
| Issue Date: | 2009-09-18 11:01:10 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 政府制訂政策時往往有許多考量，尤其是面對外人直接投資時，政府的政策規範常會因為國內發展情況不同而有所調整，本文嘗試站在政府的角度，以兩種情況討論關稅的訂定與開放外人直接投資的決策。首先，我們以Grossman ＆ Helpman (1994) 之政治獻金模型為架構，考慮兩國廠商各種遊說的情況，藉以訂出最適關稅。我們發現，政府將會選擇兩國廠商一起遊說。其次，我們考慮本國政府可以開放外國廠商進入本國直接投資，同時我們假定外國廠商擁有技術優勢，進入本國直接投資後，對本國廠商會產生一技術外溢效果 (Spillover effect)，使得本國廠商邊際生產成本下降。最後，我們比較上述兩種情況之下之政府效用大小，並發現本國政府越重視國內福利相較於政治獻金時，將會傾向開放外人直接投資。
Since the domestic government can choose the optimal policy instrument to maximize the social welfare, this paper analyzes how a domestic government sets the policy about foreign direct investment. In the beginning, we use Grossman ＆ Helpman (1994) political contribution model to endogenize tariff policy in a duopoly composed of a domestic firm and a foreign firm, where both firms affect the domestic government’s tariff policy via their contributions. It is found that the domestic government will choose both the domestic firm and the foreign firm apply contributions. Then, we consider a spillover effect when the domestic government decides to let the foreign firm with superior technology undertake foreign direct investment. Finally, we compare the government’s utility in the two situations above and find that the domestic government tends to open FDI when it puts much weight on the social welfare. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
財政研究所
95255024
96 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0095255024 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [財政學系] 學位論文
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