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    Title: 異質性偏好與地方公共財之最適提供水準
    Heterogeneous Preferences and the Optimal Provision of Local Public Goods
    Authors: 王舒齡
    Wang, Shu Ling
    Contributors: 張勝文
    Chang, Sheng Wen
    王舒齡
    Wang, Shu Ling
    Keywords: Tiebout
    異質性偏好
    完全流動性
    自我選擇機制
    區分效果
    Date: 2007
    Issue Date: 2009-09-18 11:01:25 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本文以Tiebout (1956) 之假說 (Tiebout Hypothesis) 為基礎,在數個轄區之經濟環境下,假設人民具有「異質性偏好」及「完全移動性」,利用模擬 (simulation) 的方式,探討人口以及地方公共財之最適配置狀況,並探討其背後所隱含之經濟意義。
    本文之研究發現有以下三點。第一,對於公共財具有異質性偏好、且具有完全移動性時,個人會依據自我選擇機制 (self-selection),選擇使其效用極大化之轄區居住,產生區分 (sorting) 之效果,符合Tiebout所預期。第二,就比較靜態發現,在技術水準越高,或者私有財之偏好越高的情況下,高偏好轄區的人口越多,每人持有消費性公共財數量也越多;而當資本產出彈性增加,則高偏好地區人口越少,且每人持有消費性公共財數量越少。第三,若中央政府徵單一稅 (uniform tax) ,且定額稅與資本稅之稅額相等,則以中央政府的角度觀之,不論何種稅制,均不影響全國地方公共財之總提供水準,故異質性偏好在此未造成任何影響。但若以地方政府的角度觀之,並以「每人持有公共財數量」之角度切入,則異質性偏好不但造成區分效果,更使轄區之資源配置具有脫離對稱均衡的可能。若將社會總福利水準極大化時之定額稅定義為最適稅率,其所對應之每人持有地方公共財,定義為公共財之最適提供水準,以此作為比較基礎,則在課徵資本稅之下,生產要素使用之扭曲性,影響人民之消費行為,進而改變轄區內原來的資源配置,強化轄區間資源配置的差異。在本文以兩個轄區為例,並以消費性公共財為分析重點之模型,發現地方公共財的提供,受到轄區內個人偏好強度差異之影響,出現偏好強度高之轄區公共財提供過多,偏好強度低之轄區公共財提供不足之結果。

    關鍵字:Tiebout、異質性偏好、完全流動性、自我選擇機制、區分效果。
    Reference: Beckmenn, Martin J. and Yorgos Y. Papageorguou (1989). “Heterogeneous Tastes and Residential Location.” Journal of Regional Science, 29:3, 317-323.
    Bewley, Truman F. (1981). “A Critique of Tiebout’s Theory of Local Public Expenditures.” Econometrica, 49:3, 713-740.
    Bickers, Kenneth and Richard N. Engstrom (2006). “Tiebout Sorting in Metropolitan Areas.” Review of Policy Research, 23:6, 1181-1197.
    Boadway, Robin (1982). “On the Method of Taxation and the Provision of Local Public Goods: Comment.” American Economic Review, 72:4, 846-851.
    Brueckner, Jan K. (2004). “Fiscal Decentralization with Distortionary Taxation: Tiebout vs. Tax Competition.” International Tax and Public Finance, 11:2, 133-153.
    Dawkins, Casey J. (2005). “Tiebout Choice and Residential Segregation by Race in US Metropolitan Areas, 1980-2000.” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 35:6, 734-755.
    Dowding, Keith, John, Peter; Biggs, Stephen (1994). “Tiebout: A Survey of the Empirical Literature.” Urban Studies, 31:4-5, 767-797.
    Dye, Thomas R. (1990). American Federalism: Competition Among Governments. Lexington, Mass. Lexington Books Ltd.
    Hansen, Nico A. and Anke S. Kessler (2001). “(Non-) Existence of Equilibria in Multicommunity Models.” Journal of Urban Economics, 50:3, 418-435.
    Henderson, J. Vermon (1985). “The Tiebout Model: Bring Back the Entrepreneurs.” Journal of Political Economics, 9:2, 248-264.
    Kessler, Anke S. and Christoph Lülfesmann (2005). “Tiebout and Redistribution in a Model of Residential and Political Choice.” Journal of Public Economics, 89:2-3, 501-528.
    Peng, Shin-Kun and Ping Wang (2005). “Sorting by Foot: ‘Travel-for’ Local Public Goods and Equilibrium Stratification.” Canadian Journal of Economics, 38:4, 1224-1253.
    Rhode, Paul W. and Koleman S. Strumpf (2003). “Assessing the Importance of Tiebout Sorting: Local Heterogeneity from 1850-1990.” American Economic Review, 93:5, 1647-1678.
    Samuelson, Paul A. (1954). “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure.” Review of Economics and Statistics, 36:4, 387-389.
    Schmidheity, Kurt (2006). “Income Segregation from Local Income Taxation When Households Differ in both Preferences and Incomes.” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 36:2, 270-299.
    Starrett, David A. (1980). “On the Method of Taxation and the Provision of Local Public Goods.” American Economic Review, 70:3, 350-392.
    Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1983). “The Theory of Local Public Goods Twenty-Five Years after Tiebout: A Perspective.” In George R. Zodrow, ed., Local Provision of Public Service: The Tiebout Model after Twenty-Five Years. Academic Press, New York, 17-53.
    Tiebout, Charles M. (1956). “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures.” Journal of Public Economics, 64:5, 416-424.
    Wildsin, David E. (1980). “Locational Efficiency in a Federal System.” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 10:4, 453-471.
    Williams, Alan (1966). “The Optimal Provision of Public Goods in a System of Local Governments.”Journal of Political Economics, 74:1, 18-33.
    Wooders, Myrna (1980). “The Tiebout Model: Near Optimality in Local Public Good Economies.” Econometrica, 48:6, 1467-1485.
    Zodrow, George R. (2001). “The Property Tax as a Capital Tax: A Room with Three Views.” National Tax Journal, 54:1, 139-156.
    Zodrow, George R. and Peter Mieszkowski (1986). “Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation, and the Underprovision of Local Public Goods.” Journal of Urban Economics, 19:3, 356-37.
    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政研究所
    95255031
    96
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0095255031
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 學位論文

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