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    Title: 從「做中學」的角度解釋分購策略
    Authors: 賴秉銳
    Lai, Ping Jui
    Contributors: 溫偉任
    張興華



    賴秉銳
    Lai, Ping Jui
    Keywords: 分購
    做中學
    split award
    learning by doing
    Date: 2004
    Issue Date: 2009-09-18 14:15:52 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 促進競爭是文獻中解釋分購的理由之一,競爭的程度由參與供應商的數目決定,以供應商的家數作參數。我建立一個兩期的模型,用「從做中學」的效果,將競爭的程度用成本結構的差異大小來表現,成本結構差異越大,競爭越激烈,透過模型讓競爭的程度由購買者內生控制。希望透過這一個簡單的模型檢視當廠商數目固定時,購買者會否在考量控制供應商的成本相似下採用分購策略。雖然發現在我模型的設定中,購買者考量兩期之下一定選擇不採用分購策略,但是,仍能發現只考量第二期的購買價格下促進競爭的確是購買者採用分購的原因之一。
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    國際經營與貿易研究所
    91351002
    93
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0913510021
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[國際經營與貿易學系 ] 學位論文

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