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    題名: 異質群體網路建構分析
    作者: 黃裕雄
    貢獻者: 莊委桐
    黃裕雄
    關鍵詞: 社會網路
    群體
    連結
    強度
    成對均衡
    對稱均衡
    非對稱均衡
    二階段求解
    日期: 2006
    上傳時間: 2009-09-18 15:57:49 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本論文主要在探討異質群體網路的建構問題。我們假設群體內及群體外的連結成本相同,但是不同群體內較常發生的問題不同,每個人均可能發生自己所屬群體內(較常發生)的問題以及非所屬群體(較不常發生)的問題。在這樣的假設下我們分別探討線性成本、邊際成本遞增下的對稱均衡及非對稱均衡。線性成本下,每個人會偏好擁有較多群體內連結數、較少群體外連結數,而連結強度不是1就是0,但是1或0是經濟個體的內生選擇,和Jackson and Rogers(2005)、Galeotti et al.(2006)假設強度不是1就是0的情況不同。當邊際成本為遞增,多數時候人們會偏好較多、較強的群體內連結;較少、較弱的群體外連結,所以遞增成本模型可以解釋現實社會人們傾向和同群體的人保持較多、較強關係的現像。
    若每個人的潛在可連結數一樣,則無論在線性成本或邊際成本遞增之下,對稱均衡都是最有效率的均衡型態;而若每個人潛在可連結數不一樣,經濟個體較有意願跟潛在可連結數較小的人維持較緊密的關係。另外,和線性成本比較,若邊際成本是遞增型態,就某個群體內的連結狀況來說,經濟個體會偏好較多連結數、較弱強度的模式,因此群體內的群聚現像明顯,符合實證研究的結果。
    參考文獻: Bala, V. and Goyal, S. (2000) “A non-cooperative model of network formation,"Econometrica, 68, pp 1181-1230.
    Bloch, F. and B. Dutta (2005) “Communication Networks with Endogenous Link Strength,” mimeo: GREQAM
    Bloch, F. and M.O. Jackson (2005) “Definitions of Equilibrium in Network Formation Games,” http://www.hss.caltech.edu/_jacksonm/netequilibrium.pdf
    Brueckner, J.K. (2003) “Friendship Networks,” mimeo: University of Illinois.
    Calvó-Armengol, A. (2004) “Job Contact Networks,” Journal of Economic Theory 115, 191-206.
    Dutta, B., and S. Mutuswami (1997) “Stable Networks,” Journal of Economic Theory, 76, 322-344.
    Furusawa, T. and H. Konishi (2002) “Free Trade Networks,” mimeo: Yokohama National University and Boston College.
    Galeotti, A. and Goyal, S. and Kamphorst, J. (2006) “Network Formation with Heterogeneous Players,” Games and Economic Behavior, 54, 353-372.
    Goyal, S. and J.-L. Moraga (2001) “R and D Networks,” Rand Journal of Eco-nomics, 32, 686-707.
    Goyal, S. and Joshi, S. (2006) “Unequal Connections,” International Journal of Game Theory, 34, 319-349.
    Goyal, S. and Vega-Redondo, F. (2005) “Network Formation and Social Coordination,” Games and Economic Behavior, 50, 178-207.
    Granovetter, M. [1974](1995) Getting a Job: A Study of Contacts and Careers, 2nd edition, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
    Haller, H. and Sarangi, S. (2005) “Nash Networks with Heterogeneous Links,” Mathematical Social Sciences, 50, 181- 201.
    Jackson, M.O. (2005) “The Economics of Social Networks,” mimeo: California Institute of Technology.
    Jackson, M.O. and B. Rogers (2005) “The Economics of Small Worlds,” Journal of the European Economic Association, (Papers and Proceedings) 3(2-3): 617-627.
    Jackson, M.O. and B. Rogers (2006) “Meeting Strangers and Friends of Friends: How Random are Social Networks,” mimeo: California Institute of Technology.
    Jackson, M.O. and Watts, A. (2002) “The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks,” Journal of Economic Theory, 106, 265-295.
    Jackson, M.O. and Wolinsky, A. (1996) “A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks,” Journal of Economic Theory, 71, 44-74.
    Johnson, C. and Gilles, R.P. (2000) “Spatial Social Networks,” Review of Economic Design, 5, 273-300.
    Montgomery, J. (1991) “Social Networks and Labor Market Outcomes,” The American Economic Review, 81, 1408-1418.
    Myers and G.P. Shultz (1951) The Dynamics of a Labor Market, Prentice-Hall: NY.
    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    經濟研究所
    93258029
    95
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0093258029
    資料類型: thesis
    顯示於類別:[經濟學系] 學位論文

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