English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 27 |  Items with full text/Total items : 110944/141864 (78%)
Visitors : 47995577      Online Users : 1058
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/36214


    Title: 勞資遊說賽局與關稅保護模型
    Authors: 吳依芳
    Wu ,I - Fang
    Contributors: 王智賢
    吳依芳
    Wu ,I - Fang
    Keywords: 工會
    遊說
    關稅保護
    Date: 2003
    Issue Date: 2009-09-18 17:36:05 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 大部份的工會遊說文獻,假設工會的目標函數受就業量與工資影響,且影響方向為正。但在真實世界中其實不僅止於此,吾人觀察國際工會運動,發現工會亦重視產品的國內價格,因此本文希望可以提出一個模型,將這個現象納入其中。本文以 Wang, Koo and Chen (2003) 的模型為基礎,加入工會對國內產品價格的關心,並探討工會和廠商的遊說行為, 將對貿易政策產生何種影響,產品的國內價格又如何變動。另外,亦嘗試找尋遊說賽局的子賽局完美均衡,並與只有廠商遊說的情況比較。
    本文發現,當參與遊說的兩部門利益方向一致,遊說標價皆落於國際價格的同一側,換句話說,不是同時高於國際價格,就是同時低於國際價格,那麼,遊說競賽的結果,不利於消費者福利。如果參與遊說的兩部門利益方向不同,其中一部門的遊說標價高於國際價格,另一部門的遊說標價則低於國際價格,只要勞工參與工會的比例大,則參與遊說的部門皆為廠商,可以提昇消費者福利;不過若是勞工參與工會的比例小,則提案的兩部門,一為廠商,一為工會,方能對消費者的福利有所增進。另外,若是聯合工會(跨產業的工會)參與遊說,消費者福利將達到最大。
    因此工會加入遊說競賽,對消費者福利是提昇還是減損並無法確定,須視勞工參與工會的比例高低及對手部門而定。不過可以肯定,聯合工會的出現,對消費者來說,不蒂是一項福音。本文乃啟發自國際工會運動事件,並由模型的結論之一可得到和現實世界一致的趨勢,雖然事實上遊說行為會比模型來的複雜許多,不過這個模型仍貼近真實世界,可得到相同的觀察。
    Reference: 翁永和、劉碧珍 (2001),「貿易政策、工會談判力與進口穿透 」,《人文及社會科學集刊》, 第十三卷, 第四期, 417 - 438 頁。
    Aidt, Toke S. (1997), Cooperative Lobbying and Endogenous Trade Policy, Public Choice, 93 (3-4), 455-475.
    Brander, J. A. and Spencer, B. J. (1988), Unionized Oligopoly and International Trade Policy, Journal of International Economics, 24, 217-234.
    Gaston, Noel and Trefler, Daniel (1994b), Protection, Trade and Wages: Evidence for U.S. Manufacturing, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 47, 574-593.
    Gaston, Noel and Trefler, Daniel (1995), Union Wage Sensetivity to Trade and Protection: Theory and Evidence, Journal of International Economics, 39, 1-25.
    Goldberg, Pinelopi K. and Maggi, Giovanni (1999), Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation, The American Economic Review, 89 (5), 1135-1155。
    Grossman, Gene M. and Helpman, Elhanan (1994), Protection for Sale, The American Economic Review, 84 (4), 833-850.
    Grossman, Gene M. and Helpman, Elhanan (1995), Trade Wars and Trade Talks, The Journal of Political Economy, 103 (4), 675-708.
    Grossman, Gene M. and Helpman, Elhanan (1996), Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics, The Review of Economic Studies, 63 (2), 265-286.
    Hillman, Arye L. (1982), Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives, The American Economic Review, 72 (5), 1180-1187.
    Hillman, Arye L. and Ursprung Heinrich W. (1988), Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests, and International Trade Policy, The American Economic Review, 78 (4), 719-745.
    Magee, Christopher (2002), Endogenous Trade Policy and Lobby Formation: An Application to the Free-Rider Problem, Journal of International Economics, 57, 449-471.
    Mezzetti, C. and Dinopoulos, E. (1991), Domestic Unionization and Import Competition, Journal of International Economics, 31, 79-100.
    Mitra, Devashish (1999), Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long Run Model of Trade Policy Determination, The American Economic Review, 89 (5), 1116-1134.
    Mitra, Devashish (2002), Endogenous Political Organization and the Value of Trade Agreements, Journal of International Economics, 57, 473-485.
    Panagariya, A. and R. Duttagupta (2002), Politics of Free Trade Areas: Tariffs versus Quotas, Journal of International Economics, 58, 413-427.
    Pecorino, Paul (1997), Exogenous Tariff Changes with an Endogenous Lobbying Response, Public Choice, 92, 91-108.
    Peltzman, Sam (1976), Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, Journal of Law and Economics, 19 (2), 211-240.
    Rama, Martin and Tabellini, Guido (1998), Lobbying by Capital and Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policies, European Economic Review, 42, 1295-1316.
    Riezman, Raymond and Wilson, John Douglas (1997), Political Reform and Trade Policy, Journal of International Economics, 42, 67-90.
    Stigler, George (1971), The Theory of Economic Regulation, Bell Journal of Economic Management and Science, 2, 3-21.
    Wallerstein, Michael (1987), Unemployment, Collective Bargaining, and the Demand for Protection, American Journal of Political Science, 31 (4), 729-752.
    Wang, Jue-Shyan, Hui-Wen Koo, and Tain-Jy Chen (2003), Resource Rivalry and Endogenous Lobby, working paper.
    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政研究所
    91255012
    92
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0091255012
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 學位論文

    Files in This Item:

    File SizeFormat
    index.html0KbHTML2340View/Open


    All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.


    社群 sharing

    著作權政策宣告 Copyright Announcement
    1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏,無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用,惟仍請適度,合理使用本網站之內容,以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用,則請先取得著作權人之授權。
    The digital content of this website is part of National Chengchi University Institutional Repository. It provides free access to academic research and public education for non-commercial use. Please utilize it in a proper and reasonable manner and respect the rights of copyright owners. For commercial use, please obtain authorization from the copyright owner in advance.

    2.本網站之製作,已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益,如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者,請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw),維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
    NCCU Institutional Repository is made to protect the interests of copyright owners. If you believe that any material on the website infringes copyright, please contact our staff(nccur@nccu.edu.tw). We will remove the work from the repository and investigate your claim.
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback