|Abstract: ||本研究應用二期的不充份訊息的序列談判賽局,來分析廠商和代理商之間的最佳二期的合約,希望能夠刻晝,在廠商有不充份訊息的情況時,廠商和代理商談判所決定的批貨價格,會隨著代理商在前一期的銷售量,而有所不同。 因為廠商在第一期時,並不知道代理商到底是好的(G)還是壞的(B)。所謂好的代理商表示它有好的商業計晝,而壞的代理商表示它有不好的商業計晝。所以廠商在第一期時,對代理商的真正類型有先驗的認知。在這時候,廠商和代理商以談判的方式,來決定二期合約中的批貨價格。到了第一期末,廠商和代理商都可以觀察到代理商或經銷商在第一期的銷售量。但是在我們的談判賽局中,代理商的銷售量不僅受到代理商的商業計晝的影響,還會受到外在的不確定性的影響,也就是會受到某一隨機變數的影響,譬如政治因素、股市震動等等。因此雖然廠商在第一期末可以觀察到代理商在第一期的銷售量,它仍然不知道代理商真正的類型。所以廠商在第一期末會根據新的訊息,來修正它對代理商的真正類型的先驗認知。同時廠商也會根據所觀察到代理商在第一期的銷售量,來決定第二期到底是委託代理商或是經銷商。 在求解這個序列談判賽局的均衡解時,我們是利用Rubinstein(1985)的不充份訊息序列談判模型來分析,因此我們可以設立有限制式的極大化問題,該極大化問題的解就是均衡解。在此我們考慮兩個限制式:一是讓經銷商不會為市場上其他廠商服務的條件;另一是廠商的利潤為零的條件。|
A two-period sequential bargaining game with incomplete information is presented, where the agency could be either "good" or "bad" type which can not be observed by the firm and the market. After the first period, the quantity sold by the agency is observed by the firm(and of course the agency itself) but not the market. However, the sale of the agency is affected not only by the type of the agency but also the stochastic variable. Thus, the agency wishes to signal his true type to the market by the agency instead of a representative of the firm. We expect to show that in the optimal long term contracts, the more the sales in the first period of the agency, the lower the prices settled by two parties through negotiating this period. By the way, we expect to obtain the relationship between the prior beliefs hold by the firm and the bargaining prices which are the solutions of the sequential bargaining model. Since we solve the sequential bargaining model by Nash's Axiomatic approach, we first develop one maximization problem under some constraints and then solve the solution of the problem. That is exactly the long term contracts in the model we studied here. The conditions we consider here are two: one is to insure that the agency will not be employed by the other firms in the market; the other is that the firm's zero profit condition. The agency is assumed to have all the bargaining power and there are many risk-neutral firms competing for the agency's expertise.