Loading...
|
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/38791
|
| Title: | 社會網路、買賣、與中介
The Buyer-Seller-Intermediary Network |
| Authors: | 許修懷 |
| Contributors: | 莊委桐
許修懷 |
| Keywords: | 社會網路
中介
買賣網路
intermediary
buyer-seller network
network |
| Date: | 2009 |
| Issue Date: | 2010-04-09 17:53:13 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 在網路架構下的 first-price 買賣，加入了中介，這裡建構買家二階段的決策，並且探討買家的 連結數、 valuation 、連結成本、 bid 之間的關係。在本文中，中介對想要向中介連結的買家收取費用，接著找出最適的費用以及與其他變數之間的關係，接著在一些額外的假設下找出其配對方法。最後在不同買家 valuation 分配下發現變數間的關係是一致的。
In buyer-seller network, on empirical premise, each buyer and seller must
have a relationship, that is "link," to exchange a good. Each buyer should
choose whether to link or not and choose how many links he or she should have.
In this paper, we introduce an intermediary in the buyer-seller network. Buyers can construct links by themselves, or they can exchange through an intermediary. On the other hand, the intermediary also charges an entrance fee for its service. We then discuss the intermediaries` behavior and define the allocation rule. We find the intermediary allocation rule achieves maximal profit for the intermediary but this rule cannot reach the maximal total surplus. We also characterize the relationship between link cost, buyers` valuation, the optimal number of links, and the payoff of the buyer and intermediary. |
| Reference: | [1] Venkatesh Bala and Sanjeev Goyal, A noncoperative model of network formation, Econometrica, Vol. 68, No. 5(Sep., 2000), pp. 1181-1229
[2] Yann Bramoulle, Rachel Kranton, Public goods in networks, Journal of Economic Theory 135(2007)478-494.
[3] Jeroen Bruggeman, Gianluca Carnabuci, Ivar Vermeulen, A note on structural holes theory and niche overlap, Social Networks, 25 (2003) 97-101.
[4] Calvo-Armengol, A., Job contact networks, Journal of Economic Theory 115(2004) 191-206.
[5] Bhaskar Duatta, Sayantan Ghosal, Debraj Ray, Farsighed network formation, Journal of Economic Theory, 122 (2005) 143-164.
[6] S. Goyal, F Vega-Redondo, Structural holes in social networks, Journal of Economic Theory 137 (2007) 460-492.
[7] Matthew O. Jackson, Social and economic networks, Springer, 2003.
[8] Rachel E. Kranton and Deborah F. Minehart, Competition for goods in buyer-seller networks, Review of Economic Design, 5, 301-331 (2000).
[9] Rachel E. Kranton and Deborah F. Minehart,
A theory of buyer-seller network, The American Economic Review, Vol. 91, No. 3 (Jun., 2001) pp. 485-508.
[10] Vijay Krishna, Auction Theory, 2th edition, academic press, 2010.
[11] Roger B. Myerson, Optimal auction design, Mathematics of Operations Research, Vol. 6. No. 1. February 1981.
[12] Tero Harju(2007), Lecture notes on graph theory, University of Turku. |
| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
經濟研究所
96258023
98 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0096258023 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [Department of Economics] Theses
|
Files in This Item:
| File |
Description |
Size | Format | |
|---|
| 802301.pdf | | 592Kb | Adobe PDF2 | 889 | View/Open |
|
All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.
|
