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| Title: | 我國財務危機公司之實證研究-以公司內部監控機制為中心 |
| Authors: | 蔡金拋 |
| Contributors: | 林國全
蔡金拋 |
| Keywords: | 我國財務危機公司之實證研究
蔡金拋
公司內部監控機制
林國全 |
| Date: | 2005 |
| Issue Date: | 2010-04-24 15:44:05 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 隨著社會經濟之全球化發展，公司儼然已成為各國經濟活動之核心組織，掌握絕大多數之資源與財富，影響人民之生活至鉅。且隨著公司資金需求之愈趨龐大，股份有限公司乃成為現今主要之公司型態。我國公司法在繼受外國立法例過程中，對於股份有限公司之機關設計採取其分權、制衡之機關分立方式，以股東會為公司最高意思決定機關，董事會為公司業務執行機關，監察人為公司常設監察機關，其目的即在追求經營之效率與避免專權之弊害。然而在公司規模日趨龐大、商業環境瞬息萬變的今日，此種權限分配制度是否仍能夠有效地發揮制衡公司經營者之功能，已日漸受到挑戰與質疑，我國自民國八十七年以來發生一連串撼動企業界及金融界的「地雷股」事件即為最好之警訊。該等上市、上櫃公司之所以發生財務危機，綜觀其原因，除了肇始於外在經濟環境的催化外，其餘多肇因於人謀不臧。其經營者每每利用職務之便，犧牲廣大股東、債權人及利害關係人之權益，以掌控公司資金、財產及人力等資源之便，以圖利自身，導致公司經營發生危機，進而影響到整個金融系統。
針對該等問題，政府乃積極籌思解決之道，並於民國九十年大幅度修正公司法，一方面積極開放，明訂董事會職權、放寬董監選舉之方式、放寬董監資格限制，以尊重公司自治。另一方面有效管理，對於公司內部監控的制度加以適度之強化，以避免公司經營者濫用前述開放後所獲得之權限，而危害公司股東、債權人及利害關係人之權益，例如修訂或增訂董事當然解任之規定、董事缺額強制補選期限、增訂臨時管理人制度、降低股東代表訴訟之門檻等。台灣證券交易所股份有限公司及財團法人中華民國證券櫃檯買賣中心於民國九十一年十月四日共同制定上市、上櫃公司治理實務守則；證券交易所有價證券上市審查準則第九條亦於民國九十一年二月二十二日初次納入獨立董、監事之規定，以期提升企業之營運品質。
惟如何在積極開放下取得有效管理之平衡，實應記取過去企業風暴之教訓，並吸取他國立法經驗以為我國公司法制進一步改造之方向，因此本文乃針對民國八十七年以來所發生重大財務危機並引發社會高度關注之上市、上櫃公司為研究對象，歸納其發生財務危機之原因，並參酌外國法制，探討我國公司內部監控機制之問題，進而提出今後修法之方向與公司組織建構之建議如下：
一、提高董事間之制衡
(一)檢討並嚴格限制關係企業間交叉持股
(二)廢除公司法第二十七條第二項及第三項之規定
(三)廢除董事代理出席董事會制度
(四)全面引進獨立董事制度宜審慎考量
二、強化監察人之獨立性
(一)廢除公司法第二十七條第二項及第三項之規定
(二)檢討現行監察人之選任制度
(三)全面引進獨立監察人制度宜審慎考量
三、加強監察人之專業能力
(一)財報簽證會計師宜改由監察人聘任
(二)公司內部稽核人員宜改由監察人聘任
(三)強制規定公司監察人應通過一定之資格考核
四、引進股東提案制度以增加股東會監控權限
五、改進股東代表訴訟制度以增加少數股東監控權限
六、強化檢舉制度
七、重建企業倫理
As social and economic globalization continues to deepen, companies appear to have become the core units for economic activity in country after country, gaining control over the lion’s share of resources and wealth with profound effects on people’s lives. And, with companies’ demands for funds growing ever greater, companies limited by shares are firmly entrenched as the dominant corporate form.
Taiwan’s Company Law has repeatedly borrowed from foreign legislative examples. In this process, corporate organs of companies limited by shares have been designed by adopting a decentralized compartmentalized approach, with the shareholders’ meeting as the highest decision-making organ, the board of directors as the organ that executes the business of the company, and the supervisors as the standing supervisory organ; the purpose of this being to seek operational efficiency while avoiding the evils of monopolized power.
However, with today’s ever-larger corporations and constantly changing business climate, the idea that this sort of distributed authority system can still provide effective balance for the corporate leadership function is being challenged and questioned more every day. Perhaps the best warning has come from the string of incidents involving “landmine stock” companies that have rocked the corporate and financial communities in Taiwan since 1998. Looking at the overall explanation for why these publicly listed companies encountered financial crises, one sees that some crises were originally catalyzed by the external economic environment, but most originated in the shortcomings of individuals and their plans: the leadership of these companies sacrificed the interests of the shareholding public, creditors and other stakeholders, using their control over their companies’ funds, assets, manpower and other resources to divert them for their own personal profit, leading their companies into crisis and even impacting the entire financial system.
The Government has been aggressively addressing these problems and looking for solutions, and in 2001 major amendments to the Company Law were made. On the one hand, the reforms were towards greater openness and flexibility: out of respect for corporate self-governance, the prerogatives of boards were clearly laid out, the methods for electing directors and supervisors were made more flexible than before, and the qualifications for membership less restrictive. On the other hand, they were also aimed at making management more effective, moderately strengthening companies’ internal controls in order to prevent corporate officers from abusing their authority, once their prerogatives were liberalized, thereby harming the interests of shareholders and others stakeholders. For example, the law was revised or amended to provide rules for the certain dismissal of a director and time limits on the mandatory election of directors to fill vacant seats on the board; an amendment on provisional managers was added, and the threshold was lowered for legal action by shareholders’ representatives.
On October 4 2002, The Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation and the GreTai Securities Market (OTC) jointly established a code of practice for corporate governance; and on February 22 2002, Article 9 of “Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation Regulations for Review of Securities Listings” included for the first time rules providing for independent directors and supervisors, with the expectation that this would raise the quality of business operations.
However, if the question is how to achieve balance between effective management and greater flexibility/liberalization, one must truly recall the lessons learned from the scandals of the past and absorb the legislative experience of other countries, then chart a path towards further reforms in Taiwan’s corporate law system. Therefore, this thesis shall take as the object of research the major financial crises that have occurred since 1998 and those public companies that have generated a high degree of concern within the society. It will summarize the reasons why their financial crises happened, refer in detail to other countries’ legal systems, and investigate problem with the corporate internal control system in Taiwan. It will further propose directions for legal reform and suggestions for structuring corporate organizations as follows:
1.Increase checks and balances among directors:
a.Analyze and strictly limit transactions and crossholding of shares between related businesses;
b.Discard the rules in items 2 and 3, Article 27 of the Company law;
c.Discard system whereby one director may choose another as his/her representative at board meetings; and
d.Give careful consideration to introducing independent board member system across the board.
2.Strengthen the independence of supervisors:
a.Discard the rules in items 2 and 3, Article 27 of the Company Law;
b.Analyze the current system for electing supervisors; and
c.Give careful consideration to introducing independent supervisors system.
3.Improve the professional capabilities of supervisors:
a.Analyze and strictly limit transactions and crossholding of shares between related businesses;
b.Make the appointment of accountants to audit financial statements the responsibility of supervisors; and
c.Make it a mandatory requirement that supervisors pass a qualifying examination.
4.Introduce a shareholder proposal system to increase shareholders’ control authority.
5.Improve the shareholders’ representative(legal) action system to increase the control authority of minority shareholders.
6.Strengthen system for bringing accusations.
7.Rebuild business ethics. |
| Reference: | 壹、中文書籍
一、吳樂群、周行一、施敏雄、陳茵琦、簡淑芬合著，公司管控－董事及監察人如何執行職務，證券暨期貨市場發展基金會，民國九十年一月。
二、王惠光，公司法中代表訴訟制度的缺失與改進之道，商法專論，賴英照教授五十歲生日祝賀論文集，元照出版公司，民國八十四年七月初版。
三、柯芳枝，公司法論，三民書局股份有限公司，民國九十年三月四版四刷。
四、陸年青、許冀湯譯，現代股份公司與私有財產，台灣銀行經濟研究室編印，民國七十八年八月。
五、劉連煜，公司監控與公司社會責任，五南圖書出版有限公司，民國八十四年九月初版。
六、王文宇，美國金融機構之管理與監控—以董事會之職權與責任為中心，柯芳枝教授六至華誕祝賀論文集，三民書局股份有限公司，民國八十六年四月初版。
七、劉連煜，公司監控與公司社會責任，五南圖書出版有限公司，民國八十四年九月初版。
八、劉紹梁，從莊子到安隆－A+公司治理，天下雜誌出版，民國九十一年十一月。
九、賴源河，論股份有限公司董事之地位與性質，收錄於公司法問題研究（一），三民書局，民國七十一年出版。
十、賴源河，實用商事法精義，五南圖書出版有限公司，民國九十二年八月五版三刷。
十一、賴英照，證券交易法逐條釋義第三冊，作者自刊，民國八十五年八月七刷。
十二、賴源河、王仁宏、王泰銓、曾宛如、王文宇、余雪明、黃銘傑、林仁光、劉連煜、梁宇賢、林國全、王志誠、柯芳枝合著，新修正公司法解析，元照出版有限公司，民國九十一年十月二版二刷。
十三、施智謀，公司法，作者自版,民國七十九年。
十四、陳連順，公司法精義，作者自版，民國九十三年十月。
貳、中文期刊
一、賴源河，從法規鬆綁與公司監控論公司法之修正動向，月旦法學雜誌第八十期，民國九十一年一月。
二、曾宛如，我國有關公司治理之省思－以獨立董監事法制之改革為例，月旦法學雜誌第一○三期，民國九十二年十二月。
三、王文宇，從公司治理論董監事法制之改革，台灣本土法學雜誌，第三四期，民國九十一年五月。
四、王志誠，日本公司員工參與經營制度與外部監察人制度之選擇，證交資料第四三七期，民國八十七年九月。
五、林國全，監察人修正方向之檢討－以日本修法經驗為借鏡，月旦法學雜誌第三十七期，民國九十年六月。
六、王志誠，美國公司經營機關之改造與啟發—兼論我國引進外部董事制度之基本課題，證券暨期貨管理第十六期，民國八十七年十一月。
参、中文論文
一、謝佩君，交叉持股運作下論股份有限公司之內部監控與簽證會計師之民事責任，東海大學法律研究所碩士論文，民國八十八年六月。
二、趙德樞，股東提案制度之研究，國立政治大學法律研究所碩士論文，民國七十八年六月。
三、石青平，論公司之管控，東海大學法律學研究所碩士論文，民國九十一年七月。
四、蔡昇嘉，股份有限公司內部管控法律規範之研究，東吳大學法律學系碩士論文，民國九十二年八月。
五、秦作君，公司治理之法制研究－以內部監控機制為核心，國防大學國防管理學院法律學研究所碩士論文，民國九十二年六月。
六、陳肇鴻，由經濟觀點論董事之行為規範與責任制度，國立台灣大學法律學研究所碩士論文，民國八十九年六月。
七、朱日銓，論我國公司內部監控模式之改造，國立台北大學法學學系碩士論文，民國九十年六月。
八、林培杰，我國公司監控制度之研究，銘傳大學法律研究所碩士論文，民國九十年六月。
九、吳建頤，董事會規模對公司價值的影響，中正大學財務金融研究所碩士論文，民國八十八年五月，第十八頁。
十、謝天仁，論公開發行公司監察人之現況問題及改進芻議，國立中興大學法律學研究所碩士論文，民國八十二年六月。
十一、朱琇瑜，股份有限公司業務執行機關之研究，國立政治大學法律研究所學士後法學組碩士論文，民國九十一年七月。
肆、英文部分
一、Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002。
二、Model Business Corporation Act of 2002。
三、Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems，Mergers and the Theory of Firm,88Journal of Political Economy,一九八○。
四、Margaret M. Blair, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century, Brookings Institution,一九九五。
五、Adolf A.Berle & Gardiner C.Means，Modern Corporation and Private Property，New York，Harcourt，Brace&World，Inc.，一九六八。
六、Harold Demsetz,OWNERSHIP,CONTROL,AND THE FIRM：The Organization ofEconomic Activity,Basil Blackwell,一九八八。
伍、網路資料
一、http://www.judicial.gov.tw(司法院網站)
二、http://www.sfc.gov.tw/intro_index.htm（金融監督管理委員會證券期貨局全球資訊網）
三、http://www.sfipc.org.tw/(團法人證券投資人及期貨交易人保護中心網站)
四、http://www.houko.com(日本總務省行政管理局網站)
五、http://www.abanet.org/buslaw(美國律師協會網站) |
| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
法律學系碩士班學士後法學組
89651037
94 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0089651037 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [法律學系] 學位論文
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