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| Title: | 適用土地增值稅自用住宅用地優惠稅率次數限制之研究 |
| Authors: | 顏愛靜;林秋瑾 |
| Contributors: | 財政部
國立政治大學地政學系 |
| Keywords: | 土地增值稅優惠稅制;主要適用條件;稅收損失;租稅誘發效果;所得財富分配效果;雙軌制;自用住宅 |
| Date: | 2007 |
| Issue Date: | 2010-09-15 13:41:02 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 自陳總統於本（96）年度4月份提出售屋享受土地增值稅10％優惠稅率擬不限次數以及5月份行政院宣布財政部將研議放寬自用住宅用地優惠稅率不限一生一次之政策後，其所帶來的效益能否加以落實，並達成租稅公平合理的目標，實為社會大眾所關切的課題。針對放寬土地增值稅自用住宅用地優惠稅率次數限制的措施，本研究根據有限之資料，彙整學者專家意見、國外施行經驗，就放寬土地增值稅自用住宅用地優惠稅率主要適用條件，以五大要素（ 面積、持有期間、次數、適用單位、房屋間數）就其不同限制條件組合方案加以設算並比較分析，評估土地增值稅改革措施可能造成之影響，以便擬具因應措施。其所獲致之結果，分別以稅收損失、租稅誘發效果與所得財富分配效果之評估分析，摘述如下：一、賦稅優惠措施放寬適用次數等條件，稅收損失勢所難免但高下不同從不同的組合方案計算稅收損失之評估來看，最高可達272.54億元稅收損失，占民國95年全部土地增值稅稅收之35.24%。而不同組合方案中，最少也有6.37億元的稅收損失，占95年全部土地增值稅稅收之0.82%，稅收損失之影響地方財政收入甚巨。遴選較適方案，係考慮優惠方式之限定條件與主要適用條件較為周全者，亦即在固定自用住宅優惠稅率之下，選用最嚴格的適用單位、房屋間數、持有期間等條件之各組合方案加以比較，評估面積限制變動對於稅收損失的影響，由此發現在稅收損失上有大幅度的變化；另一個組合方案則是在沒有面積限制之下，至多使用七次換屋次數，藉以評估並比較其稅收損失，此亦顯示土地增值稅自用住宅優惠稅率適用面積上限的嚴格限制，對於稅收損失減少的助益最大。 二、賦稅優惠措施放寬所致稅收增加之租稅誘發效果盈不抵虧，高額稅收損失為必然之勢倘若放寬土地稅法第34條規定的限定條件，將促使土地所有權人更有意願出售土地或房屋，則延後出售的「閉鎖效果」將會因此緩解，從而使房地產交易量增加，而土地增值稅、財產交易所得稅、契稅等其他相關賦稅也會因而增加，如此將可達到政府欲刺激房地產交易、舊屋換新屋的政策期望，並呈現出因減稅措施而產生的租稅誘發效果。然而，若考慮該減稅措施所致的稅收損失金額，可知由此所產生的稅收增加額度，遠不及於稅收損失的額度，故知高額的稅收損失為必然之勢。適值稅制改革之際，必須慎思減低部分人民受惠卻讓全民買單的不利影響。三、所得財富分配效果分析顯示中產階級較能因稅負減免而獲益，稅制改革大致可符合滿足中產階級換屋需求之政策目的稅賦減免能使民眾減輕其負擔，可謂另一形式的所得增加。土地增值稅自用住宅優惠稅制欲鎖定的政策施行對象應為中產階級的換屋需求者，因此本研究採取稅收損失試算最大與最小額兩組合方案，以估計稅收損失將會使那個所得階級獲益最高。以換屋族群來觀察，可發現根據土地增值稅稅制改革試算方案所推估的之所得分配效果，大部分集中於使中產階級因稅負降低而受惠；如不計稅收平衡之效果，大多數中產階級獲益目的及所帶來的所得分配效益，與政策鎖定於滿足中下與中產階級的換屋需求的訴求，可謂沒有悖離政策欲達成的目標。惟縣市間的都市化程度差異是否會產生另一種拉開城鄉差距性的所得分配效果，值得注意。至於低所得者，因難以從放寬的優惠稅制獲益，政府理當提供長期低利購屋貸款或利息補貼，以照顧低收入者滿足其對之自用住宅的基本需求。四、基於稅收損失較小並降低改革成本，提具土地增值稅制改革之適用方案土地增值稅改革措施可能造成之影響，從稅收損失、租稅誘發效果與所得財富分配效果三方面加以評估，仍以稅收損失的效果影響最大。因此，對於土地增值稅改革之建議方案，除避免變動幅度過大引發過大的交易成本外，仍以稅收損失效果試算之組合方案，為土地增值稅自用住宅用地優惠稅制改革主要適用條件之考量。本研究認為，其優惠方式仍以土地增值稅稅率為百分之十，其要素中考慮『面積』的限制，但建議現行之都市3公畝或非都市7公畝面積限制宜縮減為都市1.5公畝或非都市3.5公畝面積；而主要適用條件要素限制中，建議加入土地持有達10年以上之『時間』、以本人與其配偶及未成年子女為適用單位之『人』，與持有一屋（間）之『物』等的限制。再者，本研究建議採用方案中所謂土地增值稅優惠稅率之「自用住宅用地」，係指土地所有權人或其配偶、未成年子女於該地辦竣戶籍登記達一年以上，且該所有權人持有期間達十年以上，而無出租或供營業用之住宅用地一處。另者，若考慮稅收損失較小、執行之便利及減緩制度改變的衝擊，土地增值稅自用住宅用地優惠稅率的適用，於過渡期間或可採用雙軌制，亦即採取一生一次之規定，之後若土地所有權人要適用放寬規定，就要依照之前所提及之建議方案。惟現行採取一生一次之相關規範亦有缺憾之處，故於施行相當期限，民眾皆已知悉並逐漸適應後，理當全面採用土地增值稅改革之新制，以達成稅制改革之目的。 During April to May 2007, President Chen Shui-bian and Cabinet plan to our nationals to enjoy a preferential land value increment tax (LVIT) rate of only 10 percent during their lifetime on earnings from sales of residential houses, instead of the existing practice of "just once for life." Aim to loosen this Preferential LVIT policy under the fair-effect Taxation, Whom-How-What benefits will be our nationals’ further interest topics. In this study, according to the data-limitation, our research collects the experience of national and academic professional opinion. The main restriction on eligibility alternatives combine with preferential land value increment tax (LVIT) rate and conditions on the five factors( residential land size, holding period, preferential times for life, units of eligibility household, and number of residence house). We evaluate the alternation-effects by three approaches. One approach views the shrinkage of tax revenue, one is taxation lock-out effect, and the other examines income allocation effect. We gather together our findings as follows: I. The preferential taxation alternations will cause the revenue loss, the loss figures are different in alternatives. The alternative revenue loss maximum can reach to 27,254,000,000 Taiwan dollars and it is 35.24% of total LVIT revenue in 2006. The alternative combination, at least also has the revenue loss of 637,000,000 Taiwan dollars, which is 0.82% of total LVIT revenue in 2006. These are huge influences for local government revenue. The more restrictions are launched, the less loss of revenue is gain. We compare the smaller residential land size restriction to the alternative increase the preferential times for life. The final findings are the smaller land size benefit more in Taxation revenue. II. The taxation lock-out effect gains less than the loss of revenue. It is obviously high-loss revenue is existence in preferential land value increment tax policy. The origin land tax law of rule 34, the existing preferential practice of "just once for life, is result in lock-in effect on the choice of house transaction lag. The preferential LVIT rate in lifetime policy will increase the house buy-sale. The Buy-sale actions bring the relative taxation revenue. The house-exchange households increase the market trade amount. The preferential-tax policy, lock-out effect, accelerates the exchange-house market. However, the gain is less than the loss. The high revenue loss need be revalued; we do not want the benefits are favor on part of nations but loss on our alls. III. The preferential land value increment tax policy is result in income allocation effect on the middle class exchange-house households. The reform of the taxation mostly can satisfy the policy object of exchange-house demand on the middle-income family. The most of middle class exchange-house households win from the preferential land value increment tax policy. The tax-cut shrinks the revenue, but it adds the income to middle class. In our study we have max-min loss revenue alternatives come out the beneficent on the middles. The urban- rural effect may enlarge the gap of income distribution. The reform of the taxation mostly can satisfy the policy object of exchange-house demand on the middle-income family. However, the lower-income family can not gather any preference advantage, they need more subside policy for their own-house or rental-home. IV. The preferential taxation alternatives gain the revenue loss; we propose the better alternatives to alleviate the loss of revenue. The loss of revenue becomes the more pressure on the reform of preferential land value increment tax policy. We propose the better alternatives to alleviate the loss of revenue; the preferential taxation alternative is as follows: A preferential land value increment tax (LVIT) rate is keep on 10 percent, residential land size trims down to 45 pings (one ping= 36 square feet), against the corresponding space of 105 pings for houses in non-urban areas; holding period is 10-year period; preferential times for their lifetime; units of eligibility household are owner itself or owner-spouse and their under-20-aged kids; number of residence house is limit on one. The preferential residential apply on the residences have no rent or other non-dweller action during the recently one-year. We also suggest the double-track system to ease the crash from the new-reform shock during the old-to-new revolution. There still keep the first time once for life preference LVIT rate; however the next house-exchange owner need follow the new reform. Finally we can reach the goal to enjoy new- preferential taxation system of Land Value Increment Tax. |
| Relation: | 96mof007
研究期間: 9607~9609 |
| Data Type: | report |
| Appears in Collections: | [地政學系] 研究報告
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