English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 27 |  Items with full text/Total items : 95906/126496 (76%)
Visitors : 31696463      Online Users : 503
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version
    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 期刊論文 >  Item 140.119/46161
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/46161

    Title: The Effect of Dismissal Threat on Auditor Independence
    Other Titles: 更換威脅對會計師獨立性之影響
    Authors: 張文瀞;周玲臺;林修葳
    Chang, Wen-Ching;Chou, Lynette Ling-Tai;Lin, William Hsiou-Wei
    Contributors: 會計系
    Keywords: 更換威脅;更換會計師;審計意見;會計師獨立性;Dismissal threat;Auditor switch;Audit opinion;Auditor independence
    Date: 2005.10
    Issue Date: 2010-10-06 11:28:38 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: This study investigates whether the dismissal threat posed by the client jeopardizes auditor independence, where auditor independence is surrogated by the auditor's propensity to issue a going concern opinion on a financially distressed client. We use an auditor switch model to predict the unobserved switches clients would have made had they received an opposite audit opinion, and then measure the unobserved switch probability as a proxy for the dismissal threat. This study identifies two types of strategic response that may result from dismissal threats. One type is the client's coercing the auditor to issue a clean instead of a going-concern opinion. The other type of dismissal threat is that posed by clients who request a shared opinion (involving other auditors) in lieu of a going concern opinion. We argue that whether auditors surrender their independence to these two dismissal threats depends heavily on the professional responsibility and potential future failure costs. The results show that the probability of a financially distressed company's receiving a going concern opinion increases with the likelihood of dismissal to coerce clean opinions. However, the probability of a financially distressed company's receiving a going concern opinion decreases with the likelihood of dismissal to coerce shared opinions. The difference between these two inappropriate audit opinions lies mainly in perceived disutility. Hence, market-based incentives, such as loss of reputation and litigation costs, including the perceived probability of being sued, are essential to preserve auditor independence.
    Relation: 中華會計學刊, 6(1), 97-123
    Data Type: article
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系] 期刊論文

    Files in This Item:

    File Description SizeFormat
    97-123.pdf1284KbAdobe PDF736View/Open

    All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

    社群 sharing

    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback