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| Title: | 影響「市場彈性調整」之因素以及「市場彈性調整」對聯合貸款契約條件之影響 |
| Authors: | 洪培雅
Hung, Pei Ya |
| Contributors: | 張元晨
洪培雅
Hung, Pei Ya |
| Keywords: | 市場彈性調整 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| Issue Date: | 2011-09-29 16:47:44 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 隨著企業規模的擴張，大型投資案、跨國併購案等需要龐大的資金，單一銀行貸款已經無法滿足大型企業的需求，此外，銀行、金融機構如雨後春筍的誕生，銀行間殺價競爭的結果是利差下降，銀行獲利困難，銀行為求生存，紛紛興起聯合起來，提供客戶一次性滿足的服務，主貸銀行除了利息收入以外，還增加了手續費收入，參貸銀行可以參與大型公司貸款，與企業建立合作關係，增加知名度，在資金借貸雙方皆獲益的前提下，聯合貸款成為公司尋求資金的一個重要管道。
然而，聯貸案中的參貸銀行卻因為未曾與貸款公司保持長久的合作關係，而有資訊不對稱的情形，參貸銀行認知到這樣的風險，可能要求較高的利息作為補償，此結果與公司尋求聯合貸款的目的背道而馳，因此，聯合貸款案可能因此而失敗。
「市場彈性調整契約」的出現，有效的解決資訊不對稱的情形，銀行可以於未來借款時間，依公司風險調整借款利率，而公司願意簽訂「市場彈性調整契約」也給予市場一個正面的訊息，因此，「市場彈性調整契約」對於聯合貸款有顯著性的影響。
有鑑於此，本文藉由迴歸模型的實證分析，分析影響「市場彈性調整契約」的因素，並且以T檢定，檢視擁有「市場彈性調整契約」的貸款案與沒有擁有「市場彈性調整契約」的貸款案，在貸款契約上有什麼差異，以藉此了解「市場彈性調整契約」對於聯合貸款的影響。實證結果顯示，資訊不對稱的確會影響「市場彈性調整」且擁有「市場彈性調整」的貸款案，其貸款條件與沒有「市場彈性調整」貸款案相比，在統計上有顯著差異。
There are two reasons that syndicated loan market grows so fast in recent decades. The first one is when companies prepare to expand their business through investing other business or conduct merger and acquisition they will need a lot of capital. They are not willing to raise money through many bilateral loans, instead, they hope banks can provide one-stop shopping services so that companies can just negotiate with lead banks, but get enough money. The other reason is that for banks and institutional investors, their profits are squeezed because of too much competitors. Therefore, they are forced to join an alliance to stay survived. For lead bank, through syndicated loan, they can raise their profit by gaining another fee. For participant bank, they can get better reputation by joining syndicated loan.
However, generally, participant bank didn’t maintain long and intimate relationship with companies before joining syndicated loan. Thus, they tend to ask high risk premium for compensation of information asymmetry, which will raise the cost of capital for companies. “Market Flex” emerging in the loan market solve this problem efficiently. It makes lead banks with the right to adjust the loan contracts in the future period. Besides, if companies accept this contracts, the market will interpret that these companies expect themselves will perform better in the future.
We believe “Market Flex” causes have important impact on loan market. Thus, in this article, we attempt to figure out the factors resulting in “Market Flex” using regression model. Moreover, we are also interested in the difference of loan contract before and after the emergence of “Market Flex.” In this research, we use statistical tests to check this effect so that we will know more about the “Market Flex” effect on the loan market. The results show that “Information Asymmetry” indeed has impact on Market Flex and the difference in loan contract caused by Market Flex is significant statistically. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
財務管理研究所
98357007
99 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0098357007 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [財務管理學系] 學位論文
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