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    题名: 帕式化約論與初期佛教的人格同一性觀點之差異
    作者: 周大為
    贡献者: 耿晴
    周大為
    关键词: 人格同一性
    化約論
    非化約論
    業力同一性
    關係K
    日期: 2010
    上传时间: 2011-10-05 14:35:54 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本論文的內容摘要是，有一些西方學者認為初期佛教的人格同一性觀點與化約論是相近的，如帕費特、Mark Siderits等學者。然而也有一些學者認為兩者具有關鍵性的差異，如高恩斯(Gowans)、柯林斯(Collins)等學者。
    本論文的立場為後者，論文當中將介紹帕式化約論(Parfitian reductionism)的幾個主要的思想實驗，以及其在人格同一性觀點上的幾個特色。接著將介紹試圖將初期佛教的人格同一性觀點與帕式化約論人格同一性觀點作類比的立場，以及舉出兩者之間差異的立場。
    最後，本論文將指出依據前學者等所提出的佛教業力理論所要求的「業力同一性(Karmic identity」與「業力因果關係(Relation of Karma)」，使得佛教的人格同一性觀點避免了帕式化約論在人格同一性立場上所導致的不確定性與程度性等違反直覺之結果，因此兩者的人格同一性觀點確實有關鍵性的差異。此外，本論文也嘗試說明，在人格同一性的兩大取向—心理取向與生物取向所面臨的困難之下，在何種理由或情況下可能會讓我們選擇接受一種介於化約論與實體性自我的非化約論立場之間的「進一步事實」立場，如佛教的業力理論。
    參考文獻: 參考文獻
    1.佛教典籍
    ‧中文
    《大正新修大藏經》：(依冊數排列，大正藏簡稱T，其後數字表冊數)
    《長阿含經》 佛陀耶舍共竺佛念譯 (T01)
    《中阿含經》 瞿曇僧伽提婆譯 (T01)
    《雜阿含經》 求那跋陀羅譯 (T02)
    《增壹阿含經》 瞿曇僧伽提婆譯 (T02)
    《阿毘達磨俱舍論》 玄奘譯 (T29)
    《南傳彌蘭王問經》，巴宙譯。北京:中國社會科學出版社，1997.10。
    ‧英文
    The long discourses of the Buddha : a translation of the Dīgha Nikāya ; translated from the Pali by Maurice Walshe. Somerville, Mass. : Wisdom Publications, c1995.
    The middle length discourses of the Buddha : a new translation of the Majjhima Nikāya ; translated from the Pali ; original translation by Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli ; translation edited and revised by Bhikkhu Bodhi. Somerville, Mass. : Wisdom Publications in association with the Barre Center for Buddhist Studies, 2009.
    The connected discourses of the Buddha : a translation of the Saṃyutta Nikāya ; translated from the Pāli by Bhikkhu Bodhi. Boston, Mass. : Wisdom Publications, c2000.
    2.專書
    ‧西文參考書目
    Collins, Steven (1982). Selfless Persons: imagery and thought in Theravāda Buddhism. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.
    Gowans, Christopher W (2003). Philosophy of the Buddha. New York : Routledge.
    Kim, Jaegwon (1998). Mind in a Physical World. Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press.
    Kim, Jaegwon (2006). Philosophy of mind. 2nd ed. Boulder, Colo. :Westview Press.
    Hamilton, Sue (1996). Identity and experience : the constitution of the human being according to early Buddhism. Oxford [England] : Luzac Oriental.
    Hamilton, Sue (2000). Early Buddhism : a new approach : the I of the beholder. Richmond, Surrey [England] : Curzon.
    Harvey, Peter (2004). The Selfless Mind: Personality, Consciousness and Nirvāṇa in Early Buddhism . London ; New York : Curzon.
    Horst, Steven (2007). Beyond Reduction : Philosophy of Mind and Post-Reductionist Philosophy of Science. New York : Oxford University Press.
    Murphy, Nance & Warren S. Brown (2007). Did my neurons make me do it? : philosophical and neurobiological perspectives on moral responsibility and free will. Oxford [England] ; New York : Oxford University Press.
    Noonan, Harold(2003).Personal Identity. London ; New York : Routledge.
    Parfit, Derek (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    Siderits, Mark (2003). Personal identity and Buddhist philosophy : empty persons. Aldershot, England ; Burlinton, Vt. : Ashgate.
    Williams, Paul (1998). Altruism and reality : studies in the philosophy of the Bodhicaryāvatāra. Richmond, Surrey [England] : Curzon.
    Dancy, Jonathan (Ed.), (1997). Reading Parfit. Oxford, U.K. ; Malden, Mass. : Blackwell.
    3. 期刊論文
    ‧中文參考書目
    楊郁文(1994)。〈以四部阿含經為主綜論原始佛教之我與無我〉，《中華佛學學報》第2期:頁1-50。（修訂版）
    ‧西文參考書目
    Adams , Robert Merrihew (1989). "Should Ethics be More Impersonal? a Critical Notice of Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons" , The Philosophical Review, Vol. 98, No. 4 :pp. 439-484.
    Block, Ned (1997). "Anti-Reductionism Slaps Back". Noûs, Vol. 31, Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives, 11, Mind, Causation, and World : pp. 107-132.
    Bayne, Tim (2008). "The Unity of Consciousness and the Split-Brain Syndrome".The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 105(6), 277-300.
    Collins, Steven(1997). "A Buddhist Debate About the Self; and Remarks on Buddhism in the Work of Derek Parfit and Galen Strawson ". Journal of Indian Philosophy, Volume 25, Number 5, 467-493.
    Duerlinger, James (1993). “Reductionist and Noneductionist Theories of Persons in Indian Buddhist Philosophy”. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 21:79-101
    Ellis, Robert (2000). "Parfit and the buddha: Identity and identification in reasons and persons". Contemporary Buddhism: An Interdisciplinary Journal, Volume 1, Issue 1: Pages 91 – 106.
    Gamble, Ruth (2008) , “Review of Mark Siderits, Personal identity and Buddhist philosophy : empty persons,” SPHIA, Vol. 47, No. 1: pp. 83-86.
    Garrett, Brian (1991). "Personal Identity and Reductionism". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 51, No. 2 : pp. 361-373.
    Giles, James (1993). "The No-Self Theory: Hume, Buddhism, and Personal Identity." Philosophy East and West 43: 175-200.
    Gillett, Grant (1986). "Brain Bisection and Personal Identity". Mind, New Series, Vol. 95, No. 378:pp. 224-229.
    Johnston, Mark (1992). "Reasons and Reductionism" , The Philosophical Review, Vol. 101, No. 3: pp. 589-618
    Kapstein, Matthew (1986). " Collins, Parfit, and the problem of personal identity in two philosophical traditions—A review of Selfless Persons". Philosophy East and West, Vol. 36, No. 3 : pp. 289-298.
    Keown, Damien (1996). "Karma, Character, And Consequentialism". Journal of Religious Ethics: 24: 329-350.
    Melnyk, Andrew (1995). "Two Cheers for Reductionism: Or, the Dim Prospects for Non-Reductive Materialism ". Philosophy of Science, Vol. 62, No. 3 : pp. 370-388.
    Perrett, Roy (2002). " Personal Identity, Minimalism, and Madhyamaka",
    Philosophy East and West, Vol. 52, No. 3 : pp. 373-385.
    Puccetti, Roland (1993). "Mind with a Double Brain", The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 44, No.4:pp.675-691.
    Siderits, Mark (1997). "Buddhist Reductionism", Philosophy East and West, Vol. 47, No. 4: pp. 455-478.
    Siderits, Mark (2000). "Reply to Paul Williams", Philosophy East and West, Vol. 50, No. 3: pp. 453-459.
    Siderits, Mark (2001). "Buddhism and Techno-Physicalism: Is the Eightfold Path a Program? " , Philosophy East and West, Vol. 51, No. 3: pp. 307-314.
    Siderits, Mark (2008). "Paleo-Compatibilism and Buddhist Reductionism", SOPHIA No.47:pp.29–42.
    Stone, Jim (1988). "Parfit and the Buddha: Why There Are No People", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 48:519-532.
    Taylor, Richard (1969). "The Anattā Doctrine and Personal Identity", Philosophy East and West, Vol. 19, No. 4: pp. 359-366.
    Tillemans, Tom J. F. (1996). "What Would it Be Like to Be Selfless? Hīnayānist Versions, Mahāyānist Versions and Derek Parfit", Asiatische Studien, vol. 50, No. 4, pages 835-852.
    Williams , Paul (2000). "Response to Mark Siderits` Review" , Philosophy East and West, Vol. 50, No. 3, The Philosophy of Jainism: pp. 424-453.
    Witmer, D. Gene (2003). "Dupré`s Anti-Essentialist Objection to Reductionism".
    The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 211 : pp. 181-200.
    4. 專書論文
    Basu, Ananyo (1995). "Reducing Concern with Self". In Douglas Allen (Ed.), Culture and self : philosophical and religious perspectives, East and West. Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press.
    Collins, Steven(1994). "What Are Buddhists Doing When They Deny the Self? " In Frank E. Reynolds and David Tracy (Eds.), Religion and practical reason : new essays in the comparative philosophy of religions. Albany : State University of New York Press.
    Johnston, Mark (1997). "Human Concerns without Superlative Selves". In Jonathan Dancy (Ed.), Reading Parfit. Wiley-Blackwell.
    McDowell, John (1997). "Reductionism and the First Person". Jonathan Dancy (Ed.), In Reading Parfit. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Shoemaker, Sydney (1997). "Parfit on Identity". Jonathan Dancy (Ed.), In Reading Parfit. Wiley-Blackwell.
    5. 學位論文
    ‧英文
    Farrington, Roger (2007). The Identity Problem in Buddhist Ethics—An Examination of Buddhist and Parfitian Conceptions of the Subject. Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Birkbeck College, University of London.
    ‧中文
    凃均翰(2009)。《佛教對個人同一性與自我觀念之批判—以《雜阿含經》為主要依據》，台北：國立台灣大學哲學研究所碩士論文。
    劉姵君(2008)。《從帕費特論初期佛教無我思想》，台北:國立政治大學哲學研究所碩士論文。
    6. 翻譯文獻
    佐佐木現順著(2003)。《業的思想》，周柔含譯。台北：東大圖書。
    舟橋一哉著(1988)。《業的研究》，余萬居譯。台北：法爾出版社。
    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    哲學研究所
    97154002
    99
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0097154002
    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[哲學系] 學位論文

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