| Abstract: | 柏林（Isaiah Berlin）是公認二十世紀最偉大的政治思想家之一，當代西方的自由主義者與多元文化主義者，無人不受其價值多元論（value-pluralism）的影響。然而，直到九十年代初才有葛雷（John Gray）為柏林的政治思想作出系統的整理，並且從價值多元論得出一條理路，作為批判主導了西方政治哲學二十年的羅爾斯（John Rawls）自由主義之邏輯依據。價值多元論於今已發展成與羅爾斯陣營分庭抗禮的一支顯學，而葛雷對柏林政治思想的權威性詮釋，留給人們一個印象，即價值多元論在本質上排斥一切立基於特定價值的政治理論，包括正義論。本研究計劃擬從揭露柏林史學方法論內的「歷史正義」概念開始，還原隱藏於價值多元式的文化交往正義觀，進而推展出一套價值多元式國際正義理論，並將之應用於戰爭、恐怖主義與人到干預等政治議題之上，建構一個具有政策導向的政治倫理學理論。此一獨特的價值多元式正義論與羅爾斯的正義論有本質上的差異，雖然比葛雷現在所提倡的暫定協議式自由主義（modus vivendi liberalism）更強調共識，但也不同於哈伯馬斯（Jürgen Habermas）著重於溝通理性的對話倫理學。它是一個直面人類多元處境，兼顧政治現實與理想，重於同情理解與跨文化對話的國際正義理論。
Isaiah Berlin is widely recognised as one of the greatest political thinkers in the twentieth century, and few contemporary political theorists, liberals and communitarians alike, have not been influenced by his doctrine of value-pluralism. However, until John Gray assembled his political ideas in the early 90s into a systematic theory from which he managed to derive a powerful argument to challenge Rawls’s theory of justice which had then dominated for two decades in the field of political philosophy, no one attempted to reformulate Berlin’s thought into a coherent system. Today value-pluralism has become a school of thought in its own right, or in opposition to the Rawlsian paradigm, and Gray’s interpretation of Berlin remains most authoritative and has left us an indelible impression that value-pluralism is essentially incompatible with any theory grounded upon a single value, including a theory of justice. However, the task of this research project intends to construct a value-pluralistic theory of international justice, by way of reading Berlin’s value-pluralism together with the ‘empathetic’method he prescribed for historians of ideas –which in effect harbours a conception of justice, or at least an idea of what counts ‘historical injustice.’This theory of international justice is meant to be a policyoriented theory of political morality, that is to say, to be able to tackle practical issues related to war, terrorism and humanitarian intervention. This value-pluralistic theory of international justice is unique in that, one the one hand, it goes against Rawls’s theory of justice in a fundamental way and, on the other, it recognises, more than Gray does in his formulation of what is now known as modus vivendi liberalism, the significance of consensus yet differs greatly from the discourse ethics, advocated by Habermas, which is grounded on a theory of communicative rationality that emphasises consensus. It is a theory of justice which directly confronts the actual human condition of value diversity and calls for cross-cultural dialogue and empathetic understanding –hence idealistic yet realistic. |
