| 摘要: | 隨著全球化的盛行，資本在國際間的移動變得更為容易。資本的移動性增加將導致國際間租稅競爭(tax competition)的情形更為嚴重。因此不少國際組織，如OECD便積極推動國際間的租稅調和(tax harmonization)，以避免租稅競爭的發生。然而當不同國家的資本稅因租稅協定而趨於一致時，各國政府仍有誘因利用其他政策，如寬鬆的環境管制，達到吸引資本流入之目的。職是之故，國際組織在推動租稅調和時，若未能考慮環境政策的反應，恐將造成錯誤的決策。本研究第一年計畫之目的即在探討，當各國無法在環境政策上合作時，能使締約國福利極大的租稅協定應具何種性質。鑑於利益團體在環境政策制定過程中經常扮演重要的角色，本研究將加入利益團體的影響力。國際組織推動租稅協定時，便須矯正利益團體在環境政策上所造成的扭曲。由此觀之，本研究乃是「次佳理論」(second-best theory) 的應用; 亦即當環境政策受到利益團體的扭曲時，租稅協定應如何決定方能極大化締約國之福利。全球化另一個引人矚目的面向為自由貿易的盛行。自由貿易的盛行限制了許多傳統貿易政策(如關稅、出口補貼)的使用，導致各國政府轉而利用其他政策以保護國內產業或是鼓勵出口。例如，利用較寬鬆的環境政策以進行變相的出口補貼，致使「生態傾銷」(ecological dumping)的發生。與前述相同，若國際組織如WTO在推動自由貿易時，未能考慮國內環境政策的反應，亦將導致錯誤的決策。因此，本研究的第二年計畫將探討，在國內環境政策受利益團體影響的情況下，國際間的關稅協定或是限製出口補貼之協定應如何制定，方能極大化締約國之福利。本研究的結果或可作為國際組織在推動租稅協定或是自由貿易協定時之效率標準，用以判斷實際的國際協定是否有效率。此外，我國亟思與其他國家簽訂租稅協定與自由貿易協定，本研究之結果亦可供政府單位在簽約時參考之用。
Globalization has led to a higher mobility of capital, which in turn results in the more intensive capital tax competition among countries. In order to avoid harmful tax competition, international organizations such as OECD have been proposing international tax harmonization. However, although the capital taxes have been harmonized, countries still have incentive to attract capital inflow by adopting other policy instruments such as lax environmental regulations. Thus, when the international organizations propose the international tax agreements, there may emerge the inadequate policy-making, if the endogenous response of the domestic environmental regulation fails to take into consideration. The purpose of this project (the part of the first year) is to investigate the international tax agreement, which will maximize the joint welfare of the signatories, provided that the signatories are unable to coordinate in their environmental policies. Due to the significant role played by interest groups in the process of environmental policy making, this present project will also consider the influence of the interest groups. When proposing the capital tax agreement, the international organizations should correct (at least partially) the distortion in the environmental policies due to political power. Generically, this project is an application of the second-best theory; we investigate the properties of the second-best capital tax agreement, when the environmental policies are distorted. Globalization also leads to the prevalence of free trade, which in turns restricts the use of some traditional trade policy instruments such as tariffs and export subsidies. As a result, governments turn to use other policies to protect domestic industries or to prompt exports. For example, lax environmental regulations can serve as the instrument of prompting exports, thereby giving rise to the 「ecological dumping.」 As indicated above, when making the trade agreements, failing to consider the endogenous response of domestic environmental regulations will result in inappropriate decisions. Thus, the second year plan of this project intends to investigate the second-best trade agreements, which will maximize the social welfare of the signatories, when the domestic environmental policies are distorted by the interest groups. The results of this project can be used to evaluate the efficiency of the international agreements actually made |
