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Title:	Experience outruns empirical belief but remains conceptual
Authors:	林從一
Contributors:	政大哲學系
Date:	2009-10
Issue Date:	2012-08-21 15:22:42 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	According to McDowell, a germane conception of experience should accommodate the following two commonsensical views. The first is an empiricistic conviction that as we relate our empirical judgments to their credentials, experience, though fallible, is what our moves ultimately rest on. Let‟s call this the justification feature of experience. The second is a point of intentionality and objectivity: our empirical judgments are about things in the external world, a world ranged beyond our thinking activity. Let‟s name the point the intentionality feature of empirical thinking.1 In Mind and World (MW) and elsewhere, McDowell endorses a way of seeing experience, which, he holds, is that only way that suffices to accommodate the two commonsensical views. In McDowell‟s words, this way of seeing experience “enables us to acknowledge that independent reality exerts a rational control over our thinking”, (MW: 27) and “secures that we can see observational judgments as rationally responsive to the states of affairs they judge to obtain.” (EW: 15) The focus of such a perspective is to the idea that whatever manifested in and through experience is constitutively, though passively, involved with conceptual capacities, which are to be identified with the faculty of concepts exercised in self-critical activity of making up one‟s own mind.
Relation:	科學、文化、生命--2009 年度學術研討會, 台灣哲學學會
Data Type:	conference
Appears in Collections:	[Department of Philosophy] Proceedings

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