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    题名: 比較孟子與荀子的「性善說」
    A Comparism on Mencius` and Hsün-tze`s Views of Hsing-shang-Shuo
    作者: 何淑靜
    Ho, Shu-Ching
    贡献者: 政大哲學系
    关键词: 孟子;荀子;性善說;性善之性;性惡善偽;性;成善能力;內在本有;主謂式／重言式分析關係;經驗之實然;自然之性;道德之性;超驗之無限的創造性
    Mencius;Hsün Tze;Hsing-Shang Shuo;Hsing-Shang che Hsing;Hsing-O Shang Wei;Hsing;the good ability;originally innate;originally Innate/subject-predicate analytical relationship;empirical fact;natural nature;moral nature;transcendental and infinite creativity
    日期: 2009-12
    上传时间: 2012-08-23 14:44:10 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 一般都忽略了荀子有他自己對「性善」的了解與看法。本文主要就依據孟子與荀子自己的了解與觀點來比較他們對「性善說」的看法。結論是：(1)兩人都認為「性善」表示「性」與「成善能力」的能力為「分析關係」的「不離」，即為人所「內在本有」。但，(2)孟子之了解是兩者為（嚴格意義之）「重言式的分析關係」，荀子則為「主謂式的分析關係」。(3)關於「內在本有」，在荀子為「生而有」的，乃自然之順取進路之所了解的；在孟子則不是。孟子取道德之送取方式了解人之所以可能做道德實踐之根據乃內在於人且為人本有。(4)因之，對孟子，性善」之「性」為「道德之性」，對荀子則為「自然之性」。(5)依孟子的了解，此性為「超驗而無限的道德創造性」；對荀子則只為經驗實然之自然之性。最後，(6)依荀子，「性善說」不可能成立；孟子則主張「性善說」。
    This study is purposed to compare Mencius` and Hsün Tze`s views on Hsing-Shang (the goodness of human nature), by tying up with their own understandings-in the case that scholars generally neglect the fact that Hsün Tze has his own understanding and view on Hsing-Shang. And the conclusion turns out to be: (1) For both Mencius and Hsün Tze. Hsing-Shang indicates that the relationship between human nature and the ability enable one to have good action is inseparably, i.e. analytical relation. But, (2) for Mencius, it is in the form of subject-predicate, while for Hsün Tze in tautological form. (3) As to the nature in Hsing-Shang Shuo, Mencius takes to be what one originally and internally has, i.e. not what one is endowed by nature, whereas for Hsün Tze one has it while one is born. (4) The nature, for Mencius. is the Four Beginnings, which is essential to be moral. while, in Hsün Tze`s view, it is a natural ability, essential to he natural. (5) In Mencius` view, the nature is the creativity of morals. transcendental and infinite, but it is impossible to be so in Hsün Tze`s understanding: it is just an empirically nature. (6) In Hsün Tze`s theoretical system, there is no room for Hsing-Shang Shuo. and so the relationship between the nature and the good ability is empirically synthetic, but Mencius takes Hsing-Shang Shuo to be valid.
    關聯: 鵝湖學誌, 43, 1-36
    数据类型: article
    显示于类别:[哲學系] 期刊論文

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