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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/54544
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/54544


    Title: 財務績效與裁量性紅利關聯性之研究
    On the association between financial performance and discretionary bonus
    Authors: 顏佩珊
    Contributors: 梁嘉紋
    顏佩珊
    Keywords: 裁量性紅利
    主觀績效衡量指標
    財務績效
    Discretionary Bonus
    Subjective Performance
    Financial Performance
    Date: 2011
    Issue Date: 2012-10-30 11:19:25 (UTC+8)
    Abstract:   本研究主要探討裁量性紅利對企業未來財務績效之激勵效果,而本研究係以2010年美國S&P500公司作為研究對象,研究期間為2006年至2010年。實證結果顯示:(1)依據主觀績效衡量所發放的裁量性紅利確實可以對企業未來財務績效產生激勵效果;(2)獎酬契約運用主觀與客觀績效衡量時,主觀績效衡量所發放的裁量性紅利佔總紅利比重愈高,對於企業未來財務績效激勵效果愈高;(3)裁量性紅利對於企業未來後續財務績效具有長期激勵效果;(4)績效較低之企業發予高階經理人主觀績效衡量之裁量性紅利,對於企業未來財務績效仍具有激勵效果。
    The study investigate the impact of discretionary bonus on the future firm financial performance. Based on a sample of 2010 S&P500 companies spanning from 2006 and 2010. I find : (1) Discretionary bonus, which was measured subjectively, can improve future firm financial performance. (2) The more proportion of discretionary bonus to total bonus can improve more future firm financial performance. (3) Discretionary bonus can improve the long-term future firm financial performance. (4) Using subjectively discretionary bonus to CEOs on low-profit-company can improve the future firm financial performance.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計研究所
    99353050
    100
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0099353050
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系] 學位論文

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